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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of two main parts with different themes that are analysed in two pa-
pers, respectively. The first part consists of theoretical analyses of topics in the area of energy
and climate economics. Climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions is one of the great-
est (economic) challenges of our time. Limiting global warming requires an understanding of
the interaction between economic activity, energy use, emissions, and energy-saving/clean tech-
nologies. In particular, knowing the underlying market failures that prevent the first-best out-
come is a prerequisite for designing and implementing effective and efficient policy instruments.
The paper “Climate Policy with the Chequebook – An Economic Analysis of Climate Invest-
ment Support” (Chapter 2), co-authored with Ulf Moslener, identifies and characterises main
market failures related to climate mitigation investments, in particular clean energy, and dis-
cusses recent trends in international climate policy, which seems to have shifted from debating
emission targets towards financing commitments. This paper first characterises investment sup-
port instruments, such as grants, concessional loans, and guarantees, that are increasingly being
used in national and international climate policy to promote clean energy investments. In order
to assess these instruments, we then turn to investigation clean energy investments and stress
the role of capital market imperfections, in addition to the typically analysed market failures,
i.e. emission externalities and innovation spillovers. We analyse their negative impacts on the
risk-return characteristics of these investments. While investment support instruments are able
to address negative impacts of these market failures, they are not always the first-best solu-
tion. Such instruments can effectively compensate capital market imperfections and innovation
spillovers if designed appropriately. However, we argue that financial instruments are in gen-
eral inferior to marked-based instruments in compensating for emission externalities and thus
should only be used if an emission price is (politically) not feasible. Based on our analysis,
the paper provides policy recommendations on the choice of finance instruments to address the
identified market failures as well as guidance on how to use these instruments in order to reduce
the risk of inefficient public spending.
The second paper “Directed Technical Change and Energy Intensity Dynamics: Structural
Change vs. Energy Efficiency” (Chapter 3), co-authored with Christian Haas, investigates an-
other promising way to reduce emissions and thus meet climate policy targets: reducing the en-
ergy used to produce a certain level of output, i.e. decreasing energy intensity in the economy.
This paper investigates two core drivers of energy intensity reductions: the adoption of more ef-
ficient production technologies and the adjustments of the structural composition of economic
activity. The contribution of both driving forces to energy intensity reductions substantially dif-
fers across economies. Using a model with directed technical change, this paper provides new
insights on the effects of energy price growth and endogenous technical change on energy inten-
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sity developments. We decompose changes in aggregate energy intensity into structural changes
in the economy (structural effect) and within-sector energy efficiency improvements (efficiency
effect). We find that both sectoral productivities that drive the direction of technical change and
energy price growth determine the direction and magnitude of both effects. The efficiency effect
dominates the development of energy intensity in economies, where research is directed to the
energy-intensive sector. When research is directed to the labour-intensive sector, the structural
effect is the main driver of energy intensity dynamics. In both cases, increasing energy prices
cause reductions in energy intensity by inducing a substitution of energy by other factors of
production. Energy price shocks might induce a permanent redirection of innovation activities.
In order to illustrate the results and to cross-check our findings with empirical decomposition
studies, we calibrate the model to empirical data. Our simulation results for 26 OECD countries
are largely consistent with the empirical evidence.
The second part of this doctoral thesis addresses labour market issues that are empirically
analysed based on professional sports data. Professional sports provides a unique laboratory for
labour market research. One advantage is the detailed and accurate information on attributes,
performance, and earnings of individuals. Furthermore, individuals’ actions within sports con-
tests are observable and well documented, which offers a unique setting to study behaviour.
The paper “Misconduct and Leader Behaviour in Contests – New Evidence from European
Football” (Chapter 4), co-authored with Hannes Rusch, provides an empirical investigation of
severe misconducts in contests. Misconduct is either illegal or immoral behaviour and thus com-
mitted covertly in many economic contests. Professional sports offers the opportunity to inves-
tigate such behaviour, as destructive actions against the opponent can be observed openly and
rather reliably. Using data from European football championships, we extend previous literature
by differentiating between two types of misconduct both resulting in a yellow card, namely dis-
sents against the authority in charge of the interpretation and enforcement of the contest’s rules,
i.e. the referee, and other misconducts aimed at the opposing team directly, i.e. fouls. For other
misconducts we find that teams with lower ability are more likely to commit sabotage in order
to compensate for their disadvantage. Sabotage is also more likely when the outcome of the con-
test is still open. In contrast to sabotage, dissent with the referee is affected by the current score
of the match. The more unfavourable the score is, the more likely is dissent with the referee.
This finding could indicate self-serving (or team-serving) attribution. Another new perspective
we introduce is the differentiation between misconducts committed by team captains and other
players. Our findings indicate that captains challenge referees’ decisions in direct reaction to
sanctions awarded to teammates. Furthermore, they engage in more misconduct during impor-
tant matches, while retaliative foul plays cannot be observed for captains. Finally, our analyses
indicate that all types of misconduct have a negative effect on the likelihood of team success. As
we find that (severe) punishment seems to deter misconducts, it could be a possible measure to
prevent or at least reduce illegal behaviour in contests. This measure is also applicable to other
contests (e.g. within firms) as long as punishment can be observed by other team members.
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Finally, the paper “Generalists vs. Specialists: Skill Variety and Remuneration in Football”
(Chapter 5) uses professional sports data from the German Bundesliga to analyse the returns
on skill variety and extends the existing literature on the remuneration of generalists versus
specialists. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first contribution that measures skill special-
isation based on the concept of task-specific human capital. The main idea is that task-specific
human capital is accumulated on the job through learning-by-doing. The basic idea is as fol-
lows. The more an employee focuses on one or very few tasks, the higher is his specific human
capital and thus productivity in that task(s), i.e. he is a specialist. An individual, who has per-
formed a larger variety of different tasks, but each of them less often than the aforementioned
specialist (given the same level of work experience), would have a more versatile task-specific
skill set and thus could be referred to as a generalist. A specific advantage of football data for
analysing this issue is that it allows for a precise measurement of specialisation of players in
certain skills/tasks. In football, there are three main field positions – defender, midfielder, and
forward – that I refer to different occupations in a football team (firm). These can be further
subdivided into twelve tactical (sub-)positions1, which could be interpreted as specific tasks
in team production. To measure whether a player is rather a specialist or a generalist, I con-
struct three measures of skill specialisation. The empirical findings indicate that returns to skill
specialisation are occupation-specific: defenders and forwards receive a return on skill special-
isation, while midfielders neither benefit from specialisation nor receive any premium for being
generalists. An explanation might be that defenders and forwards have more specialised tasks in
football compared to midfielders. While the latter are almost equally engaged in offensive and
defensive plays, the former two groups mainly perform defensive or offensive tasks. Hence, it is
not surprising that forwards and defenders earn a premium as specialists. In the general labour
market context, these findings indicate that specialisation seems to be a more beneficial strategy
for employees. Particularly in occupations characterised by a specific and narrow set of tasks,
there are salary premiums on specialisation, while there is no effect of skill versatility even in
occupations involving a wider range of tasks.
All four papers are separate works and presented as such. As the first two papers are already
published, they are included in the layout of the respective journals. The third and fourth paper
are unpublished working papers.
1These positions are Left-, right-, and centre-back; left-, right-, defensive-, central-, and attacking midfield; left-,
right wing, secondary striker, and central forward.
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Chapter 2
Climate Policy with the Chequebook – An Economic
Analysis of Climate Investment Support
Reference for this Paper:
Kempa, Karol and Ulf Moslener (2017), “Climate Policy with the Chequebook – An Economic
Analysis of Climate Investment Support”, Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy 6(1),
111-129. DOI: 10.5547/2160-5890.6.1.kkem.
Conferences with Review Process:
12th European Conference of the International Associations for Energy Economics, Venice,
2012 (presentation by Ulf Moslener).
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Climate policy with the chequebook—
An economic analysis of climate investment
support
Karol Kempaa,b and Ulf Moslenera
abstract
Across the globe, climate policy is increasingly using investment support instru-
ments, such as grants, concessional loans, and guarantees—whereas carbon prices
are losing importance. This development substantially increases the risk of inefﬁ-
cient public spending. In this paper, we examine the ability of ﬁnance instruments
to effectively and efﬁciently address market failures related to clean energy invest-
ments. We characterise these market imperfections—emission externalities, knowl-
edge spillovers and capital market imperfections—and identify their negative im-
pacts on the investor-relevant risk-return characteristics. We argue that ﬁnance
instruments are able to address the effects of these market failures. However, a
carbon price is superior in internalising the emission externalities. With respect to
the latter two inefﬁciencies, investment support instruments can effectively com-
pensate the market failures if designed appropriately. We further provide policy
recommendations on the choice of ﬁnance instruments to address the various mar-
ket failures and guidance on how to use these instruments avoiding inefﬁcient
government spending.
Keywords: climate ﬁnance, investment support, market failures, policy
instruments
https://doi.org/10.5547/2160-5890.6.1.kkem
f 1. INTRODUCTION—IS CLIMATE POLICY STILL ON TRACK? g
Over the past few years, climate related policy intervention has witnessed a stark increase in
the use of government subsidised financing. The corresponding instruments are neither di-
rectly tied to the emissions abated nor do they make carbon emissions more costly, but rather
decrease the financing costs of certain projects and thereby increase the attractiveness of the
corresponding investment. Essentially, the government moves away from its role as regulator
determining the market rules and tackling externalities at their origin by introducing prices
through carbon taxes or permit trading schemes. Governments take on the role of an actor
on financial markets by providing financing to specific projects or programmes, often through
their public finance institutions.
Environmental regulation and in particular climate policy have been through a dynamic
history. Traditional command and control instruments dominated early policies characterised
by government-defined technological standards such as “best available technologies” or direct
a FS-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate and Sustainable Energy Finance, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management,
Sonnemannstrasse 9-11, 60314 Frankfurt, Germany. Corresponding author: Karol Kempa, E-mail: K.Kempa@fs.de.
b Department of Economics, Justus Liebig University Giessen.
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input or output controls (Harrington and Morgenstern, 2007). The economic literature fol-
lowing the work of Pigou (1920) powerfully demonstrated the superiority of market-based
instruments—at least in terms of their ability to implement a given level of emissions at least
cost.1 One key issue is the decentralised nature of those market-based instruments that allows
for cost efficient implementation without requiring detailed knowledge at the government
level of technologies and individual firms’ abatement cost structures. Rather than giving ex-
plicit directives on pollution levels, market-based instruments provide incentives throughmar-
ket signals to encourage the behaviour. These instruments—if designed and applied appro-
priately—realise a desired level of pollution abatement at least cost to society (Baumol and
Oates, 1988; Montgomery, 1972; Tietenberg, 1995). The price signal induces an equalisation
of marginal abatement costs across firms such that the pollution abatement burden is allocated
efficiently among polluters, where firms with the lowest abatement cost will be the first to
abate. Furthermore, market-based instruments perform better in terms of incentivising the
development of new technologies which has led to a rapid increase in the use of these instru-
ments since the 1970s across OECD countries (Hahn and Stavins, 1992; Jaffe and Stavins,
1995; Stavins, 2003; OECD, 1999). The most prominent economic instruments in climate
policy are the CO2 emissions trading scheme introduced by the European Union (EU) and
the state-level emissions trading foreseen in the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change in 2005 or 2009, respectively. Other policy schemes
were introduced in parallel that mainly target the promotion of renewable energy (Menanteau
et al., 2003).
In very recent years the trend of increased climate related government investment subsidy
appeared, mainly through grants, interest subsidised loans or (less often) guarantees. Even the
use of more complex so-called structured investment vehicles can be observed.2 The EU
recently set regulations on the use of financial instruments of various European funds for,
among other goals, reducing pollution.3 The International Development Finance Club
(IDFC)—consisting of 20 national development banks operating nationally and internation-
ally, inside and outside the OECD—reports total green financing by 18 reporting institutions
of USD 99 billion in 2013 (Khosla et al., 2014). Multilateral Development Banks—not
included in the figures above—report USD 28 billion of climate finance in 2014 compared
to USD 27 billion in 2011 (World Bank, 2015). In addition to these financial institutions,
22 multilateral and 6 bilateral funds are dedicated to financing climate related investments.4
According to the IEA/IRENA Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures database,
currently 208 support policies (subsidy and loan programmes) for renewable energy are in
force worldwide.5
Consistent with this development, the international climate policy debate drifted from
“emission targets” towards “financing commitments.” A major element of the United Nations
(UN) climate process is the promise of the industrialised countries to mobilise climate fi-
nancing of USD 100 billion per year from 2020 on, to finance mitigation and adaptation in
1. See Sumner, Bird, and Dobos (2011) for a review of carbon tax policies.
2. An example is the Global Climate Partnership Fund, structured similarly to a credit default obligation (CDO) where the
riskiest tranche is held by the government and serves as a risk buffer to attract private investment for the less risky tranches.
3. See EU Regulations No 1303/2013 and No 480/2014 as well as the Commission Implementing Regulation No 821/2014.
4. See Climate Funds Update, available at http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/ (last accessed 22 March, 2016).
5. The database is available at http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/renewableenergy/ (last accessed 22 March, 2016).
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developing countries (UNFCCC, 2012) and the establishment of the UN Green Climate
Fund (GCF) by the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Durban (2011).
Thus, policy seems to move away from the explicit internalisation of externalities, it
requires technology-specific information to formulate the investment subsidy programmes,
and, by subsidising individual projects, it moves away from a decentralised approach. Con-
siderations from a political economy perspective might explain parts of this trend. For a policy
maker it is more attractive to offer support for climate friendly investments than to introduce
additional costs for established conventional technologies (Bowen, 2011; Green and Yatchew,
2012). Green and Yatchew (2012) provide an economic analysis of support schemes focusing
on the difference between programmes focusing on prices, e.g. feed-in tariffs, and quantities,
e.g. renewable portfolio standards. We complement this work by examining to what extent
these instruments can efficiently correct market failures caused by the emission externality,
innovation spillovers, and capital market failures as well as providing guidance on how to use
them appropriately. We argue that finance instruments are in general inferior to economic
instruments in compensating for environmental externalities. However, these instruments
seem suitable to effectively address knowledge spillovers and, in particular, capital market
failures. Both aspects can be expected to be increasingly relevant as the world is trying to
speed-up the structural change towards a low carbon economy as decided in the Paris Agree-
ment under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.6
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following Section 2 presents
three major instruments for investment support (grants, interest subsidised loans, and guar-
antees). In Section 3, we characterise three main market failures relevant to clean energy
investments and illustrate their effects from an investor’s perspective. In Section 4, we examine
whether finance instruments are suitable to address the respective market failure and provide
policy recommendations. The final Section 5 concludes.
f 2. INSTRUMENTS FOR CLIMATE RELATED INVESTMENT SUPPORT g
Subsidies to financing renewable energy or energy efficiency investments occur in a variety of
instruments.7 In this analysis, (i) simple grants, (ii) interest-subsidised loans, and (iii) loan
guarantees are considered. While this set of instruments is not exhaustive, it still covers the
majority of the subsidised financing volume and represents the main elements more complex
instruments, such as structured funds, are composed of. Table 1 provides an overview of the
major design parameters of a grant programme compared with concessional loans and loan
guarantees. These design parameters largely determine the value of an instrument to the
recipient (subsidy element) and the cost to the government.
6. According to the Paris Agreement, parties to the convention agree to “undertake rapid reductions [. . .], so as to achieve a
balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century.”
7. See Mclean et al. (2008) for an overview. A comprehensive comparison between the different instruments for government-
intervention would be complex, since the different instruments imply different rights and obligations on the side of the investor
(in our case sometimes the government). While the right of a debt-provider is merely restricted to receiving information and
interest, the right of an equity provider may be different and involve decisions of the respective company. Similarly, the risks
taken on by the institution providing the instrument are different according to the instrument. In our analysis, we concentrate
on debt.
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TABLE 1
Variables characterising the three major instruments for investment support which need to be
determined when designing a corresponding support programme.
Grant Concessional Loan Guarantee
volume volume (implicit: loan characteristics.)
timing timing loan fraction covered
interest (& risk free years) risks covered
seniority trigger event
pricing
2.1. Grants
A grant is typically a simple payment that is tied to a specific investment. As a support
instrument used by a government or a public finance institution, the grant provision as such
and its volume can be flexibly coupled to any politically justified parameters. In the field of
clean energy, these parameters may be a list of technologies or activities that are eligible for
support. It may also be a more abstract description of activities (e.g. by their goal or purpose)
in order to keep the instrument flexible. In general, one may also link the grant provision to
parameters such as emissions saved. This is, however, rarely the case, since it is often difficult
to determine the emissions saved through an investment. If at all, expected savings for stan-
dardised technologies, which may be estimated up-front, are used.
The parameters may not be limited to climate related political goals. Typical examples of
additional requirements are a certain maximum income of the supported household in order
to focus the support on low-income households, or so-called local content rules that require
part of the investment to be spent on technologies produced in the country that is funding
the support scheme to support the regional economy. Grants are mainly used for two different
purposes: (i) to fund early-stage clean technologies in their pre-maturity phase (research,
development, and demonstration) and (ii) to subsidise the deployment of small-scale renewable
energy.
In any case, the support scheme needs rules to determine whether support is granted, the
volume of the support, as well as the timeframe. The latter has strong implications on dynamic
incentives. A credible long-term commitment of a government to subsidise, e.g., certain energy
efficiency improvements in residential buildings or renewable energy heating systems, might
incentivise innovations in these technologies that could lead to cost reductions. A very limited
subsidy scheme might not be able to trigger innovation activities.
2.2. Concessional Loans
Concessional loans use public money to extend loans for politically desired projects at
more favourable conditions (maturity, interest, seniority) compared to commercial loans avail-
able on the market. If a concessional loan programme is used as a support policy, the conditions
for the loan provision can—similar to the case of grants—be coupled to any parameters.
A number of reasons make the efficiency analysis for concessional loans fundamentally
more complicated than the case for grants. One reason is that a concessional loan is charac-
terised by more variables than a grant. While a grant is largely determined by volume and
time of payment, a concessional loan needs to be further specified with respect to maturity,
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interest rate, including potential interest-free years at the beginning plus the seniority relative
to other loans. A so-called senior loan will have to be paid back with priority while a “junior”-
ranked loan might leave the priority to other loans, perhaps commercial lenders, who would
find themselves in a more secure situation.
A second complexity relative to grants stems from the fact that the subsidy element of a
concessional loan is not completely determined by the characteristics of the offered loan, but
also by the risk profile of the recipient: At market prices, a high-risk borrower will normally
be charged a higher interest rate than a low-risk borrower. Therefore, a concessional loan
programme with a standardised interest rate will effectively mean a higher support for the
high-risk- borrower than for the low-risk borrower.8 This support-bias may give rise to stan-
dard adverse selection problems. Further, it is obvious that the absolute value of support
increases with the volume to be financed.
An alternative to direct public lending are interest subsidies. In this case, the government
does not directly provide loans, but rather offers a subsidy on the interest paid by the borrower.
In such an interest softening mechanism, the borrower receives a loan at market conditions
from a bank, but the interest repayment is partly taken over by the government such that the
effective interest rate for the borrower is reduced.
2.3. Guarantees
Public guarantees to loans are typically used in order to lower the financing costs for a
specific project. If a lender (e.g. a bank) receives a guarantee for some risks or part of a loan
by a credible public institution, he is confronted with less risk and consequently may ask for
a lower risk-premium on the interest rate, provide a higher loan amount or provide a loan at
all.
A potential investment support programme structured as guarantees needs to specify the
loan types (often loan purpose) that are eligible for a guarantee. Hence, implicitly most char-
acteristics of the loan are part of the support scheme (maturity, seniority, volume, etc.). The
added complexity of guarantees versus concessional loans comes from defining the trigger of
the guarantee, the covered risks, and its pricing. While the pricing is often very similar to
loan pricing (as a percentage of the covered loan volume), guarantees usually do not cover the
full loan, but rather a certain fraction of the full amount—typically between 70–80% in
practice (Honohan, 2010). One main reason is that coverage of (close to) 100% would induce
moral hazard, as it would weaken the monitoring incentives of the lender (Anginer et al.,
2014).9 A major complexity—also when it comes to implementation—is the specification of
risks to be taken by the public guarantor. In the event of default, it might be difficult to
determine the drivers for this default ex-post. Depending on the risks covered by the guarantee,
the value (or the subsidy embedded in the guarantee) may be higher for high-risk borrowers/
projects.
8. This may be different if the interest rate is formulated relative to some interest rate that the borrower would have been
offered on the market.
9. Green (2003) provides an analysis and examples on this moral hazard effect. One case is the Lithuanian Rural Credit
Guarantee Fund that offered 100% coverage for loans for purchasing agricultural equipment and resulted in a huge amount of
defaulted loans. When the Canadian Small Business Loans Act increased its guarantee coverage from 85% to 90%, lenders
awarded loans to riskier clients resulting in a drastic increase in defaults.
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f 3. MARKET FAILURES AND THE INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE g
Two main market failures that are related to climate investments and frequently used to justify
the promotion of climate investments are the negative externality caused by greenhouse gas
emissions and the positive innovation externality (spillover).10 One class of market imperfec-
tions, which is typically disregarded in analyses of instruments for environmental policy, are
potential imperfections on capital markets. We argue, however, that it is essential to consider
these market imperfections for at least two reasons. Firstly, climate related investments highly
depend on services provided by capital markets, as renewable energy investments, e.g., are
typically characterised by high up-front investment and low operating costs, which means that
the cost structure is dominated by capital costs (Evans et al., 2009; Painuly, 2001; Wiser et
al., 1997). For photovoltaics, the capital costs can account for more than 95% of total life
cycle costs compared to a share of only 11% in the case of an oil power plant (Kannan et al.,
2007). Secondly, climate policy increasingly acts through capital markets, as demonstrated
above.
We therefore examine three major economic market failures related to low-carbon in-
vestments—(i) environmental emission externality, (ii) innovation spillovers and (iii) capital
market failures (Stern and Rydge, 2012)—and, following Dinica (2006), translate these ex-
ternalities into the investor perspective to illustrate their effects on the risk-return profile of
climate investments.
3.1. Environmental Externalities & Innovation Spillovers
Emission externalities are characterised by a (negative) impact of one agent’s emissions on
the well-being of others. If this market failure is not corrected, e.g., through a price on
emissions via taxes or a tradable permit scheme, then renewable energy or energy efficiency
projects are commercially less attractive compared to otherwise similar projects based on con-
ventional thermal power generation. There is a cost differential in favour of conventional
technologies as long as the external costs of, e.g., fossil-based energy generation are not inter-
nalised.11
Innovation spillovers refer to the positive effect of inventions or innovations on other
market actors. Technological change can be roughly divided into three stages: (i) invention:
the creation of ideas, (ii) innovation: creation of new products or processes based on ideas,
and (iii) deployment and diffusion: the actual penetration of the relevant market by the new
technology (Popp, 2010). A firm invests in innovation activities if the expected returns of
these activities exceed the costs. A successful technology innovation or deployment activity,
however, usually leads to increased general knowledge due to its public goods nature. It is
difficult to exclude others from these benefits. Even if intellectual property rights are in place,
patents cannot entirely exclude other firms from profiting, as they can modify the patented
innovation and utilise it (Levin et al., 1987). Hence, the social returns of innovation and
10. Other reasons frequently used to justify policy intervention include clean energy investments’ contribution to energy
security or strategic considerations of industrial policy aimed at establishing competitive advantages for local clean technology
firms.
11. Renewable energy, however, might also be associated with negative externalities as negative impacts of visual and noise
pollution from wind turbines on neighbouring properties’ prices ( Jensen et al., 2014) or changes in the landscape and impov-
erishment of natural diversity caused by hydropower (Kataria, 2009). Ladenburg and Lutzeyer (2012) provide a review on visual
impacts of offshore wind.
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deployment activities exceed the private returns of the innovator and result in an under-
provision of such activities (Arrow, 1962; Griliches, 1992; Jaffe, 1987; Jones and Williams,
1998). Private actors invest too little, or possibly not at all, in certain socially beneficial
innovation activities, as they cannot fully exploit the resulting benefits. Dechezlepretre et al.
(2014) and Braun et al. (2010) provide evidence for knowledge spillovers in the clean-tech-
nology sector.
Environmental externalities and innovation spillovers may also interact. Successful inno-
vation and diffusion of clean technologies reduce the marginal costs of achieving a desired
pollution level. Policies targeting one of these externalities might also indirectly affect the
other. Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Fischer (2008) show that it is inefficient if only one of
both externalities is addressed by policy.12 Hence, a portfolio of public policy instruments
might be better suited to address both externalities (Bennear and Stavins, 2007; Jaffe et al.,
2005).
3.2. Capital Market Failures
Less specific to renewable energy or energy efficiency, but relevant for the discussion of
the government acting through the capital market, are imperfections on the capital market
itself. This refers to cases where—despite a hypothetical absence of other market failures—
the market does not allocate capital such that it is used most productively from a social point
of view (see, e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; and Stiglitz, 1993). In this context,
we consider two types of capital market failures that systematically affect investment decisions
on clean energy projects. These are (i) the lack of a liquid market for long-term debt (credit
rationing) and (ii) imperfect credit markets.
These market failures are caused by information asymmetries between the lender (prin-
cipal) and the potential borrower (agent) that knows the expected return and risk of his project.
Expenditures to reduce this asymmetry might be sufficiently high such that transactions are
limited or deterred. This credit rationing particularly affects long-term contracts, where in-
formation asymmetries and hence the risks for the lender are particularly large, and result in
a lack of a market for long-term debt (Stiglitz, 1993).
However, even in successful transactions, imperfections on credit markets might result in
interest rate rationing, i.e. a borrower receives a loan, but at unfavourable conditions ( Jaffee
and Stiglitz, 1990). We focus on two major externalities on capital markets that are particularly
relevant for climate related projects. The first imperfection, relationship banking, refers to the
relationship of the lender (bank) and the potential borrower. As the costs of screening a
borrower, i.e. reducing information asymmetry, are sunk, a lender has an incentive for multiple
transactions with the same borrower. A continuing relationship with a borrower results in cost
savings, as the private information the bank obtained in previous transactions can be used for
future deals. Hence, borrowers with a certain relationship with a bank are offered loans at
more favourable conditions compared to unknown potential borrowers.13
Another imperfection is caused by externalities of monitoring, selection, and lending (Stig-
litz, 1993). One main task of banks is the selection of projects and subsequent monitoring.
12. There are also interactions between externalities and capital market imperfections (see, e.g., Hoffmann et al., 2016). They
may lead to optimal emission taxes deviating from a linear pigouvian tax.
13. A number of studies have shown empirical support for the positive effect of lending relationships on loan conditions
(Bharath et al., 2011; Bra¨uning and Fecht, 2012; Jime´nez and Saurina, 2004; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Boot (2000) provides
a survey on relationship banking.
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Other lenders interpret a positive lending decision by a bank as a signal that the project was
deemed as attractive after thorough screening, which informs part of their financing decision.
Consequently, it will be easier for the project to raise additional financing. Furthermore, similar
projects (e.g. using the same technology) will receive loans more easily or at better terms.
Banks do not account for this positive externality on subsequent (other) lenders for the project
or similar projects. Hence, there might be an under-provision of loans (or a provision of loans
with bad conditions) for projects using novel technologies or project developers or technology
firms with a limited track record.
These capital market failures are not exclusive for innovative clean technology, but are
particularly present in this sector due to the following reason. Carpenter and Petersen (2002)
show that particularly young high-tech firms have issues obtaining debt financing as high-
tech investments are associated with higher uncertainty compared to conventional projects
using established technologies. The fact that young firms do not have an established relation-
ship with a lender further fosters credit rationing (Berger and Udell, 2002). The clean-tech-
nology sector plays an important role among small high-tech firms and attracts a large amount
of venture capital investments.14 Substantial information asymmetry between these firms and
potential lenders aggravates the aforementioned capital market failures.
Capital market failures in this sector may be reinforced by the corresponding project
finance characteristics. Due to the high up-front costs of renewable energy generation invest-
ments only utilities and large project developers are sufficiently capitalised to use on-balance
sheet (corporate) finance (Kann, 2009). More typically, project finance structures are used.15
These project finance structures are often long-term and characterised by a large share of debt,
typically 70 to 80 % (Pollio, 1998), but do not involve any collateral as the lending is based
on the project cash-flow. Collateral, however, is an important signalling device that can oth-
erwise reduce the information asymmetry between lender and borrower.16 Consequently, a
limited capability to provide collateral can result in credit rationing (Bester, 1987).
The role of capital market failures for energy efficiency investments is similar, as they have
a similar structure compared to renewable energy projects: high initial capital costs and lower
energy costs in the future (Gillingham et al., 2009). Credit rationing for energy efficiency can
be caused by limited information of the lender on the (certainty) of potential payoff of the
energy efficiency investment and future energy prices (Golove and Eto, 1996; Gillingham and
Palmer, 2014). Furthermore, energy efficiency loans are typically not secured as energy effi-
ciency investments can typically not be used as collateral. However, capital market constraints
seem to be less severe for energy efficiency compared to other clean technology investments.
In developed countries, lenders can rely on credit ratings/histories of firms and households
such that the lender does not have to rely on returns from energy savings for the repayment
of a loan. An overview of recent empirical studies on industrial energy efficiency investments
14. In 2011, the US clean-tech sector attracted more than one quarter of the total venture investments (Pernick et al., 2014).
This indicates the importance of small high-tech firms in the sector and might give an indication for credit rationing in the
clean-tech sector as equity financing, e.g. through venture capital, seems to be an option chosen in the case of credit rationing
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).
15. In a project finance structure, the project is developed and financed off-balance sheet. This means that financing is based
upon the future cash flows of the project and only secured by the project assets (rather than the general assets of the sponsor).
In 2014, project finance accounted for almost 32% of worldwide investments in utility-scale renewable energy (McCrone et al.,
2015).
16. Collateral can be used by the lender to induce a self-selection among borrowers. A high-risk borrower, knowing that his
project has a high probability to default, is less likely to accept collateral requirements set by the lender. In contrast, low-risk
investors will reveal themselves by accepting the collateral requirement (Bester, 1987).
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by Trianni et al. (2016) shows that, in developing countries, alternative options for investing
scarce capital play a more important role in deterring energy efficiency investments than a
limited access to capital. Hence, credit constraints are more relevant in developing countries
and for borrowers with a poor credit rating (Palmer et al., 2012).17 Although varying in
magnitude, capital market failures therefore affect all types of clean energy related investments.
3.3. The Investor Perspective
When discussing market failures and policy measures in clean energy, it is helpful to
complement the policy-maker perspective by an investor perspective through translating the
market failures relating to clean energy investments into consequences for the risk-return
profile of these projects.18 A potential investor decides on a certain investment opportunity
based on the risk-return characteristics of the underlying project. Hence, an investor’s decision
on whether or not to move forward with a certain project is indirectly affected by market
failures through their effect on the (perceived) risk-return of the underlying project. Further-
more, instruments of public investment support directly influence this risk-return profile.
Those instruments may provide financing below market interest rates (concessional loans) or
take risk (guarantees), which can directly increase an investment’s attractiveness by counter-
acting the symptoms of market failures.
Environmental externalities affect the risk-profitability of a climate investment, but rather
indirectly: If the negative environmental externalities are not internalised, alternatives to clean
energy projects—e.g. fossil fuel based electricity or less energy efficient production technology
in case of industrial energy efficiency—have higher returns than they should have from a social
perspective. Hence, the relative risk-return profile of an emission mitigation project is nega-
tively affected. Knowledge spillovers affect the risk-return characteristics of the clean energy
project itself. As not all benefits are exclusive to the investor, the private return is below the
social return of an innovative investment. Furthermore, innovative activities, e.g. the deploy-
ment of a new technology, have higher risks compared to using established dirty technologies.
Finally, capital market imperfections have a direct impact on the financial characteristics of a
project. As argued above, capital market imperfections result in worse loan conditions—e.g.
higher interest rates—and hence negatively affect the profitability of a project. Hence, all these
market imperfections—if uncorrected—decrease the attractiveness of a clean energy invest-
ment relative to other investments.
f 4. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FINANCE INSTRUMENTS g
After characterising main market failures associated with clean energy investments and their
effects from the investors’ perspective above, we now turn to examining the ability of finance
instruments to compensate those market failures. For this evaluation, it is important to con-
sider how much value is transferred through such investment support, i.e., the subsidy element
17. Apeaning and Thollander (2013) and Kostka et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence for the relevance of credit constraints
for energy efficiency investments. However, overall, other market failures as imperfect information, principal-agent issues, dif-
ferences between private and social discount rates, or bounded rationality seem to be at least as important in deterring energy
efficiency investments (for a review, see Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; and Linares and Labandeira, 2009).
18. Wiser et al. (1997) provided an early contribution focussing on barriers for renewable energy financing from an investor
perspective. Dinica (2006) analyses the risk characteristics of support instruments might affect investor behaviour and hence the
deployment of renewable energy technologies.
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of such an instrument, as characterised in Section 2. In this section, we first examine to what
extent finance instruments are capable of correcting each of these market failures (in com-
parison to alternative policies) and the information requirements to design those instruments
cost-efficiently. Finally, we provide some brief policy recommendations on designing and
applying public finance instruments, particularly in cases where alternative first-best policies
are unavailable. Table 2 summarises the results of the analysis and the policy recommendations.
4.1. Environmental Externalities & Innovation Spillovers
Both for environmental externalities and innovation spillovers, instruments of investment
support do not directly correct the respective market failure, as, e.g., an emission trading
scheme or emission tax do in case of the environmental externality, but rather address their
symptoms, namely their negative impact on the risk-return profile of a clean energy invest-
ment. Thereby, the incentive to realise the project would be increased, compensating its
disadvantage relative to other projects emitting CO2 or profiting from knowledge spillovers
(see Table 2). In order to achieve the internalisation of both externalities through investment
support efficiently, the value / cost of the respective finance instrument must not exceed the
social value of the avoided emission externality and the knowledge spillover.
Determining the value of the environmental externality requires the amount of avoided
emissions and a (hypothetical) price per unit of emissions. In the absence of a CO2 price,
assumptions on a price are required, potentially based on other areas/sectors where CO2 prices
exist.19 Overall, market-based instruments are more suitable to correct the emission externality
at least cost due to two main advantages. Firstly, these instruments provide incentives through
markets signals that encourage emission abatement where it can be achieved at least cost
(Stavins, 2003). Hence, these instruments do not require detailed information of firms’ or
technologies’ marginal abatement costs. In order to apply financial instruments efficiently, the
policy maker would require this information in order to target financial support at the most
cost-efficient investments. Secondly, revenues from market-based instruments—revenues from
emission taxes or from auctioned permits in emission trading schemes—might be used to
reduce other distortionary taxes resulting in the beneficial “revenue-recycling effect” (Goulder
and Parry, 2008; Goulder et al., 1997) or to support climate investments in developing econ-
omies, where a carbon price might not be feasible (Bowen et al., 2014).
Overall, finance instruments seem to be suitable for targeting this market failure. Evidence
suggests that, even in the presence of economic instruments that provide incentives for in-
novation and deployment of clean technologies, the market failures associated with knowledge
spillover cannot be compensated entirely ( Jaffe et al., 2005; Popp et al., 2010). Johnstone et
al. (2010) find that direct investment incentives, e.g. grants, concessional loans, and guaran-
tees, effectively support innovation in clean technology, particularly in the case of less mature
technologies. Olmos et al. (2012) provide a comprehensive analysis on the suitability of dif-
ferent finance instruments for supporting innovation and deployment of clean technologies
based on features of innovation that vary across clean technologies, e.g. the maturity of the
respective technology. Public (concessional) loans and loan guarantees seem particularly suit-
able for close-to-maturity technologies that are expected to be profitable large-scale deploy-
19. Note that in general one might argue that the socially optimal CO2 price should be based on some global cost benefit
considerations. We abstract from the issue of a globally optimal emission level but rather look at the question of cost-efficient
abatement.
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ments in the future. By providing a concessional loan or a loan guarantee that improves the
loan conditions, the government subsidises the investor conducting the innovative project by
compensating for the knowledge spillovers other actors benefit from. This subsidy lowers the
financing costs and hence increases the private return (and lowers the risk) and reduces / closes
the gap between the private and the social return of innovative activities with knowledge
spillovers. Grants can, in principle, be used for any clean innovation activity. Considering the
higher costs of this instrument—in contrast to loans, grants are not paid back—it seems
particularly suitable to support early-stage clean technology innovation which is commercially
the least attractive. For concessional loans or guarantees, the value of the support is determined
relative to the same instrument at market prices. Note, however, that this does not solve the
issue of determining the appropriate level of support (which exists for clean energy technologies
as well as for all other innovations) that should not supersede the benefits, i.e. the social value
of knowledge spillovers that is challenging to quantify (Hall, 1996).20
4.2. Capital Market Failures
Providing public finance instruments means that the government acts as player on the
capital market. In contrast to compensating emission externalities or knowledge spillovers,
here the public intervention is aimed at the market where the failure actually occurs. According
to previous studies, public intervention on financial markets can effectively correct market
imperfections (see, e.g., Arping et al., 2010; Gale, 1990; Honohan, 2010; Janda, 2011; Phi-
lippon and Skreta, 2012).
Policy interventions on capital markets have the ability to remedy the negative effects of
market failures on climate related investments. The provision of (concessional) public loans
is the most direct instrument: the regulator provides debt for climate related investments that
is underprovided, or offered at unfavourable conditions, by private lenders due to asymmetric
information. This instrument seems particularly suitable for the case of the lack of a market
for long-term debt for climate related investments (credit rationing). As a loan guarantee partly
takes over the risk of default, the lender can improve the loan conditions, e.g. reduce the
interest rate, of loans for clean energy investments. In the absence of a guarantee, the private
lender charges a higher interest to account for the risk, while the interest payments of the
borrower can be reduced through interest subsidies.
In spite of the differences of both instruments, interest rate subsidies and loan guarantees
generally have the same effect: they diminish the unfavourable loan conditions induced by
information asymmetries. Minelli and Modica (2009) show that both subsidised loans and
loan guarantees are optimal to correct market failures on credit markets and imply similar
costs to the regulator.21 As guarantees are only paid in the case of failure, the costs of this
instrument increase with the guaranteed loan’s risk of default and maturity (Honohan, 2010).
The costs of interest subsidies (also the subsidy component) occur even in the case of a
successful project and rise with difference to the market interest, volume, and maturity. Hence,
for both instruments the costs increase with the magnitude of market failure. Grants also have
the ability to remedy capital market failures, but, as they are normally not paid back, grants
are in general the more expensive instrument and hence inferior to loans and guarantees in
20. See Kaiser (2002) and Nelson (2009) for an overview of alternative approaches of approximating knowledge spillovers.
21. Janda (2011) argues that the costs of guarantees and interest subsidies depend on the diversity of projects, i.e. the difference
in the success probability of high-risk and low-risk projects. The author shows that guarantees are less costly in case of high
project diversity, while interest subsidies are less costly in case of low project diversity.
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addressing capital market failures (Minelli and Modica, 2009). With respect to costs, direct
concessional lending by the state combines the attributes of interest subsidies and guarantees.
If government budget is used to subsidise interest, the costs are similar to paying an interest
subsidy on a loan provided by a private lender. The amount of the subsidy, however, is likely
to be smaller in case of public loans, as government institutions—at least in developed coun-
tries –usually have lower refinancing costs than private institutions. In case of a default, the
government has costs amounting to the defaulted loan, which is similar to the cost attributes
of guarantees. The latter, however, are potentially lower as they typically do not cover the
whole loan amount.
In addition to the static effects, capital market interventions also have a dynamic effect
by reducing information asymmetries over time. When projects supported by public finance
instruments materialise, private lenders acquire information on those projects. Hence, lenders
have better information on the profitability of investments in, e.g. certain clean technologies.
The same applies to clean technology firms or project developers that might build up a track
record that can reduce the information asymmetry between them and lenders. Overall, finance
instruments seem to be the instruments of choice to correct capital market failures related to
clean energy investments.
4.3. Policy Considerations
Climate related investments, as renewable energy and energy efficiency projects in the real
world, are subject to more than one market imperfection and frequently a number of policy
instruments and incentives coexist. Designing appropriate support policy schemes in such a
context is challenging (Fischer and Preonas, 2010; Sijm, 2005; Sorrell and Sijm, 2003). Nev-
ertheless, their design will benefit from a clear understanding of the individual market im-
perfections. Note that in order to implement the first-best optimum, theoretically each exter-
nality needs to be internalised and this could be achieved with one instrument per externality.
If we assume, however, that this design of multiple internalisation policies is not possible, then
one approach could be the following: In general, and if all the externalities could be quantified,
one would be able to aggregate them with respect to their effect on risk and return. These
aggregate effects could then be compensated through support policies.
As market-based instruments are the first-best choice to internalise the emission exter-
nality, other policies, such as finance instruments, should only be considered if an emission
price is (politically) not feasible. When using finance instruments to correct the emission
externality, government support should aim to achieve a certain benefit at least cost, which
requires some estimate of the benefit of saved emissions. In the case of a renewable energy
project, e.g., expected emission savings can be estimated based on assumptions about: the
technology, the capacity, the expected lifetime, and some reference generation technology. In
the case of an energy efficiency investment, emission savings estimations have to be based on
the lifetime and usage of the technology. Quantifying the value of the externality requires an
emission (shadow) price assumption to value the avoided emissions. A potential approach for
such a quantification of emissions avoided by renewable energy projects could be the use of
standardised baselines as suggested by Spalding-Fecher and Michaelowa (2013) for the Clean
Development Mechanism. A corresponding estimation for an energy efficiency project (e.g.
a new technology) might be less straightforward.22 The costs of the applied finance instrument,
22. With some assumptions, it might be possible to estimate the expected emissions saved, but the business-as-usual reference
is less obvious if the investment in a new cleaner technology was due to other reasons than just increased energy efficiency.
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i.e. the subsidy element, should not exceed the benefit of the avoided emission externality.
Even under these considerations, investment support for clean energy might induce additional
inefficiencies. Consider subsidies to an energy efficiency investment that illustrates the non-
equivalence of an emission price on the one hand and subsidising carbon free technology on
the other. Inefficiencies particularly result if the (subsidised) investment also raises the emission
baseline. An example would be the provision of low-interest loans for cars with relatively low
emissions. On top of making relatively efficient cars more attractive, the low-interest loan may
have two additional effects: (i) it subsidises the use of cars in general (leading to additional
emissions, especially if clean / cleaner means of transportation are substituted) and (ii) the
subsidy element increases with the price of the vehicle, which typically means a higher subsidy
to bigger (more expensive) cars often emitting more carbon than smaller (cheaper) ones.
In contrast to the emission externality, finance instruments are suitable to address market
failures due to knowledge spillovers and, in particular, market failures on capital markets. In
case of knowledge spillovers, a main guideline for using financial support is that grants should
be used for early-stage, far-from-maturity clean-tech innovation investments, whereas the sup-
port of more mature technologies, in particular their deployment, can be more cost efficiently
supported by subsidised loans or even guarantees. In order to avoid crowding out, particularly
loans and guarantees should be only employed for innovation and deployment projects, where
(i) the investors have difficulties receiving private finance due to the gap between social and
private returns or (ii) the public sector is more knowledgeable / experienced with the respective
technology than the private sector (Olmos et al., 2012).
Within the group of finance instruments, loan guarantees and interest subsidies are the
most appropriate policies to address capital market failures as they are generally more cost
efficient compared to (investment) grants. However, direct government lending bears the risk
of crowding out private lending. Whether direct (concessional) lending is an appropriate
instrument also depends on the development of the financial sector and its liquidity.23 In case
of limited liquidity, direct public lending might be the only instrument to provide finance to
clean energy projects. This could be the case in emerging and developing countries as well as
in developed countries in periods of credit crunches during, e.g., a financial crisis.24 Further-
more, when the financial sector development is low, the public sector lender might have an
advantage in assessing projects of potential borrowers (lower information asymmetry) due to
better screening skills based on previous experience and knowledge. Hence, concessional lend-
ing by, e.g. bilateral or multilateral development banks, are particularly suitable to finance
clean energy investments in emerging and developing countries, where financial sectors are
less developed.25 In this case, direct public lending might be an effective tool to reduce the
information asymmetry by providing finance to pilot projects. The learning effect for private
lenders might be increased by public and private co-financing of clean energy projects.
23. Lending by governments or mandated public finance institutions in fact may either happen directly or through other
commercial banks which are for these projects refinanced by public finance institutions (so-called on-lending). Inter alia this is
used to limit crowding out or to use specific strengths of the commercial bank such as an established client base.
24. Due to the current expansionary monetary policy in a majority of OECD countries and the resulting low interest rates,
liquidity seems, at least currently, not to be a major issue on credit markets in developed economies.
25. Brunnschweiler (2010) provides empirical evidence for the importance of financial sector development for the deployment
of renewable energy in emerging and developing countries.
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f 5. CONCLUSIONS g
In this paper, we raise the issue of whether the intensified use of public finance instruments
to support climate related investments is compatible with facilitating the structural change at
least cost to society, or whether they run the risk of being overly expensive or extensively using
scarce public funds, therefore impeding the transition towards a low carbon economy.
In general, finance instruments are capable of compensating for the main market imper-
fections associated with clean energy investments. From an investor’s perspective, all market
failures analysed here negatively affect the risk-return characteristics of the underlying clean
energy investment. As public finance instruments for investment support are able to directly
influence risk and capital cost (i.e. return), they can be flexibly designed to compensate where
climate related investments are less attractive from the investors’ perspective than they should
be—based on societal / economic considerations. Whether these instruments are the first-best
choice, however, largely differs across market failures and investment environments.
With respect to emission externalities, policies of finance support are economically inferior
to market-based instruments. Whenever economic instruments are not politically possible,
e.g. in emerging and developing countries, finance instruments might be second-best choice.
When applying these instruments, however, the design of public investment support pro-
grammes—e.g. the magnitude of an interest subsidy or the proportion of a loan that is covered
by a guarantee—should be based on cost benefit considerations. The cost of a finance instru-
ment and the subsidy element should not exceed the value of abated emissions.
An additional advantage of market-based instruments, if designed appropriately, is their
ability to provide incentives to innovate and deploy clean technologies (Bennear and Stavins,
2007; Jaffe et al., 2005). Although these policies cannot fully compensate for the market
failures related to innovation and deployment, they can reduce the social cost of innovation
policies, as, with a carbon price in place, clean technology innovation investments require less
financial support. As economic instruments cannot fully overcome the innovation market
failures, a combination of this policy with financial support innovation and deployment can
compensate both market failures at least cost. Finally, finance instruments are optimal policies
to address capital market failures.
Given the global consensus of limiting global warming, a substantial structural change in
the energy infrastructure is required. Based on our examination, this speaks strongly in favour
of (i) introducing carbon-price-based regulation to cope with the corresponding externality
and (ii) focusing on understanding the non-emission market imperfections when designing
investment support policies in order to avoid inefficient government spending. While it can
be technically challenging to quantify all market imperfections, understanding them provides
a reliable foundation when designing policy to moderate structural change.
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Directed Technical Change and Energy Intensity Dynamics: 
Structural Change vs. Energy Efficiency
Christian Haas* and Karol Kempa**
abstract
This paper uses a model with Directed Technical Change to theoretically analyse 
observable heterogeneous energy intensity developments. Based on the empiri-
cal evidence, we decompose changes in aggregate energy intensity into structural 
changes in the economy (structural effect) and within-sector energy efficiency 
improvements (efficiency effect). The relative importance of these effects is deter-
mined by energy price growth and sectoral productivities that drive the direction 
of technical change. When research is directed to the labour-intensive sector, the 
structural effect is the main driver of energy intensity dynamics. In contrast, the 
efficiency effect dominates energy intensity developments, when research is di-
rected to energy-intensive industries. Increasing energy price generally leads to 
lower energy intensities and temporal energy price shocks might induce a perma-
nent redirection of innovation activities. We calibrate the model to empirical data 
and simulate energy intensity developments across countries. The results of our 
very stylised model are largely consistent with empirical evidence.
Keywords: Directed technical change, Energy efficiency, Energy intensity, 
Structural change
https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.39.4.chaa
1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship of energy use and economic activity has been a recurring theme in the 
political and academic debate, particularly since the energy crisis in the 1970s. Main reasons include 
the high dependency on fossil fuel energy carriers in energy generation—80.6% in 2014 (IEA, 
2015)—and the resulting consequences for the world climate as well as increasing energy prices. A 
promising way to lower emission levels and meet climate policy targets is reducing energy intensity, 
i.e. decreasing the input of energy for production of a given output.
Since the energy crisis in the 1970s, numerous studies have analysed the development 
of energy intensities.1 Studies covering the period before the energy crisis, i.e. 1950–1970, show 
increasing or constant energy intensities across most of the analysed developed and emerging econ-
omies (Casler and Hannon, 1989; Hannesson, 2002; Proops, 1984). For the period after the energy 
1. A theme related to the energy intensity literature is the so-called rebound effect, which can be decomposed into a direct 
rebound, an indirect rebound, and an economy wide (or growth) effect (Binswanger, 2001;00 Brookes, 2004; Greening et al., 
2000; Khazzoom, 1980; Khazzoom, 1987; Qiu, 2014; Schipper and Grubb, 2000).
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crisis, however, there is strong evidence for substantial reductions in energy intensity in the majority 
of developed economies (Csereklyei et al., 2016; Greening et al., 1998; Grossi and Mussini, 2017; 
Liddle, 2012; Mulder and de Groot, 2012; Sun, 1998; Voigt et al., 2014; Wang, 2013).2 In addition 
to analysing trends of overall energy intensities across countries, numerous studies use, e.g., index- 
or structural decomposition analyses to disaggregate energy intensity into its driving forces (Ang, 
2004; Loschel et al., 2015; Mendiluce et al., 2010; Mulder, 2015; Sue Wing, 2008).3 Most studies 
decompose energy intensity into an efficiency effect4 and a structural effect. The former describes 
energy efficiency improvements within sectors, i.e. reductions in sectoral energy intensities due to 
e.g. substitution of energy by other factors or energy-saving technological progress. The structural 
effect refers to structural adjustments towards sectors with low energy intensities.
Mulder and de Groot (2012) decompose the development of energy intensities across 50 
sectors in 18 OECD countries for the period 1970–2005. The authors find an important contribution 
of the structural effect for energy intensity reductions (25% in all analysed OECD economies). 
However, the relative importance of the efficiency effect seems to be stronger.5 A recent and very 
comprehensive decomposition analysis was conducted by Voigt et al. (2014). Using the World In-
put-Output Database (WIOD) covering 34 sectors in 40 countries from 1995–2007, Voigt et al., 
(2014) show a conspicuous divergence in the importance of the structural and the efficiency effect 
for energy intensity developments across countries. In around one third of all developed economies 
energy intensity reductions are primarily caused by a restructuring of the economy towards sectors 
with low energy intensities (structural effect). In the reminder of all industrial countries, the effi-
ciency effect is primarily responsible for the decline in energy intensity. Overall, the data analyses 
on energy intensities show the following trends:
1.  while energy intensities were constant or increasing in the majority of economies until 
the early 1970s, they systematically decreased since the energy crisis;
2.  the contributions of energy intensity reductions within industries, e.g. through techno-
logical progress (efficiency effect) and structural change towards less energy-intensive 
economic activities (structural effect) to energy intensity reduction differ substantially 
across countries.
In contrast to the extensive empirical literature on energy intensity developments, there is a 
lack of theoretical approaches to analyse the underlying mechanisms of the trends described above. 
Recent studies, as Mulder and de Groot (2012) and Voigt et al. (2014), highlight the exploration of 
the determinants of these developments, including the role of technological change, as directions of 
future research. Our paper aims to fill this research gap by providing a, to our knowledge, first the-
2. Greening et al. (1998) analyse ten developed economies from 1971–1991 and find energy intensity reductions be-
tween 37.5% (Norway) and 61.7% (Japan). For a similar period (1973–1990), Sun (1998) finds a reduction of energy inten-
sity of 26.2% across OECD countries. Liddle (2012) and Wang (2013) find similar results using more recent data. In spite 
of continuous reductions in energy intensities, there is still a high potential for energy efficiency improvements (Velthuijsen, 
1993; Worrell et al., 2009).
3. Ang and Zhang (2000) found 124 studies applied decomposition analyses related to energy-based emissions and en-
ergy demand. Only ten years later, the number of studies almost doubled (Su and Ang, 2012).
4. The efficiency effect is also referred to as technology or (sectoral) intensity effect.
5. Sun (1998) finds a contribution of the efficiency effect of 75.5% from 1973–1980 that even increased to 90% from 
1980–1985 and 92.8% from 1985–1990. Greening et al. (1998) also find that energy efficiency improvements within sectors 
are the main drivers of energy intensity decline.
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oretical analysis of energy intensity dynamics.6 We analyse how endogenous technical change and 
energy price affect the direction and magnitude of the structural and the efficiency effect.
For this purpose, we use a theoretical Directed Technical Change (DTC) framework as 
proposed by Acemoglu (1998, 2002) to analyse the observed trends in energy intensity dynamics. 
The application of DTC model frameworks to examine the relation of technical change and the 
use of energy or natural resources is not new. Di Maria and van der Werf (2008b) use a two-sector 
DTC model with an energy- and a labour-intensive sector to analyse the effect of unilateral climate 
policy on carbon leakage, while Di Maria and Smulders (2004) examine the pollution haven effect. 
Di Maria and Valente (2008) and Pittel and Bretschger (2010) study whether technical change is 
resource-augmenting within DTC model frameworks. André and Smulders (2014) investigate long-
run trends in oil dependency by introducing energy input from non-renewable resources into a DTC 
model setup.
Our analysis mainly builds on the DTC model of Acemoglu et al. (2012). We use a mar-
ginally modified version of their model with exhaustible resources, as it ideally serves the purpose 
of our analysis. Since we want to analyse the effect of energy prices on innovation and energy use, 
we need a model framework with energy as input factor and endogenous technical change. Further-
more, we require a multi-sectoral setup to explicitly differentiate between structural adjustments 
between sectors and within-sector energy efficiency improvements. Based on the model, we provide 
new insights on the effects of energy price growth and endogenous technical change on energy 
intensity developments. We show how energy price growth and the relative productivity of the 
labour- and the energy-intensive sector affect the direction of technical change. After decomposing 
overall energy intensity into efficiency effect and structural effect, we show how the direction and 
magnitude of both effects is affected by technical change and energy price growth. We find that the 
efficiency effect dominates the evolution of energy intensity in economies, when research is directed 
to the energy-intensive sector. When research is directed to the labour-intensive sector, the structural 
effect is the main driver of energy intensity dynamics. By calibrating the model to empirical data for 
26 OECD countries, we illustrate how energy intensity development, driven by these two effects, 
varies across these countries.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and 
characterise the equilibrium. Section 3 contains the main analysis. We decompose energy intensity 
into structural and efficiency effect and show how both effects are affected by technical change and 
energy price growth. Section 4 provides simulations to illustrate the model results. In Section 5, 
we discuss our results and possible extensions of the model. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of several 
main results are available in the technical Online Appendix.
2 THE MODEL
In this section, we introduce the model framework, which is based on the setup of Acemo-
glu et al. (2012) and modified in the following ways. The authors model the energy price as function 
of the resource stock, since they analyse how the depletion of an exhaustible resource might induce 
a redirection of technical change towards a clean sector due to a continuously increasing price. In 
contrast, we model an exogenous price for energy and endogenous energy use, as our focus is the 
analysis of heterogeneous energy intensity dynamics across countries with different energy price 
6. A recent exception is Cao (2017), who uses a different model framework. A main difference is that the author explicitly 
models the production of energy. In contrast to Cao (2017), the direction of technical change is determined endogenously in 
our analysis.
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growth rates. Furthermore, we formulate our model in continuous time. This redefinition of the time 
dimension allows an extension of the model by an analytical decomposition of energy intensity into 
a structural and an efficiency effect, which we present in Section 3.
2.1 Model Framework
Consider an economy with infinitely-lived households consisting of scientists, entrepre-
neurs, and workers. Consumer behaviour can be described by a representative household that max-
imises its utility ( )U  through consumption ( ( ))C t  of the only final product at time t with the utility 
function
( )
0
( ) ,ρ
∞ −≡ ∫ tU e u C t dt  (1)
where ρ  is the rate of time preference. The unique final good ( ( ))Y t  is assembled from sectoral out-
puts of a labour-intensive sector ( ( ))lY t  and an energy-intensive sector ( ( ))eY t  according to
1 1 1
( ) = ( ) ( ) .
ε
ε ε ε
ε ε
− − − 
+ 
 
l eY t Y t Y t
 
(2)
Markets for ( )Y t , ( )lY t , and ( )eY t  are perfectly competitive. The outputs of the labour-intensive and 
the energy-intensive sector are imperfect substitutes, where ε  (with > 0ε ) is the elasticity of substi-
tution between both goods. In the following, the two goods will be referred to as (gross) substitutes 
when > 1ε  and (gross) complements in the case of < 1ε . = 1ε  is not considered, as in this case the 
production function converges to the Cobb-Douglas type and hence technical change is neutral to 
the input factors.
In each sector { , }∈j l e , labour ( ( ))jL t  and a sector specific set of machines are used for 
production. Each machine type i in sector j, ( )jix t , has an individual productivity ( )jiA t . The pro-
duction in the energy-intensive sector additionally requires energy ( )E t . The production functions 
of both sectors are:
11 1
0
( ) = ( ) ( ) ( ) ,α α α− −∫l l li liY t L t A t x t di  (3)
1 112 1 1
0
( ) = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,α α αα −− ∫e e ei eiY t E t L t A t x t di  (4)
with 1 2=α α α+  and 1 2, , (0,1)α α α ∈ . The aggregate productivity of sector { , }∈j l e  is defined as
1
0
( ) ( ) .≡ ∫j jiA t A t di  (5)
This definition will be used for the subsequent analysis of the direction of research. Labour is as-
sumed to be supplied inelastically. Normalising labour supply to 1, the labour market clearing con-
dition is
( ) ( ) 1.+ ≤l eL t L t  (6)
Energy is supplied at per unit costs of ( )Ec t . With respect to the evolution of energy costs over time, 
we consider different scenarios that are discussed in Section 3.
Machines are produced with an identical, linear production technology at identical costs of 
ψ  units of the final product and supplied under monopolistic competition. Market clearing for the 
unique final good implies
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( )1 10 0( ) = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).ψ+ + +∫ ∫li ei EY t C t x t di x t di c t E t  (7)
Technological progress is driven by quality improvements of machines. Each machine is 
owned by an entrepreneur, the measure of entrepreneurs in each sector is normalised to one, respec-
tively. At the same time, scientists (entrants) attempt to enter the market (become an entrepreneur) 
through innovation. Scientist direct their research at either the labour- or energy-intensive sector. 
With the probability (0,1)η ∈j , the innovation attempt is a success and the scientists is randomly al-
located to a specific machine, increases its quality by > 0γ , receives a patent, and becomes the sole 
producer of this machine variety. The entrepreneur that used the old version of this machine leaves 
the market and joins the pool of scientists. Normalising the mass of scientists to one, the market 
clearing condition for scientists is
( ) ( ) 1,+ ≤l es t s t  (8)
with ( )js t  denoting the mass of scientists directing their research towards sector j. Due to this 
innovation process, together with (5), the aggregate sector productivity, ( )jA t , improves over time 
according to the following law of motion:
( ) = ( ) ( ).η γ j j j jA t s t A t  (9)
2.2 Research Incentives and Directed Technical Change
In this subsection, we define the equilibrium, which is formally derived in the Online Ap-
pendix A, and analyse the direction of research.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is given by prices for sector outputs ( ( )jp t ), machines ( ( )ijp t )  
and labour ( ( )jw t ), demands for machines ( ( )jix t ), the exogenous energy price ( ( )Ec t ), 
sector outputs ( ( )jY t ), labour ( ( )jL t ) and energy ( ( )E t ) inputs in sector = { , }j e l , such that at 
t: ( ), ( )ij ijp t x t  maximizes profits of producers of machine i in sector j; ( ), ( )eL t E t  maximizes 
profits of producers in the energy intensive sector, ( )lL t  maximizes profits of producers in 
the labour intensive sector; ( )jY t  maximizes profits of final good producer; ( )js t  maximizes 
expected profits of researchers in sector j.
In order to determine technical change, i.e. the development of productivities in the en-
ergy-intensive and the labour-intensive sector, the direction of research has to be examined. The 
research incentives of scientists are determined by the profitability of research in both sectors, i.e. 
the expected firm value due to the patented innovation in the respective sector. Following Acemo-
glu et al. (2012) and Daubanes et al. (2013), a patent for an improved sector specific machine is 
enforced for the smallest definable unit of time. This assumption simplifies the expected firm value 
to the profit in t.7 Combining (A.13), (A.15), and (A.16) with (B.1) yields the relative profitability 
of research as:
( 1)2
1
( ) ( ) ( )=
( ) ( )
α ε ϕ
ϕ
η
κ
η
− −
−
Π
Π
l l E l
e e e
t c t A t
t A t
 
(10)
7. A detailed analysis of the direction of technical change with longer (infinite) duration, where the scientist derives mo-
nopoly profits until another scientist improves her machine variety and hence replaces her, can be found in Online Appendix 
D. Although this approach is more general, this simplification does not affect our further analysis.
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with ( )
( )
1
2
2 (1 ) 11
12 2
1 2
1
1
ε
α
α ε
α α
α α ακ α
α ψ α
−
− − −≡   −  
, ( )( )1 1ϕ α ε≡ − − , ( )( )1 11 1ϕ α ε≡ − − . Relative profitabil-
ity is a function of time-invariant parameters, the energy price, research efforts in both sectors as 
well as productivities. The following lemma can be derived from expression (10).
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, research is directed to the energy-intensive sector only, when  
( ) ( 1) ( )1 2( ) > ( ) ( )ϕ α ε ϕη κη− − −e e l E lA t c t A t , to the labour-intensive sector only, when  
( ) ( 1) ( )1 2( ) < ( ) ( )ϕ α ε ϕη κη− − −e e l E lA t c t A t , and to both sectors, when 
( ) ( 1) ( )1 2( ) = ( ) ( )ϕ α ε ϕη κη− − −h e l E lA t c t A t .
Proof: See Online Appendix B. 
This means that for > 1ε , research is directed to the technically more advanced sector 
whereas for < 1ε  the less advanced sector is favoured. In addition to the technological level of both 
sectors, the exogenous energy price affects research incentives. In general, an increasing energy 
price increases (decreases) the profitability of innovation in the labour-intensive sector for > 1ε  (
< 1ε ). Whether this effect of the energy price ultimately dominates the direct productivity effect 
depends on the growth rates of the energy price and the technologies. Analysing the growth rate of 
the relative profit yields the following lemma:
Lemma 2 i. With moderate growth of the energy price, i.e. the growth rate remains 
in the band ( ) ( )2 1 21 / 1 /η γ α α γ η γ α α− − ≤ ≤ −l c eE , the direction of technical change is 
determined by relative productivity that dominates the effect of energy price growth. 
ii. Strong growth of the energy price, i.e. ( )1 2> 1 /γ η γ α α−c eE , will ultimately lead to 
research in the l-(e-) sector for > 1ε  ( )< 1ε . 
iii. Strong negative growth of the energy price, i.e. ( ) 2< 1 /γ η γ α α− −c lE , will ultimately 
lead to research in the e- (l-) sector only for > 1ε  ( )< 1ε .
Proof: See Online Appendix B. 
Finally, we impose the following three assumptions based on Lemma 1, which will be 
useful for the subsequent analysis.
Assumption 1 ( ) ( 1)( )1 2( ) / ( ) < ( ) / .ϕ α εϕ κ η η− −−e l E l eA t A t c t
Assumption 2 ( ) ( 1)( )1 2( ) / ( ) > ( ) / .ϕ α εϕ κ η η− −−e l E l eA t A t c t
Assumption 3 ( ) ( 1)( )1 2( ) / ( ) = ( ) / .ϕ α εϕ κ η η− −−e l E l eA t A t c t
Assumption 1 implies that the l-sector’s technological advancement results in research in 
the l-sector (e-sector) only for > 1ε  ( < 1ε ). Similarly, under Assumption 2 the e-sector’s sufficient 
advancement at time t induces research in the e-sector (l-sector) only for > 1ε  ( < 1ε ). Assumption 3 
implies that research is directed to both sectors. For the analysis, we use natural baseline scenarios, 
namely research directed to one sector only for > 1ε  and research directed to both sectors in case of 
< 1ε . The intuition follows from Lemma 1. If both sectoral goods are gross substitutes and Assump-
tion 1 holds, research is and will remain directed to the l-sector, as research increases the relative 
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profitability of innovation in this sector. Similarly, when Assumption 2 holds, research is directed to 
the energy-intensive sector only and further increases the profitability of innovation in the e-sector.
In contrast, when both goods are gross complements and Assumption 1 holds, i.e. the la-
bour-intensive sector is more advanced, research will be directed to the less advanced e-sector as the 
price effect dominates. Similarly, if Assumption 2 holds, research is directed to the more backward 
l-sector. Hence, ultimately the equilibrium must be characterised by innovation in both sectors.8
3 ENERGY INTENSITY DYNAMICS
After characterising the model equilibrium and the determinants of the direction of tech-
nological progress, we analyse the energy intensity of the whole economy. We first show that the 
evolution of the energy intensity can be disaggregated in two driving forces: a structural effect and 
an efficiency effect. Subsequently, we analyse direction and magnitude of these effects given energy 
price growth, technical change in the labour-intensive sector, and technical change in the ener-
gy-intensive sector. Finally, we combine these results to examine the energy intensity dynamics in 
heterogeneous economies that differ with respect to their sectoral productivities and the direction of 
technical change. In order to simplify notation, the time index t is dropped throughout this section.
3.1 Decomposition into Structural Effect and Efficiency Effect
Defining the energy intensity as total energy input relative to total output, /E Y , and using 
the production function for the final product (2), the energy intensity of the whole economy can be 
written as:
1 1
1 1 1
= = 1 .
ε
ε ε
ε
ε
ε ε ε
ε ε
− −
− − −
 
  +       + 
 
l
e e
l e
YE E E
Y Y Y
Y Y
 
(11)
The growth rate of the energy intensity, γ E
Y
, is obtained by taking logarithms and differentiating with 
respect to time as


1
1 1
total effect efficiency effect
structural effect
ln
= ,
ε
ε
ε ε
ε ε
γ γ γ
−
− −
    
  ≡ + −  + 

l
E E Yl
Y Y Ye el e
Ed
YY
dt Y Y
 
(12)
where γ E
Ye
 denotes the growth rate of the energy intensity in the energy-intensive sector and γ Yl
Ye
 is
the growth rate of the labour-intensive sector relative to the energy-intensive sector. As shown in 
expression (12), the development of the energy intensity can be decomposed into an efficiency effect 
and a structural effect. The efficiency effect refers to changes in the energy intensity in the e-sector, 
which translate into changes in the energy intensity of the whole economy. The structural effect 
captures the relative size of the labour-intensive sector. Since this sector does not use any energy for 
production, an increase of the share of the labour-intensive sector in total production leads, c.p., to 
a reduction of the economy wide energy intensity.
8. This result is formally derived in Online Appendix B.
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Using the previously derived equilibrium values (see Online Appendix A), the strength and 
direction of the efficiency and the structural effect can be analysed. Using the equilibrium values for 
energy use and production in the e-sector, (A.21) and (A.23), we can analyse how the energy inten-
sity in the e-sector is affected by changes of the energy costs as well as changes of the productivity 
levels in both sectors. The equilibrium energy intensity in the energy-intensive sector is:
( ) ( ) ( )( )
12 12
2
1
11 122 1 22 2 1
1 2
= .
αα α
εε εα αα α ϕα ϕ
α α
α ψ α α
− −
−−− − + 
 
E l
e
E l e
c AE
Y
c A A
 
(13)
Taking the logarithms and differentiating with respect to time yields the following expression for the 
development of the energy intensity in the energy-intensive sector, i.e. the efficiency effect:
( )2 1= 1 (1 ) (1 ) ,γ α γ α γ α γ ≡ − − + − − − E c A AE l e
Ye
efficiency effect S S
 
(14)
with 
1 1 11
(1 )1 2
= / (0,1)
ε ε εε
ε ε ε
α εε θ
− − −−
−−
 
≡ + ∈ 
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l l e
E
AS Y Y Y
A c
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1 1
1
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e
l
AA
A
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1
2
22 1 2
1 2
> 0
ε
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−
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, γ cE
denoting the growth rate of the energy price, and γ Al  (γ Ae) denoting the rate of technical change in 
the labour-intensive (energy-intensive) sector.
In a next step, we derive the structural effect. Using the equilibrium values for sectoral 
outputs, (A.22) and (A.23), the relative output of the labour-intensive sector is:
( )2 1 11 2 1 2 1( (1 )2 11 1 1 1 2
1 2= .
α α ε α α α ε α
ε εα α ϕ εααε α ϕα α α αα α α ψ
+ −
− − − − − − − −− − − −l
e l E
e
Y A A c
Y  
(15)
Taking the logarithms, differentiating with respect to time, and multiplying with ( )−S  yields the 
structural effect:
( )2 1= (1 ) (1 ) .γ ε α γ α γ α γ≡ − ⋅ ⋅ − − − + −Y c A Al E l e
Ye
structural effect S S
 
(16)
3.2 The Effects of Technical Change and Energy Price Growth
In order to characterize the effect of technical change and energy price growth on energy 
intensity dynamics, we substitute the expressions (14) and (16) into (12). This yields the growth 
rate of the economy wide energy intensity as the sum of the efficiency effect (EE) and the structural 
effect (SE):
( )
( )
2 2
EE SESEEE
1 1
EE SE
= [ 1 ] [(1 ) (1 ) ]
[ (1 ) 1 ] .
γ α εα γ α α ε γ
α ε α γ
− − − + − − −
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S S S S
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(17)
This expression for the growth rate of energy intensity (total effect) establishes the following propo-
sition that shows how innovation in the e-sector, innovation in the l-sector, and energy price growth 
respectively affect the efficiency and the structural effect.
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Proposition 1 i. Innovation in the e-sector, > 0γ Ae , leads to a positive structural effect 
and a negative efficiency effect, where, in the case of > 1ε  ( < 1)ε , the structural (effi-
ciency) effect dominates the efficiency (structural) effect, i.e. it increases (decreases) the 
growth rate of energy intensity.
ii. Innovation in the l-sector, > 0γ Al , leads to a negative structural effect and a positive 
efficiency effect, where, in the case of > 1ε  ( < 1)ε  the structural (efficiency) effect domi-
nates the efficiency (structural) effect, i.e. it decreases (increases) the growth rate of the 
energy intensity.
iii. A positive (negative) growth rate of the energy price, > 0γ cE  ( < 0)γ cE , leads to a 
negative (positive) structural effect and a negative (positive) efficiency effect and hence 
always decreases (increases) the growth rate of the energy intensity.
Proof: See Online Appendix C. 
The first part of Proposition 1 (i) implies that technical change in the energy-intensive 
sector, c.p., implies a positive structural effect. The increasing productivity in the energy-intensive 
sector induces a reallocation of labour towards this sector. Hence, the relative size of the e-sector 
increases over time. This restructuring of the economy towards the energy-intensive sector increases 
energy intensity (positive structural effect). Furthermore, > 0γ Ae  implies a negative efficiency ef-
fect. Due to the increased productivity of the e-sector, the sectoral output grows faster than energy 
input and hence reduces energy intensity.
According to the first part of Proposition 1 (ii), innovation in the labour-intensive sector 
induces, c.p., an increase in average productivity in the l-sector and a reallocation of labour from 
the e- to the l-sector. The resulting restructuring of the economy’s composition towards the l-sector 
yields a negative structural effect, i.e. a reduction of energy intensity in the economy. The induced 
decrease in labour input in the e-sector causes a substitution of labour by other factors of production, 
as energy, which, c.p., yields an increase of the energy intensity in the e-sector (positive efficiency 
effect).
In the case of both > 0γ Ae  and > 0γ Al , the structural effect dominates the efficiency effect 
in the case of substitutes and vice versa for gross complements (second parts of Proposition 1, i and 
ii). This result is solely driven by the effect of ε  on the structural effect, which is reduced, when both 
sectors are gross complements. Consider gross complements. As can be seen in the relative 
demand for both sectoral goods (A.1), an increase of output in the l-sector induced by > 0γ Al  results 
in a more than proportional increase of the relative price of the energy-intensive good ( /e lp p ) due 
to the gross complementarity of both sectors. This price reaction dampens the growth of the l-sector 
and hence the induced structural effect. Similarly, output growth in the e-sector induced by > 0γ Ae  
induces a more than proportional increase in the relative price of the labour-intensive good and also 
dampens the structural effect. In the case of gross substitutes, the structural effect dominates the ef-
ficiency effect. In the case of > 0γ Ae , e.g., this implies that, in spite of technological improvements 
in the energy-intensive sector, the increase of the share of this sector’s output overcompensates the 
energy saving effect of technical change and hence leads to an increase of the energy intensity. Sim-
ilarly, for > 0γ Al , the reduction of energy intensity induced by the negative structural effect is stron-
ger than the positive efficiency effect.
Finally, Proposition 1 (iii) implies that increasing energy prices, c.p., negatively affect both 
effects independent of the elasticity of substitution. Positive energy price growth induces a substi-
tution of energy by other factors of production in the energy-intensive sector (negative efficiency 
effect). The reduction of energy use in the e-sector reduces the marginal productivity of labour in 
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this sector. Hence, labour is reallocated towards the l-sector, which increases the l-sector’s relative 
size (negative structural effect).
3.3 Combined Results
In this subsection, we now turn to the comprehensive analysis of energy intensity devel-
opments. We combine the results from Lemmas 1 and 2 and Proposition 1 to examine the joint 
effect of energy price growth and technical change on the direction and magnitude of the efficiency 
and the structural effect. The analysis distinguishes between economies that are technologically 
more advanced in the labour-intensive and those more advanced in the energy-intensive sector. For 
both cases, we derive how the development of overall energy intensity (total effect) is affected by 
efficiency and structural effect and different energy price growth rates. We analyse both the case of 
gross substitutes, > 1ε , as well gross complements, < 1ε .
Substituting for S in (17) and rearranging yields the growth rate of energy intensity:
1 11
2 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )1 1 12 2 2
(1 )= 1 .
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α ε ϕϕγ γ γ γ
θ θ θ
− −−
− − −− − −
     − −
− + +     
+ + +          
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(18)
The expressions for the efficiency effect (14), the structural effect (16), and the total effect 
(18) are the basis for the following propositions, which identify the direction and magnitude of these 
effects for different directions of technical change.
Proposition 2 With research directed to the l-sector only, i.e. Assumption 1 (Assumption 
2) holds for > 1ε  ( < 1ε ), and hence =γ γηA ll  and = 0γ Ae :
i. The total effect is negative, when 
( )
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−−
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ii. The efficiency effect is negative, when 
1
,(1 )1 2
2
(1 )> > 0
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ε
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αγ γη
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−
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− +
c l l EEE
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∂Λ
∂
l EE
A
 for 
(<)
>1ε .
iii. The structural effect is negative, when ( ) 2> 1 /γ η γ α α− −c lE , i.e. strong negative 
growth of the energy price.
Proof: See Online Appendix C. 
Assume > 1ε  and consider an economy where research is directed entirely to the l-sector, 
i.e. Assumption 1 holds, and hence Proposition 2 can be applied. In order to illustrate the results, 
Figure 1 depicts efficiency, structural, and total effect as a function of the energy price growth rate.
The figure shows that energy price growth negatively affects energy intensity development. 
Furthermore, the evolution of energy intensity is largely driven by the structural effect. As long as 
the energy price does not decline at a strong rate, the restructuring of the economy away from the 
energy-intensive sector has a decreasing effect on the overall energy intensity. The efficiency effect 
becomes negative for all energy price growth rates above the threshold ,Λl EE. When the energy price 
grows at a lower rate or even decreases, producers in the energy-intensive sector do not have in-
centives to reduce energy use. In addition, technical change in the l-sector induces a reallocation of 
labour towards this sector and hence fosters a substitution of labour by other factors of production, 
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as energy, in the e-sector. The threshold ,Λl EE is negatively affected by A. As research is directed to 
the l-sector only, A declines and hence the threshold ,Λl EE increases. The intuition is as follows. A 
higher productivity in the l-sector induces a reallocation of labour towards this sector. The reduction 
of labour in the e-sector fosters a substitution away from labour towards other production factors, 
as energy. Hence, the higher the productivity advantage of the l-sector, the higher the energy price 
growth rate has to be in order to induce a negative efficiency effect. The total effect is negative, when 
energy price grows at a rate larger than ,Λl TE.
Proposition 3 With research directed to the e-sector only, i.e. Assumption 2 (Assumption 
1) holds for > 1ε  ( < 1ε ), and hence = 0γ Al  and =γ γηA ee :
i. The total effect is negative, when 
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iii. The structural effect is negative, when ( )1 2> 1 /γ η γ α α−c eE , i.e. strong growth of the 
energy price.
Proof: See Online Appendix C. 
In contrast, consider an economy that is more advanced in the energy-intensive sector, i.e. 
Assumption 2 holds, and research is directed to e-sector. In this case, the results of Proposition 3 can 
be applied, which are illustrated in Figure 2.
Similar to the previous case, the figure clearly shows that the development of energy in-
tensity and both partial effects are negatively affected by the energy price growth rate. In contrast to 
the case of technical change directed to the l-sector, technical change in the energy-intensive sector 
Figure 1:  Efficiency, structural, and total effect for ε > 1 and research directed to the labour-
intensive sector.
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induces a structural change of the economy towards the e-sector. Hence, the structural effect is pos-
itive in this case as long as there is no strong growth of the energy price. In contrast, the efficiency 
effect is negative for all energy price growth rates above the negative threshold ,Λe EE and largely 
drives the energy intensity development. The threshold itself is positively affected by A, and hence 
increases, when research is directed to the e-sector only. The higher the productivity in the e-sector, 
the more labour is reallocated towards this sector and the more costly it becomes to attract additional 
labour from the l-sector. This increases the incentive for producers in the e-sector to substitute away 
from labour towards other factors of production, as energy. Hence, the higher A, the larger ,Λe EE 
has to be in order to induce a negative efficiency effect. For energy price growth rates above ,Λe TE
, the negative efficiency effect dominates the positive structural effect and hence the total effect is 
negative.
Comparing the efficiency effects in Figures 1 and 2 illustrates the role of technical change 
in the e-sector. In the case depicted in Figure 1, there is no technical change in the energy-intensive 
sector. Hence, the negative efficiency effect is solely caused by the substitution of energy by other 
factors of production, which is only induced by energy price growth above ,Λl EE. In Figure 2 we can 
see that even for small negative energy price growth rates the efficiency effect is negative, which is 
due to the additional effect of technical change in the energy-intensive sector in this case.
For > 1ε , it is important to bear in mind that, as outlined in Lemma 2, a sufficiently strong 
(negative) energy price growth can ultimately change the direction of research. In the case of an 
economy, where research is initially directed to the e-sector (Proposition 3), strong growth of the 
energy price will ultimately induce a redirection of innovation towards the labour-intensive sector. 
This effect can be seen in Figure 2, where the structural effect becomes negative for strong energy 
price growth. The intuition is as follows. The rapidly growing costs of energy cannot be compen-
sated by innovation. Energy input declines over time and hence the output in the energy-intensive 
sector shrinks. This means that strong energy price growth fosters a restructuring of the economy 
towards the l-sector even when innovation is still directed to the e-sector. As the decline in relative 
output is stronger than the increase of its relative price, the profitability of innovation in this sector 
Figure 2:  Efficiency, structural, and total effect for ε > 1 and research directed to the energy-
intensive sector.
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decreases. This process continues until the relative profitability of research in the e-sector falls be-
low unity and research switches to the l-sector, i.e. Assumption 1 applies. The timing of this switch 
of research depends, next to the actual magnitude of energy price growth, on the relative productiv-
ity of the -sector.9
Proposition 4 Consider < 1ε .
i. With moderate growth of the energy price growth, i.e. 
( ) ( )2 1 21 / 1 /η γ α α γ η γ α α− − ≤ ≤ −l c eE , and research directed to the both sectors, 
i.e. Assumption 3 holds, and hence 
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s , the efficiency effect equals γ− cE, the structural 
effect equals zero. Hence, the total effect equals γ− cE .
ii. With strong growth of the energy price growth, i.e. ( )1 2> 1 /γ η γ α α−c eE , and research 
directed to the e-sector only, i.e. Assumption 1 holds, and hence = 0γ Al  and =γ γηA ee , the 
efficiency effect, the structural effect, and the total effect are negative.
iii. With strong negative growth of the energy price growth, i.e. ( ) 2< 1 /γ η γ α α− −c lE , 
and research directed to the l-sector only, i.e. Assumption 2 holds, and hence = 0γ Al  and 
=γ γηA ee , the efficiency effect, the structural effect, and the total effect are positive.
Proof: See Online Appendix C.
The results of Proposition 4 are illustrated in Figure 3. When research is directed to both 
sectors, which is the relevant case for moderate energy price growth rates, the relative sector size 
does not change and hence the structural effect is equal to zero. The evolution of energy intensity 
is solely driven by the efficiency effect. The higher the energy price growth, the larger the share of 
scientists directing their research towards the e-, which is the typical result of DTC models.10 This 
reallocation compensates the increasing growth rate of the energy price such that the relative sector 
size remains constant (structural effect is zero). Increasing costs of energy induce substitution of en-
ergy by other production factors in the energy-intensive sector which leads to a negative efficiency 
effect. Given the constant relative sector size, this directly translates to a energy intensity reduction 
in the whole economy. The opposite effects can be observed for moderate negative growth rates of 
the energy price.
For strong (negative) growth rates of the energy price, research is directed to one sector 
only. In case of strong energy price growth, i.e. ( )1 2> 1 /γ α η γ α−c eE , all research is directed to the 
e-sector, i.e. Assumption 1 holds. However, technical change in the energy-intensive sector cannot 
overcompensate the rapidly growing energy costs. This means that strong energy price growth fos-
9. The reverse effect applies for an economy, where research is initially directed to the l-sector. In this case, strong neg-
ative growth of the energy price will ultimately redirect innovation to the e-sector.
10. This can be seen in the expressions for the equilibrium allocation of researchers to the l- and the e-sector, Sl and Se, 
in Proposition 4. As can be seen for ε < 1, Se increases, when cEγ  decreases, i.e. the higher energy price growth, the more 
researchers direct their effort towards the energy-intensive sector.
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ters a restructuring of the economy towards the l-sector even when innovation is still directed to the 
e-sector. Hence, as we can see in Figure 3, the structural effect becomes negative.11
Overall, the model results crucially depend on whether ε  is larger or smaller than unity, 
which is a typical attribute of DTC models. Our theoretical results better fit empirical observations 
for > 1ε . For < 1ε , the structural effect is equal to zero, unless there is a strong positive or negative 
growth rate of the energy price. However, decomposition analyses show an important role of sec-
toral adjustments as a driver of energy intensity reductions as they attribute for 25% of energy in-
tensity reduction in OECD countries (Mulder and de Groot, 2012). For gross substitutes, the model 
predicts an efficiency and a structural effect different from zero for almost any energy price growth 
rate. The latter results are in line with empirical decomposition studies, that typically find both 
effects. It is, however, difficult to provide empirical evidence on this elasticity. While there are nu-
merous studies estimating elasticities of substitution between production factors, there are almost no 
estimates of elasticities of substitution between sectors. Exceptions are Oberfield and Raval (2014), 
who estimate cross industry elasticities of demand based on US data and overall find values ranging 
between 0.75 and 2.2, and Edmond et al. (2015), who determine an elasticity of substitution across 
sectors of 1.24. To our knowledge, however, there are no estimates of the elasticity of substitution 
between energy-intensive and labour-intensive sectors and an estimation of such an elasticity is out 
of the scope of this paper. Overall, we consider > 1ε  to be the more plausible assumption, which we 
will use for the subsequent calibration.
4. CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN ENERGY INTENSITY DYNAMICS
In this section, we present simulations of energy intensity developments and their drivers 
across countries. The purpose of this exercise is not to provide comprehensive quantitative predic-
tions of energy intensity developments. Our objectives are twofold. First, we illustrate the main 
results of our theoretical model, i.e. how differences in sectoral productivities and different energy 
11. The opposite effects can be observed for strong negative energy price growth. Research is ultimately directed to the 
l-sector only inducing a positive structural effect.
Figure 3: Efficiency, structural, and total effect for ε < 1.
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prices between countries affect energy intensity dynamics in the model. Second, we cross-check our 
results with empirical decomposition studies.
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model based on the World Input-Output Database (WIOD, 2013).12 Our 
calibration mainly draws from the Environmetal Accounts (EA) and the Socio Economic Accounts 
(SEA) of the WIOD both covering 34 sectors in 40 countries from 1995–2007/2009. As we explic-
itly model energy as an input factor in the energy-intensive sector, we drop two energy produc-
ing sectors from the WIOD in the calibration, namely Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 
(WIOD Code 23) and Electricity, Gas and Water Supply (WIOD Code E). An advantage of this 
data is that it contains consistent information relevant for the calibration. Furthermore, it benefits 
the cross-checking of our results with the decomposition study of Voigt et al. (2014), which is also 
based on the WIOD. For the energy price, we use the Indices of Real Energy Prices for Industry 
from the IEA as they are based on energy prices paid by firms (IEA, 1999; IEA, 2007; IEA, 2008; 
IEA, 2017).13 Combining both sources yields a sample of 32 sectors in 26 OECD countries between 
1995 and 2007 (see Table 1 in the Appendix for an overview). We calibrate the model based on 1995 
data and simulate the development of energy intensities and its drivers until 2007.
As we use a two-sector model, all sectors covered in the WIOD have to be aggregated into 
two sectors, i.e. an energy-intensive and a labour-intensive sector. We use data on sectoral energy 
use (EU) in physical units (TJ) from the EA and sectoral gross output (GO) in million USD from the 
SEA for all 26 countries in order to calculate the aggregate energy intensity for each sector. We cal-
culate the average energy intensity and define all sectors with energy intensities above the average 
as energy-intensive, while all sectors with energy intensities below the average are aggregated into 
the labour-intensive sector.
We take = = 0.02η ηe l  and = 1γ , which is consistent with a long-run growth rate of 2% 
(see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2015)). We follow the standard convention 
to set the labour share of income to (1 ) = 2 / 3α− . Hence, a share of = 1/ 3α  is spent on machines 
(could be interpreted as capital) in the l-sector and on both machines and energy in the e-sector. For 
the latter sector, we need to also calibrate 2α , which is the energy share of output in the energy-inten-
sive sector. For each country, we derive the energy costs at purchasers’ prices in the energy-intensive 
sector from the World Input-Output Tables of the WIOD.14 Using the data on sectoral GO, we then 
calculate the energy cost share in the e-sector for each country, which gives us country-specific 
proxies of 2α .15 We further set = 2ε .
Finally, we need to determine the initial sectoral productivities ( = 0)eA t  and ( = 0)lA t  for 
all countries in 1995. While these are difficult to observe, the SEA contain information on sectoral 
12. We use the 2013 release of the data, which is available at http://www.wiod.org. For detailed information on data 
sources, construction, and structure of the database see Dietzenbacher et al. (2013), Genty et al. (2012), and Timmer et al. 
(2015).
13. Similar to our approach, Ley et al. (2016) base their analysis of the effect of energy prices on green innovation on 
end-use energy prices for the manufacturing sector from IEA.
14. Similar to Kaltenegger et al. (2017), we calculate energy costs as a sum of four cost components: (i) coal, lignite, 
and peat (CPA10), (ii) crude petroleum and natural gas; services incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding surveying 
(CPA11), (iii) coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuels (CPA23), and (iv) electrical energy, gas, steam and hot 
water (CPA40).
15.  We calibrate α2 country-specific, as we see quite substantial cross-country differences in the energy cost shares rang-
ing from below 4% to more than 15%.
142 / The Energy Journal
All rights reserved. Copyright © 2018 by the IAEE.
employment (total hours worked by persons engaged), which allows us to compute employment in 
the l-sector relative to the e-sector. Using the relative employment condition (A.16), we can then set 
the sectoral productivities to match the observed employment. Hence, also the direction of research 
is determined for each country.
4.2 Results
Given the Parameter choices outlined above, we simulate the efficiency, the structural, and 
the total effect for all countries in our sample. Figure 4 shows the correlation between the average 
annual growth rate of energy prices and energy intensity for all 26 countries between 1995–2007. 
The figure illustrates some core results of the model. The higher the growth rate of the energy price, 
the stronger is the reduction of energy intensity. The overall reduction of energy intensity seems, on 
average, larger in countries, where technical change is directed towards the labour-intensive sector.
The results for the efficiency effect and the structural effect are depicted in Figure 5. The 
figure shows the average annual growth rates for both effects based on our simulation. To cross-
check our results, we also calculated the respective growth rates based on the decomposition anal-
ysis by Voigt et al. (2014), who cover all 26 countries that we analyse in their decomposition study. 
Furthermore, they use WIOD data for their analysis, which is the basis for our calibration.
In 11 out of the 26 countries, research is directed towards the energy-intensive sector, i.e. 
Proposition 3 holds, and hence energy intensity dynamics should be dominated by the efficiency 
effect. This can be seen, e.g., for Germany. While the structural effect is positive, the efficiency 
effect is negative. As the growth rate of the energy price is above the threshold ,Λe TE, the total effect 
is negative. The restructuring towards the energy-intensive sector induced by innovation in this 
Figure 4:  Correlations between average annual growth rates of energy prices and energy 
intensities. The subscript e (l) denotes the direction of technical change towards the 
e-sector (l-sector).
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sector positively affects energy intensity, but is overcompensated by the energy savings within the 
e-sector. In contrast, the USA are an example for an economy that is relatively more advanced in the 
labour-intensive sector, i.e. Proposition 2 holds. As research is directed to the l-sector, we see a neg-
ative structural effect in the USA. The efficiency effect is negative as well, which implies an energy 
price growth rate above the growth rate of the energy price is above the threshold ,Λl EE.
In both cases, our model’s predictions are in line with the decomposition of Voigt et al. 
(2014). In some cases, our simulation results contradict their results. For Sweden, e.g., our model 
predicts research to be directed towards the energy-intensive sector resulting in a positive structural 
and a negative efficiency effect, whereas Voigt et al. (2014) finds a negative structural effect. The 
opposite discrepancy can be observed for Spain. In the latter case, however, our results are in line 
with Mulder and de Groot (2012), who find a negative structural effect for Spain in a similar period 
and hence are in line with our predictions.16
Overall, the simulation results of our stylised model seem to be largely consistent with 
the decomposition studies. To examine the sensitivity of our results, we used different methods to 
aggregate all available sectors into the energy-intensive and the labour-intensive sector. In a first 
alternative calibration, we only considered sectors with energy intensities of at least (not more than) 
10% above (below) the average as energy-intensive (labour-intensive). We repeated this for 25% 
and 50%. Hence, going from 10% to 50%, we excluded more sectors that are close to the average of 
the energy intensity, i.e. we focused more on sectors with very high and those with very low energy 
intensities. We also used sectoral energy costs per gross output, i.e. sectoral energy cost shares, as 
an alternative measure to split the sectors into the two groups.17 Similar to energy intensities, we 
also stepwise excluded sectors close to the average cost share and repeated the calibration exercise. 
Overall, the simulation results stayed qualitatively stable compared to our baseline scenario, which 
we consider to be the most suited for our model.
16. Table 2 in the Appendix depicts an overview of our simulation results, the results of Voigt et al. (2014) and addi-
tionally those of Mulder and de Groot (2012), who computed average annual growth rate for all three effects between 1995 
and 2005.
17. See footnote 14 for the approach to calculate sectoral energy costs.
Figure 5:  Efficiency effect and structural effect—Simulation Results and Results of Voigt et al. 
(2014)
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5. DISCUSSION
Our model provides insights on the impacts of energy prices and technical change on the 
development of energy intensity and, in particular, the relative importance of structural adjustments 
between sectors and energy efficiency improvements within sectors. Furthermore, our model pre-
dicts a negative effect of energy price growth on economy-wide energy intensity, which is in line 
with empirical evidence (Loschel et al., 2015; Metcalf, 2008; Moshiri and Duah, 2016; Popp, 2002). 
Our simulations illustrate how these two effects predicted by our model vary between countries.
We show that energy intensity reductions are driven by the efficiency effect, when re-
search is directed to the energy-intensive sector, which can be seen in the simulation results for, 
e.g., Austria or Germany. This efficiency effect is driven by technical change in the e-sector as well 
as factor substitution induced by energy price growth, which is in line with empirical findings. 
Fisher-Vanden et al. (2016) empirically investigate energy intensive industries and find that higher 
energy prices and R&D stocks negatively affect energy intensity in these industries. Steinbuks and 
Neuhoff (2014) analyse various industries and show that the effect of energy price is higher for 
energy intensive industries and that labour is a substitute for energy. Wang (2013) conducts a de-
composition of the efficiency effect in underlying driving forces and shows that technical progress 
is the the main contributor to energy intensity reductions in Europe. According to Popp (2001), two 
thirds of the energy savings in energy-intensive industries are due to factor substitution, while one 
third is due to innovation.
When research is directed to the labour-intensive sector, the model predicts that structural 
adjustments are a main driver of energy intensity developments. Examples for this case are France 
or the USA in our simulation exercise. According to our model, the efficiency effect is negative as 
well if the energy price growth rate is above the positive threshold ,Λl EE, which is the case for all 
the countries in our sample. However, the results of the long-run decomposition study by Sue Wing 
(2008), covering the second half of the 20th century, provide some further evidence on the relation-
ship between ,Λl EE and efficiency effect in this case. Sue Wing (2008) decomposes energy intensity 
in the USA and shows that, in the period between 1958 and the energy price shock 1974–1986, en-
ergy price was decreasing and the efficiency effect in the USA was positive. According to our model, 
the efficiency effect is positive if the energy price growth rate is below the positive threshold ,Λl EE
, which is in line with the empirical evidence. For energy price growth rates below the threshold, 
there are no incentives to substitute away from energy and hence the efficiency effect is positive. In 
the period we analyse, the average energy price growth rate is above ,Λl EE and hence induces substi-
tution away from energy and resulting in a negative efficiency effect.
We further show that strong (negative) energy price growth may redirect technical change. 
In our sample, however, we did not observe strong positive or negative growth rates of the energy 
price.18 The scenario of strong energy price growth could be applied to the periods of the energy 
crises and their aftermath (1974–1986) that were characterised by dramatic increases in energy costs 
(Alpanda and Peralta-Alva, 2010; Linn, 2008; Sue Wing, 2008). In case of gross substitutes, our 
model predicts stronger energy intensity reductions for strong energy price growth. This finding is in 
line with, e.g. Sun (1998), who analyses the period 1973–1990 and shows that the reduction in en-
ergy intensity was particularly strong in the periods 1973–1980 (14.25%) and 1980–1985 (12.52%). 
Although this period of strong energy price growth was temporary, it could have redirected techno-
logical progress from the energy-intensive to the labour-intensive sector, as outlined in Section 3.
18. The period since the late 1980s, particularly since the late 1990s, has been mainly characterised by moderately grow-
ing energy prices (Lee and Lee, 2009; Ley et al., 2016; Narayan and Narayan, 2007; Regnier, 2007).
Directed Technical Change and Energy Intensity Dynamics / 145
Copyright © 2018 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
Our model is highly stylized compared to the complex reality. We used some simplifi-
cations in order to identify the effects of energy price and directed technical change on energy 
intensity dynamics as clearly as possible. Hence, there is room for extensions of our approach. One 
simplifying assumption we used was an exogenous energy price and did not explicitly model energy 
generation. We think that this assumption is not too critical, as we do not attempt to do an analysis 
or predictions for the (very) long run. Furthermore, we interpret the energy price as the final energy 
price faced by producers including all taxes, which are exogenous from the producers’ perspective. 
According to Sato et al. (2015), the cross-country variation in final industrial energy prices is largely 
explained by variations in the tax component (e.g., around 60% for electricity and 50%–80% for 
oil).19 However, in reality the energy price is not independent of demand. An extension of the model 
could be to introduce an endogenous energy price by, e.g., introducing resource extraction or an 
energy production sector. Although we do not model an endogenous energy price, we are able to 
assess how such an extension would affect our results. In our model, energy price growth induces, 
e.g., a more efficient use of energy, which does not have any effects on its price. With endogenous 
energy prices, this price-induced reduction of energy use could in turn dampen the energy price in-
crease. Hence, the introduction of an endogenous energy price in this model would probably reduce 
the magnitude of the efficiency and structural effects we predict. In order to explicitly analyse the 
effect of energy taxes/subsidies, the end-use energy price could be split up in a wholesale price and 
tax/subsidy component ( = τ+E Wc c ). Although we assumed the price to implicitly include effects of 
regulatory instruments, as taxes, we are able to gain some insights on energy-saving policies. A tax 
on energy, e.g., increases the end-user price of energy and hence negatively affects energy intensity. 
However, such a policy would mainly work through energy intensity reductions within the ener-
gy-intensive sector, which is in line with the findings of Mulder (2015). A redirection of research to 
the labour-intensive sector would require very high price increases.
For our analysis, we needed a model with at least two sectors that differ in their energy 
intensity. We followed the majority of the DTC literature by introducing one final good that is as-
sembled from two sectoral goods. This choice, however, does not drive any of the results. The pro-
duction function for the aggregate output Y could also be interpreted as the households’ preferences 
for sectoral output (Pittel and Bretschger, 2010). To introduce a difference in energy-intensity across 
sectors, we chose to assume that the productivity of energy in the labour-intensive sector is zero, 
which reduces the production function of ( )lY t  and hence simplifies the analysis. Such a sectoral 
structure is commonly used for analyses in two-sector DTC models, where one sector is more en-
ergy-, resource-, or emission-intensive than the other (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Daubanes et al., 2013; 
Di Maria and Valente, 2008; Di Maria and van der Werf, 2008b; Pittel and Bretschger, 2010). This 
simplifying assumption—energy input is only included in one sector—allows for a clear identifi-
cation of the efficiency and the structural effect and their driving forces. Of course, one might also 
think of an alternative and more realistic modelling of this sector structure. A possibility could be 
to introduce energy input in both sectors, but introduce differences between the sectoral production 
functions to model the difference in energy intensity, e.g., by assuming energy and other factors to 
be complements in one sector and substitutes in the other. Such extensions, however, might affect 
the model’s tractability and make it more complex, or even impossible, to analytically decompose 
energy intensity changes into efficiency and structural effect.
19. Due to this attribute, end-use energy price indices are used as proxies for environmental policy stringency in empir-
ical studies, as Sato and Dechezlepretre (2015) and Aldy and Pizer (2015).
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6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we used a DTC model with an energy-intensive and a labour-intensive sector 
to analyse the adverse developments of energy intensities across countries. We decomposed energy 
intensity into a structural effect and an efficiency effect in order to investigate their dynamics due to 
the direction of research and energy price growth.
Our main contribution to the literature is a first attempt to theoretically analyse the de-
terminants of heterogeneous energy intensity trends based on a dynamic model with endogenous 
technical change. So far, studies analysing the trends in energy intensities and the interaction of the 
driving forces, as the structural and efficiency effect, have been empirical. With increasing availabil-
ity of data and sophisticated methodologies, these studies, particularly those using decomposition 
methods, have shown extensive and fruitful insights into energy intensity trends that substantially 
differ across countries. We offer an explanation why structural adjustments drive energy intensity 
reductions in certain countries whereas they are dominated by within-sector efficiency improve-
ments in others.
We have analysed how energy price growth and the relative productivity of labour- and 
energy-intensive sectors affect the direction of research and hence the direction and magnitude of 
the aforementioned two effects. For the case of gross substitutes, we have shown that in economies 
that are relatively more advanced in the labour-intensive sector, research is directed to this sector 
and the energy intensity developments are mainly driven by the structural effect. In economies with 
a relatively more productive energy-intensive sector, the efficiency effect dominates the evolution of 
energy intensity. When both sectoral goods are gross complements and research is directed to both 
sectors, energy intensity dynamics are solely driven by the efficiency effect as the relative sector size 
remains constant. Energy price growth generally negatively affects energy intensity developments 
and strong positive (negative) growth rates of the energy price can ultimately redirect technical 
change. Finally, we have calibrated the model to empirical data to illustrate how differences in en-
ergy price growth and sectoral productivities affect energy intensity trends across 26 OECD coun-
tries. In spite of our very stylised model, the results are largely consistent with empirical studies.
An area of future work might be an empirical investigation of the elasticity of substitution 
between sectors with high and low energy intensities. As our approach is a first step to theoretically 
analyse underlying drivers of energy intensity dynamics, extensions or alternative theoretical mod-
elling strategies seem a fruitful direction of further research. In addition to the proposed extensions 
discussed above, it would be valuable to develop a multi-country model that could be used to anal-
yse between-country structural adjustments caused by international trade, as the data indicates struc-
tural adjustments in production between countries. Overall, theoretical research appears to have a 
potential for important additional insights, as the empirical literature has taught us a great deal about 
energy intensity developments and its decomposition, whereas the underlying determinants are still 
largely unexplored.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Sectoral Energy Intensities
Sector Energy Intensity* 
Real Estate Activities (sec70) 0.49 
Financial Intermediation (secJ) 0.55 
Transport Equipment (sec34t35) 0.79 
Electrical and Optical Equipment (sec30t33) 0.81 
Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities (sec71t74) 0.99 
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles (sec51) 1.03 
Machinery, Nec (sec29) 1.10 
Leather, Leather and Footwear (sec19) 1.26 
Post and Telecommunications (sec64) 1.33 
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling (sec36t37) 1.37 
Health and Social Work (secN) 1.45 
Education (secM) 1.45 
Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel (sec50) 1.57 
Construction (secF) 1.70 
Rubber and Plastics (sec25) 1.76 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco (sec15t16) 1.84 
Other Community, Social and Personal Services (secO) 1.95 
Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods (sec52) 2.05 
Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; Activities of Travel Agencies (sec63) 2.12 
Hotels and Restaurants (secH) 2.21 
Textiles and Textile Products (sec17t18) 2.31 
Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security (secL) 3.15 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (secAtB) 4.43 
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork (sec20) 4.69 
Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing (sec21t22) 5.18 
Inland Transport (sec60) 6.52 
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal (sec27t28) 7.15 
Other Non-Metallic Mineral (sec26) 9.10 
Mining and Quarrying (secC) 12.28 
Chemicals and Chemical Products (sec24) 15.11 
Water Transport (sec61) 22.66 
Air Transport (sec62) 24.26 
* Energy intensity = energy use / gross output, measured in gross energy use in TJ per millions of US. 
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Online Technical Appendices
A. SOLVING FOR THE EQUILIBRIUM
In order to simplify notation, we drop the time index in Appendix A. Due to perfect competition on
market for the final product, the profit-maximising behaviour of the final good producer results in the
following relative demand for both sectoral goods:
pl
pe
=
(
Yl
Ye
)− 1
. (A.1)
This price ratio implies that the relative price is inversely related to the relative supply of both sectors.
Defining the final good as numeraire, the price index can be written as(
p1−l + p
1−
e
) 1
1−
= 1. (A.2)
Sectoral producers maximise their profits by choosing the quantities of the respective sector
specific machines and labour,
max
xli,Ll
{
ΠYl = plL
1−α
l
∫ 1
0
A1−αli x
α
lidi − wLl −
∫ 1
0
pli xlidi
}
, (A.3)
as well as, in the case of the e-sector, the amount of energy,
max
xei,Le,E
{
ΠYe = peE
α2L1−αe
∫ 1
0
A1−α1ei x
α1
ei di − wLe −
∫ 1
0
pei xeidi − cEE
}
. (A.4)
Profit-maximisation yields the sectoral demands for machine i in the labour-intensive sector,
xli =
(
αpl
pli
) 1
1−α
LlAli, (A.5)
and in the energy-intensive sector,
xei =
(
α1peEα2L1−αe
pei
) 1
1−α1
Aei . (A.6)
The demands for machines increase in the price of the respective sector’s output (pj), employed labour
in the sector (Lj), and the quality of the individual technology (Aji).
Machines are produced under monopolistic competition. The producer of each variety
maximises her profit (piji =
(
pji − ψ
)
xji) given the demand for her variety. The optimisations yield
the price setting rules for monopolists in both sectors, that are pli = ψ/α for machine producers in the
l-sector and pei = ψ/α1 for machine producers in the e-sector. Using these prices and the demands
1
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for machines in both sectors, (A.5) and (A.6), the equilibrium profits of machine producers in the
labour-intensive sector are
pili = (1 − α)α 1+α1−α
(
1
ψ
) α
1−α
p
1
1−α
l
LlAli, (A.7)
whereas the profits in the energy-intensive sector are
piei = (1 − α1)α
1+α1
1−α1
1
(
1
ψα1
) 1
1−α1
p
1
1−α1
e E
α2
1−α1 L
1−α
1−α1
e Aei . (A.8)
Profit maximisation in the energy-intensive and labour-intensive sectors yields the following
first-order conditions:
Ll =
©­« w(1 − α) pl ∫ 10 A1−αli xαlidi ª®¬
− 1α
, (A.9)
Le =
©­« w(1 − α) peEα2 ∫ 10 A1−α1ei xα1ei di ª®¬
− 1α
, and (A.10)
E = ©­« cEpeα2L1−αe ∫ 10 A1−α1ei xα1ei di ª®¬
1
α2−1
. (A.11)
Plugging the equilibrium quantity of machines (A.5) into (3) yields the production of
labour-intensive output:
Yl = LlAl
(
α2pl
ψ
) α
1−α
. (A.12)
Plugging (A.6) into (A.11) yields the equilibrium quantity of energy:
E =
( (α1)2
ψ
) α11−α (α2Ae
cE
) 1−α1
1−α
p
1
1−α
e Le (A.13)
Combining (A.13) and (A.6) with (4) yields the production of the energy-intensive good as:
Ye =
( (α1)2
ψ
) α11−α (α2Ae
cE
) α2
1−α
p
α
1−α
e LeAe . (A.14)
Equilibrium on the labour market implies an identical wage in both sectors. Equating (A.9)
and (A.10), together with (A.13), (A.6), and (A.5), yields the relative price:
pl
pe
=
ψα2 (α1)2α1 (α2)α2 A1−α1e
cα2E α
2αA1−α
l
. (A.15)
The relative price (A.1) yields, together with the sectoral production quantities,(A.12) and
(A.14), the relative supply in both sectors. Combining relative supply and with relative demands
yields the relative employment as:
Ll
Le
=
(
cα2E α
2α
ψα2 (α1)2α1 (α2)α2
)−1
A−ϕ
l
A−ϕ1e
(A.16)
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with ϕ1 ≡ (1 − α1) (1 − ) and ϕ ≡ (1 − α) (1 − ).
Finally, the equilibrium prices and quantities can be calculated. The price ratio (A.15),
together with the price index (A.2), leads to the equilibrium prices in both sectors:
pl =
ψα2α2α11 α
α2
2 A
1−α1
e( (
α2αcα2E
)1− Aϕ
l
+
(
ψα2α2α11 α
α2
2
)1−
Aϕ1e
) 1
1−
, (A.17)
pe =
α2αcα2E A
1−α
l( (
α2αcα2E
)1− Aϕ
l
+
(
ψα2α2α11 α
α2
2
)1−
Aϕ1e
) 1
1−
. (A.18)
Combining the prices with input demands yields the equilibrium employment of labour in both sectors
Ll =
(
ψα2α2α11 α
α2
2
)1−
Aϕ1e( (
α2αcα2E
)1− Aϕ
l
+
(
ψα2α2α11 α
α2
2
)1−
Aϕ1e
) , (A.19)
Le =
(
cα2E α
2α)1− Aϕ
l( (
α2αcα2E
)1− Aϕ
l
+
(
ψα2α2α11 α
α2
2
)1−
Aϕ1e
) (A.20)
as well as equilibrium energy use in the energy-intensive sector
E =
(
α21
ψ
) α1
1−α
α
1−α1
1−α
2 α
2α( 11−α −+1)cα2−1−α2E A1+ϕl A
1−α1
1−α
e( (
α2αcα2E
)1− Aϕ
l
+
(
ψα2α2α11 α
α2
2
)1−
Aϕ1e
) 1+ϕ
ϕ
. (A.21)
Plugging these optimal inputs into (A.12) and (A.14) yields the the equilibrium outputs in the labour-
and energy-intensive sector as
Yl =
α
2α
1−α ψ
α1(α2−1)
1−α α
2α1(1−+α)
1−α
1 α
α2(1−−α)
1−α
2 A
1−α1
1−α (α+ϕ)
e Al( (
α2αcα2E
)1− Aϕ
l
+
(
ψα2α2α11 α
α2
2
)1−
Aϕ1e
) α+ϕ
ϕ
, (A.22)
Ye =
(
α21
ψ
) α1
1−α
α
α2
1−α
2 α
2α( 11−α −)c−α2E Aα+ϕl A
1−α1
1−α
e( (
α2αcα2E
)1− Aϕ
l
+
(
ψα2α2α11 α
α2
2
)1−
Aϕ1e
) α+ϕ
ϕ
. (A.23)
B. EQUILIBRIUM PROFIT RATIO AND ALLOCATION OF RESEARCHERS
B.1 Relative Profitability of Research
Since scientists only direct a sector and are randomly allocated to a specific machine variety, the
average sectoral productivity is used as defined in (5). Combining (A.7) and (A.8) and taking into
account the probabilities of a successful innovation, ηj , the expected firm value (i.e. expected profit)
Copyright © 2016 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
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of an innovation in the l-sector, Πl(t), relative to an innovation in the e-sector, Πe(t), is:
Πl(t)
Πe(t) = ω
ηl
ηe
· pl(t)
1
1−α
pe(t)
1
1−α1︸     ︷︷     ︸
price effect
· Ll(t)
E(t)
α2
1−α1 Le(t)
1−α
1−α1︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
market size effect
· Al(t)
Ae(t)︸︷︷︸
direct
productivity effect
(B.1)
with ω ≡ (1 − α)α 1+α1−α (1 − α1)−1 α
− 1+α11−α1
1 ψ
α+α1
(1−α)(1−α1) . Analogously to the Directed Technical Change
literature (Acemoglu, 1998, 2002), relative profitability of innovating is affected by a price- and a
market size effect. The price effect directs innovation in the sector with the higher price. The market
size effect makes innovations more attractive in the sector, where more factors of production, labour
and energy, are employed. Since a larger market size is associated with a lower price for the output
of the respective sector, both effects are opposite forces. Finally, the term Al(t)/Ae(t) captures a
direct productivity effect as introduced by Acemoglu et al. (2012). This effect directs innovation to
the sector that is technologically further advanced and hence follows the concept of “building on
the shoulders of giants”. In addition to these three forces, the respective probabilities of successful
research, ηl and ηe, affect the relative profits.
B.2 Allocation of Researchers
With strong positive (negative) energy price growth, i.e. ηeγ (1 − α1) /α2 < γcE < (−ηlγ (1 − α) /α2),
the direction of the change of relative profit is independent of research.
Proof: For  > 1, it follows with (8), (9), and (10) that,
d
(
Πl (t)
Πe (t)
)
dt
= α2( − 1)γcE + ϕ1seηeγ − ϕslηlγ > 0 ⇔ γce > ηeγ(1 − α1)/α2
and
d
(
Πl (t)
Πe (t)
)
dt
= α2( − 1)γcE + ϕ1seηeγ − ϕslηlγ < 0 ⇔ γce < −ηlγ(1 − α)/α2.

From that it follows that for moderate energy price growth, i.e. −ηlγ (1 − α) /α2 ≤ γcE ≤
ηeγ (1 − α1) /α2, the direction of the change of relative profit is not independent of research.
Moderate energy price growth
In the case of substitutes ( > 1):
1. From equation (10) and with s(t) ≡ sl(t) it follows that
d
Πli(t)
Πei(t)
/dt R 0 if s(t) R
α2( − 1)γcEγ + ηlϕ1
ϕηl + ϕ1ηe
≡ s∗∗. (B.2)
Proof:
d
Πli(t)
Πei(t)
/dt R 0⇔ 0 Q
d Πli(t )
Πei(t ) /dt
Πli(t )
Πei(t )
=
α2( − 1)
cE (t)
dcE (t)
dt
− ϕ
Al(t)
dAl(t)
dt
+
ϕ1
Ae(t)
dAe(t)
dt
.
Copyright © 2016 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
5 / The Energy Journal
Using equation (8) and (9) yields:
0 Q α2( − 1)γc − ϕsl(t)γηl + ϕ1se(t)γηe
⇔ s(t) R
α2( − 1)γcEγ + ηlϕ1
ϕηl + ϕ1ηe
≡ s∗∗.

2. At time t = z there exists a unique equilibrium research allocation s∗(t = z) with research
directed to sector l (e) only, i.e. s(t = z) = 1 (s(t = z) = 0), if
A(t = z) ≡ Ae(t = z)
(1−α1)
Al(t = z)(1−α)
(>)
<
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1
.
Proof: Using equation (10) yields:
Πl(t)
Πe(t) = κ
ηlcE (t)α2(−1)
ηe
Al(t)−ϕ
Ae(t)−ϕ1
(<)
> 1⇔
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1 (<)
>
Ae(t)(1−α1)
Al(t)(1−α
≡ A(t).

If s∗(t = z) ∈ {0, 1} is an equilibrium in t = z than it is also an equilibrium in all t > z (follows
from (B.2)).
3. At time t = z there exist multiple equilibria s ∈ [0, 1] if
A(t = z) =
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1
.
Proof:
Πl(t)
Πe(t) = κ
ηlcE (t)α2(−1)
ηe
Al(t)−ϕ
Ae(t)−ϕ1 = 1⇔
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1
=
Ae(t)(1−α1)
Al(t)(1−α
≡ A(t).

If s∗(t = z) ∈ (0, 1) is an equilibrium in t = z then s∗(t = z) ∈ (0, 1) is also an equilibrium in
t > z if and only if s∗(t) = s∗∗ ∀ t ≥ z. If s∗(t) (<)> s∗∗ there will be research in sector l (e) only
in all t > z (follows from (B.2)).
In the case of complements ( < 1):
1. From equation (10) follows:
d
Πli(t)
Πei(t)
/dt R 0 if s(t = z) Q s∗∗.
Proof: Analogue to the case of substitutes ( > 1) and moderate energy price growth. 
2. At time t = z there exists a unique equilibrium research allocation s∗ with research directed to
sector l (e) only, i.e. s(t = z) = 1 (s(t = z) = 0), if
A(t = z) (<)>
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1
.
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Proof: See proof for  > 1 and moderate energy price growth. 
With s∗(t = z) ∈ {0, 1},
1 − Πli(t )Πei(t )  decreases over time and hence there exists a time τ > z,
where Πli(t=τ)
Πei(t=τ) = 1
(
⇔ A(t = τ) =
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
 −1
)
.
3. At time t = z there exist multiple equilibria s∗ ∈ [0, 1], if
A(t = z) =
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1
.
If s∗(t = z) ∈ (0, 1) is an equilibrium in t = z than s∗(t = z) ∈ (0, 1) is also an equilibrium in all
t > z if and only if s∗(t) = s∗∗ ∀ t ≥ z.
We assume s∗ = s∗∗ (i.e. the dynamically stable equilibrium) in the case of an inner equilibrium.
This is also the technical result for longer patent duration (see Appendix D).
Strong energy price growth
In the case of substitutes ( > 1):
1. At time t = z there exists a unique equilibrium research allocation s∗(t = z) with research
directed to sector l (e) only, i.e. s(t = z) = 1 (s(t = z) = 0), if
A(t = z) = Ae(t = z)
(1−α!)
Al(t = z)(1−α
(>)
<
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
 −1
. (B.3)
Proof: Using equation (10) yields:
Πl(t)
Πe(t) = κ
ηlcE (t)α2(−1)
ηe
Al(t)−ϕ
Ae(t)−ϕ1
(<)
> 1⇔
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1 (<)
>
Ae(t)(1−α!)
Al(t)(1−α
≡ A(t).

If A(t = z) (>)<
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1 and with strong positive (negative) energy price growth,
s∗(t = z) = 1 (0) is an equilibrium in t = z and in all t > z (follows from Lemma 2).
If A(t = z) (<>
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1 and with strong positive (negative) energy price growth,
s∗(t = z) = 0 (1) is an equilibrium in t = z and since
1 − Πli(t )Πei(t )  increases over time, there exists
a time τ > z, such that Πli(t=τ)
Πei(t=τ) = 1 and
Πli(t )
Πei(t )
(<)
> 1 for all t > τ, leading to an equilibrium with
research directed only to sector l (e) for all t > τ.
2. At time t = z there exist multiple equilibria s ∈ [0, 1] if
A(t = z) =
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1
.
Proof:
Πl(t)
Πe(t) = κ
ηlcE (t)α2(−1)
ηe
Al(t)−ϕ
Ae(t)−ϕ1 = 1⇔
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
1−
=
Ae(t)(1−α1)
Al(t)(1−α
≡ A(t).

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With strong positive (negative) energy price growth, s∗(t) = 1 (= 0) is the unique equilibrium
in all t > z (follows from Lemma 2).
In the case of complements ( < 1):
1. At time t = z there exists a unique equilibrium research allocation s∗(t = z) with all research
directed to sector l (e), i.e. s(t = z) = 1 (s(t = z) = 0), if
A(t = z) (>)<
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1
. (B.4)
If A(t = z) (>)<
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1 and with strong positive (negative) energy price growth,
s∗(t = z) = 0 (1) is an equilibrium in t = z and in all t > z (follows from Lemma 2).
If A(t = z) (<>
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1 and with strong positive (negative) energy price growth,
s∗(t = z) = 1 (0) is a unique equilibrium in t = z and since
1 − Πli(t )Πei(t )  increases over time, there
exists a time τ > z, such that Πli(t=τ)
Πei(t=τ) = 1 and
Πli(t )
Πei(t )
(<)
> 1 for all t > τ, leading to an equilibrium
with all research directed to sector l (e) for all t > τ.
2. At time t = z there exist multiple equilibria s∗ ∈ [0, 1], if
A(t = z) =
(
ηe
κηlcE (t)α2(−1)
) 1
−1
.
With strong positive (negative) energy price growth, s∗(t) = 0 (= 1) is the unique equilibrium
in all t > z (follows from (B.4)).
C. STRUCTURAL EFFECT AND EFFICIENCY EFFECT
Proof of Proposition 1
γ E
Y
= [(α2S − 1) − Sα2]γcE + [(1 − α)S − S(1 − α)]γAl + [−(1 − α1)S + S(1 − α1)]γAe
Proof:
i. Follows from equation (17) with γAe > 0, γAl = 0, and γcE = 0:
structural effect = (1 − α1)SγAe > 0,
efficiency effect = −(1 − α1)SγAe < 0,
structural effect + efficiency effect ≡ γ E
Y
= ( − 1)(1 − α1)SγAe
(<)
> 0⇔  (<)> 1
ii. Follows from equation (17) with γAe = 0, γAl > 0, and γcE = 0:
structural effect = −(1 − α)SγAl < 0,
efficiency effect = (1 − α)SγAl > 0,
structural effect + efficiency effect ≡ γ E
Y
= (1 − )(1 − α)SγAl
(>)
< 0⇔  (<)> 1
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iii. Follows from equation (17) with γAe = 0, γAl = 0, and γcE , 0:
structural effect = −Sα2γcE
(>)
< 0⇔ γcE
(<)
> 0,
efficiency effect = −(1 − α2S)γcE
(>)
< 0⇔ γcE
(<)
> 0,
structural effect + efficiency effect ≡ γ E
Y
=
(>)
< 0⇔ γcE
(<)
> 0.

Proof of Proposition 2
Proof:
i. Follows from equation (18):
total effect =
[
α2(1 − ) A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
− 1
]
γcE +
[
ϕ A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
]
γηl < 0
⇔ γcE >
ϕA1−
(α2(1 − ) − 1) A1− − θcα2(1− )E
γηl ≡ Λl,TE
(<)
> 0⇔  (<)> 1,
∂Λl,TE
∂A
= − (1 − )ϕA
− θcα2(1− )E[
(α2(1 − ) − 1) A1− + θcα2(1− )E
]2 γηe < 0.
ii. Follows from equation (14):
efficiency effect =
(α2 − 1)A1− − θcα2(1− )E
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
γcE +
(1 − α)A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
γηl < 0,
⇔ γcE >
(1 − α)A1−
(1 − α2)A1− + θcα2(1− )E
γηl ≡ Λl,EE > 0.
∂Λl,EE
∂A
=
ϕA− θcα2(1− )E[
(1 − α2)A1− + θcα2(1− )E
]2 γηl (>)< 0⇔  (<)> 1.
iii. Follows from equation (16):
structural effect =
A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
(−α2γcE − (1 − α)γηl) < 0⇔ γcE > −
(1 − α)
α2
ηlγ.

Proof of Proposition 3
Proof:
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i. Follows from equation (18):
total effect =
[
α2(1 − ) A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
− 1
]
γcE +
[
−ϕ1 A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
]
γηe < 0
⇔ γcE >
ϕ1A1−
(α2(1 − ) − 1) A1− − θcα2(1− )E
γηe ≡ Λe,TE
(<)
> 0⇔  (<)> 1,
∂Λe,TE
∂A
= − (1 − )ϕ1A
− θcα2(1− )E[
(α2(1 − ) − 1) A1− + θcα2(1− )E
]2 γηe < 0.
ii. Follows from equation (14):
efficiency effect =
[
α2 A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
− 1
]
γcE +
[
−(1 − α1) A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
]
γηe < 0
⇔ γcE > −
(1 − α1)A1−
(1 − α2)A1− + θcα2(1− )E
γηe ≡ Λe,EE < 0,
∂Λe,EE
∂A
= − ϕ1A
− θcα2(1− )E[
(1 − α2)A1− + θcα2(1− )E
]2 γηe (<)> 0⇔  (<)> 1.
iii. Follows from equation (16):
structural effect =
[
− α2A
1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
]
γcE +
[
 (1 − α1) A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
]
γηe < 0⇔ γcE >
(1 − α1)
α2
ηeγ.

Proof of Proposition 4
Proof:
i. Follows from (16):
structural effect = − A
1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
α2γcE −
A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
(1 − α)γηl
α2( − 1)γcEγ + ηeϕ1
ηeϕ1 + ηlϕ
+
A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
(1 − α1)γηe
−α2( − 1)γcEγ + ηlϕ
ηeϕ1 + ηlϕ
= − A
1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
α2γcE +
A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
α2γcE
(1 − α)ηl + (1 − α1)ηe
ηl(1 − α) + ηe(1 − α1)
+
A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
γ
(1 − α)ηlηe(1 − α1) − (1 − α1)ηeηl(1 − α)
ηl(1 − α) + ηe(1 − α1)
=0.
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Follows from (14):
efficiency effect =
(
α2
A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
− 1
)
γcE + (1 − α)
A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
γηl
α2( − 1)γcEγ + ηeϕ1
ηeϕ1 + ηlϕ
− (1 − α1) A
1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
γηe
−α2( − 1)γcEγ + ηlϕ
ηeϕ1 + ηlϕ
=
(
α2
A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
− 1
)
γcE +
(−1)(1 − α) A1−
A1−+θcα2(1− )E
ηlα2γcE
ηe(1 − α1) + ηl(1 − α)
−
(1 − α1) A1−
A1−+θcα2(1− )E
ηeα2γcE
ηe(1 − α1) + ηl(1 − α)
+
(1 − α) A1−
A1−+θcα2(1− )E
γηeηl(1 − α1) − (1 − α1) A1−
A1−+θcα2(1− )E
γηeηl(1 − α)
ηe(1 − α1) + ηl(1 − α)
=
(
α2
A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
− 1
)
γcE −
A1−
A1− + θcα2(1− )E
α2γcE
(1 − α)ηl − (1 − α1)ηe
ηe(1 − α1) + ηl(1 − α)
= − γcE .
ii. As γcE > ηeγ (1 − α1) /α2 > Λe,EE < 0 (see Proposition 3), the efficiency effect is negative.
For γcE > ηeγ (1 − α1) /α2, the structural effect is negative (see Proposition 3). Hence, the
total effect must be negative.
iii. As γcE < ηlγ (1 − α) /α2 < Λl,EE > 0 (see Proposition 2), the efficiency effect is positive.
For γcE < ηlγ (1 − α) /α2, the structural effect is positve (see Proposition 2). Hence, the total
effect must be positive.

D. DIRECTION OF TECHNICAL CHANGEWITH INFINITE-DURATION PATENTS
Scientists choose to direct their research at the sector with higher expected firm value (discounted
flow of future profits as entrepreneur):
E
[
Vji(t = z)
]
=
∫ ∞
z
E
[
piji(t)
]
exp
(
−
∫ t
z
(
1 − E [sj(t)] ηj ) dt) dt with j ∈ {e, l}.
The expected relative value of firm i in sector j at time t = z comprises current (at time z) and
discounted future (t > z) expected profits (E
[
piji(t)
]
). The expected discount rate (1 − E[sj(t)]ηj)
depends on the expected research effort in sector j at each time t (E[sj(t)]) and the probability of
successful research (ηj). Expected relative firm value at t = z is defined as
V(t = z) ≡ E [Vli(t = z)]
E [Vei(t = z)] .
Substitutes (i.e.  > 1):
Since equilibrium research allocation depends crucially on the expected discount rate, the subsequent
discussion of research equilibria is structured along three discount rate cases (for special cases see 1.
& 3., general case 2.):
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1. For (1 − E[sj(t)]ηj) → 0, V(t = z) → Πli (t=z)Πei (t=z) , i.e. relative firm value reduces to current
relative firm profits. Results of Appendix B can be applied.
2. For 0 < (1 − E[sj(t)]ηj) < 1 and since ∂E[Vj i (t=z)]∂Π j i (t) > 0,
∂E[Π j i (t)]
∂A j (t) > 0,
∂E[Π j i (t)]
∂A j (t) >
∂E[Πsector, j, i (t)]
∂A j (t) , limA j (t)→0
E[Πji(t)] = 0, lim
A j (t)→∞
E[Πji(t)] = ∞ for each set of parameters there
exists a unique relative technology (Al(t = z)/Ae(t = z))∗ such that Vli (t=z) |s(t )=1Vei (t=z) |s(t )=0
 Al (t=z)
Ae (t=z)=
(
Al (t=z)
Ae (t=z)
)∗ =
1. With Al (t=z)Ae (t=z)
(<)
>
(
Al (t=z)
Ae (t=z)
)∗
, research will take place in the l-sector (e-sector) only. With
Al (t=z)
Ae (t=z) =
(
Al (t=z)
Ae (t=z)
)∗
there exists a unique equilibrium (s∗∗ ∈ (0, 1)) with research directed to
both sectors.
(a) With moderate energy price growth the expected relative profit (and therefore the expected
relative firm value (V(t))) increases (decreases) if research is directed to sector l (e) only
(Proof: see (B.2)). Therefore a research equilibrium s∗ ∈ {0, 1} at time z is always a
research equilibrium in t > z. An inner equilibrium in t = z, s∗(t = z) = s∗∗, is an inner
equilibrium if and only if s∗(t) = s∗∗ ∀ t ≥ z. With s∗(t = z) (<)> s∗∗ research will take
place in sector l (e) for all t > z (follows from (B.2)).
(b) With strong positive (negative) energy price growth and Al (t=z)Ae (t=z)
(<)
>
(
Al (t=z)
Ae (t=z)
)∗
research
will occur in sector l (e) at t = z and all t > z (follows from (B.3)). If Al (t=z)Ae (t=z)
(>)
<
(
Al (t=z)
Ae (t=z)
)∗
and with strong positive (negative) energy price growth, research will at t = z take place in
the e-sector (l-sector) only. Since strong positive (negative) energy price growth increases
(decreases) V(t), there exists a time τ > z where V(τ) = 1 and V(t > τ) (<)> 1, leading to
research equilibrium in sector l (e) for all t > τ (follows from (B.3)). There are multiple
equilibria with s∗(t = z) ∈ [0, 1] if Al (t=z)Ae (t=z) =
(
Al (t=z)
Ae (t=z)
)∗
and a unique equilibrium with all
research in sector l (e) for all t > z in the case of strong positive (negative) energy price
growth.
3. For (1 − E[sj(t)]ηj) → 1 and moderate energy price growth, V(t = z) → 1 and there exist
two equilibria with all research directed to the e- or the l-sector and multiple equilibria with
research directed to both sectors (i.e. s ∈ (0, 1)). With strong positive (negative) energy price
growth there exists a unique equilibrium with all research directed to sector l (e), as dΠe i(t)dt → 0
( dΠl i(t)dt → 0) and therefore V(t = z) →
(0)∞.
For discount rates smaller than 1, i.e. 0 ≤ (1 − E[sj(t)]ηj) < 1, from 1. and 2. it follows that
alternative patent terms do not induce qualitative differences in the research equilibrium at t = z.
Research takes place in the relatively more advanced sector; patent terms only affect the level of
relative technology threshold (Al/Ae)∗.
In the case of strong positive (negative) energy price growth and Al (t=z)Ae (t=z)
(>)
<
(
Al (t=z)
Ae (t=z)
)∗
, patent duration
affects the timing of the redirection of technical change from the e- to the l-sector (l- to the e-sector).
The lower the discount rate the earlier technical change is redirected.
Complements (i.e.  < 1):
With moderate energy price growth, in finite time V(t) = 1 holds and s∗∗ is the equilibrium research
allocation (analogue to moderate energy price growth and complements in AppendixB). With strong
positive (negative) energy price growth, in finite timeV(t) (>)< 1 holds and s = 0 (= 1) is the equilibrium
research allocation (analogue to strong energy price growth and complements in AppendixB).
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1. Introduction
Contests are situations in which competing individuals or teams exert costly efforts to win
prizes. Winning economic contests is of obvious importance in our highly competitive mar-
ket economy. Therefore, much previous research has tried to identify individual and team-level
factors affecting the likelihood of contest success. Most theoretical work on tournaments and
contests, e.g., assumes that exerting higher effort than the opponent increases the own probabil-
ity of winning (see, e.g., Tullock, 1980; Dechenaux et al., 2015).1 In addition to increasing their
own chances to win by exerting more effort, however, contestants often also have a potentially
cheaper means at hand: reducing their opponents’ chances to win through sabotage (Lazear,
1989). Such destructive behaviour can be observed, e.g., in comparative advertising or political
smear campaigns (Chowdhury and Gürtler, 2015).
However, because sabotage is either illegal and/or committed covertly in many economic
contests, empirical studies on such destructive behaviour are rather rare. Notable exceptions are
studies analysing data from sports contests, most prominently in professional football (soccer),
and laboratory experiments with students (Chowdhury and Gürtler, 2015). An advantage of
studying behaviour in sports is the observability of the attributes and actions of the competing
contestants. In particular, destructive actions against the opponent can be observed openly and
rather reliably, allowing for an operationalisation of sabotage as any action that violates the
rules of the respective game. Multiple previous studies using football data, e.g., use disciplinary
sanctions awarded to players by the referee as measures of sabotage (del Corral et al., 2010;
Deutscher and Schneemann, 2017; Deutscher et al., 2013; Garicano and Palacios-Huerta, 2014).
In this paper, we analyse a new dataset on professional football matches. Our analysis adds
to the existing literature on misconducts in sports contests as follows. In contrast to previous
studies, we differentiate between two types of misconducts that are both sanctioned with a yel-
low card, namely dissents with the referee and other misconducts. According to FIFA’s official
Laws of the Game, a player is to be cautioned and shown a yellow card for any dissent by word
or action against the referee. The important point is that dissent targets the referee, while other
cautioned misconducts, such as severe and repeated fouls or delaying the restart of play, are
aimed at opponent players, i.e. the opposing team. As only the latter is sabotage as defined by
contest theories, our differentiation allows for a more precise empirical analysis of sabotage in
sports contests.
Complementarily, the differentiation we introduce allows for a distinct analysis of dissents
against the authority in charge of the interpretation and enforcement of the contest’s rules, i.e.
the referee. Thus, in addition to sabotage, we are able to study a second route which contestants
might take towards influencing the outcome of a contest: trying to influence how the rules of
the game are implemented.
Further, we add a new perspective to the literature by explicitly distinguishing between the
1In the case of great heterogeneity of players, the theoretical research on contests has shown that weaker players
may be discouraged from exerting effort (Dechenaux et al., 2015).
Misconduct and Leader Behaviour in Contests 3
behaviour of team captains and other players. According to previous survey-based studies, team
captains are typically older and more experienced team members taking on leadership tasks,
such as on-field motivation and encouragement, and seem to have specific skills, such as re-
maining positive and controlling their emotions (Dupuis et al., 2006; Elgar, 2016; Fransen et
al., 2014). By incorporating this second distinction, we are able to investigate whether players
in a leadership role within a team in competition make different use of dissent and sabotage than
regular players.
Our main results are that, in line with previous findings, destructive actions against the op-
ponent increase with lower team ability. However, dissents with the referee are not affected by
ability. Rather, the current state of the match, e.g. an unfavourable goal difference, increases the
occurrence of dissent. Differentiating between player types shows that captains, in contrast to
other players, do not seem to participate in the escalation of series of retaliative misconducts.
Furthermore, captains are more likely to protest and to use sabotage during important matches.
In addition, they are more likely to challenge referees’ decisions in direct reaction to sanctions
awarded to their teammates. Finally, we analyse the impact of misconducts on match outcome
and find that this kind of sabotage likely reduces a team’s chances of success.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of previous literature.
In Section 3 the dataset and its variables are introduced. Section 4 presents our econometric
analysis. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.
2. Overview of Previous Literature
Sabotage in contests has been investigated in numerous experimental studies (see, e.g., Carpen-
ter et al., 2010; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011; for reviews see Chowdhury and Gürtler, 2015;
Dechenaux et al., 2015). However, studies on sabotage outside the lab are rare. One obvious
reason is that sabotage is usually associated with disreputable and/or illegal activities. Hence,
individuals engaging in sabotage try to conceal such actions, rendering them difficult to observe
in the field (Balafoutas et al., 2012).
The main body of observational research on sabotage in contests uses sports data (Chowd-
hury and Gürtler, 2015). An exception are, e.g., Jirjahn and Kraft (2007), who use intra-firm
wage dispersion data and hence face smaller challenges in generalising their results to labour
market contexts. A disadvantage of such analyses, however, is their very indirect measurement
of sabotage. Jirjahn and Kraft (2007), e.g., find effects of wage-dispersion and promotions on
employees’ efforts and then argue that sabotage caused the outcome they observe. A main ad-
vantage of data from sports tournaments is that destructive actions against the opponent athlete
or team aiming to reduce the opponent’s chances to win can be observed directly and quite
reliably.
Balafoutas et al. (2012) analyse the effect of contestants’ relative skill levels on sabotage as
well as the cost of engaging in such in Judo world championships. As a measure of sabotage,
the authors use shido, a sanctioning mechanism against mild violations of the spirit of Judo.
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Their results show that contestants with lower ability use sabotage more often than contestants
with greater ability. Furthermore, Balafoutas et al. (2012) examine the effect of a rule change
in Judo introduced in 2009. Prior the rule change, every shido was penalised with one point for
the opponent. After the rule change, the first shido merely results in a caution, but subsequent
shidos still increase the opponent’s score. Using this rule change as a natural experiment, the
authors show that sabotage significantly increased after the rule change that decreased the cost
of sabotage.
Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2014) and del Corral et al. (2010) study a similar natural
experiment. They analyse the effect of changing the reward for winning a football match from
two to three points. Using match-level data, Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2014) find that the
increase in prize spread, i.e. the difference between the prize received by the winner and the
loser of a contest, led to significantly more sabotage compared to the period before the rule
change. Similarly, del Corral et al. (2010) examine the change in the probability of red cards
being awarded after the increase in prize spread. Controlling for within-match dynamics, such
as the minute of the match and the goal score, they find an increased probability for sabotage in
teams that are in a losing position.
Frick et al. (2008) analyse how sabotage is affected by the difference in ability of two com-
peting teams, determined based on betting odds prior to the respective match. They find that
sabotage, measured as the number of yellow and red cards, increases when teams of similar
ability compete. Using data from football and basketball, Stulp et al. (2012) find similar results.
Measuring differences in ability as the absolute difference in table ranks for football and as the
share of won games per season in the case of basketball, they find that the smaller the difference
in the ability of two teams, the higher the number of fouls per match (basketball and football)
and the more yellow cards are given per match (football).
Deutscher et al. (2013) explicitly differentiate between effort compliant with the rules of the
game (fair tackles) and sabotage (fouls) in football matches. Their results indicate that weak
contestants engage more in sabotage, while contestants with greater abilities exert more com-
pliant effort. Deutscher and Schneemann (2017) further refine this analysis by using information
on the ex-ante heterogeneity of competing football teams, based on betting odds, and within-
game information, namely the goal difference. Like del Corral et al. (2010), the authors control
for within-game dynamics and show that both a lower ex-ante ability as well as a negative goal
difference increase sabotage (measured as severe misconduct penalised by a yellow card).
Previous research on leadership in sports has mainly concentrated on coaches. However, team
members can also take on leadership roles (Loughead et al., 2006). In the present study, we fo-
cus on formally appointed or elected leaders, namely team captains.2 Team leaders typically
are more experienced team members taking on tasks such as on-field team motivation (Fransen
et al., 2014). Also, as Elgar (2016) show using data from the London 2012 Olympics and Par-
2Captains typically are the peer leaders within teams, although other team members might simultaneously take
on specific leadership roles.
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alympics, team captains are often considerably older than their teammates and their influence
on team discipline increases with age. Psychological research on captains has found them to
have specific skills such as remaining positive and controlling their emotions (Dupuis et al.,
2006). In their study on adolescent football players, Price and Weiss (2011) found that peer
leaders are characterised by higher peer acceptance, behavioural conduct, and intrinsic motiva-
tion. However, the specific role team leaders play in contests has become a focus of theoretical
and empirical interest in economics only very recently (Eisenkopf, 2014; Gauriot and Page,
2015). As previous evidence on team captains’ characteristics is largely based on interviews
and surveys of athletes, it seems worthwhile to investigate whether differences between team
captains and other players in sports contests can be observed in our behavioural data as well.
3. Empirical Framework
3.1. Data
For our analysis, we use data from live tickers that provide (almost) real-time coverage of an
event, in our case football matches.3 We used data from the German football portal weltfuss-
ball.de, which covers football games of many European football leagues by live tickers and
usually contains information on the causes of yellow cards in the respective posts. The advan-
tage of this portal compared to most of its alternatives is that ticker texts remain online after the
match. League games with dissents were identified by searching the texts of the available live
tickers for yellow cards and German terms for dissent.4 This procedure resulted in a dataset con-
taining 227 matches in 10 European football leagues from the seasons 2004/2005 to 2013/2014.
The dataset includes 1,345 yellow cards. Whenever the cause of at least one caution was not
identifiable, the websites kicker.de, transfermarkt.de, and fussballoesterreich.at were used to
identify the missing reason(s) and to cross-check the data. Furthermore, these sources were
used to identify the captains of the respective teams in all matches.
In contrast to previous studies using football data, our dataset is not a balanced panel cover-
ing only one league over one or several seasons. Both del Corral et al. (2010) and Garicano and
Palacios-Huerta (2014) use data on all matches from two seasons of the Spanish First Division
(Primera División, while Deutscher et al. (2013) as well as Deutscher and Schneemann (2017)
use data from the first division in Germany (Bundesliga) covering three seasons. In our dataset,
the distribution of matches across the 10 European leagues is very unbalanced (see Table 5
in the Appendix). As the data is drawn from a German website, leagues in German speaking
countries, i.e. Austria and Germany, are overrepresented. Hence, there is a possibility that our
3Live tickers are usually offered by online news/sports media. The tickers consist of stenotype short comments
in varying degrees of frequency (also based on the type of broadcasted sport) with information on decisive
game events as well as important plays. In individual cases, live tickers are enriched with statistical materials
(lineups, player data, etc.).
4These terms are “meckern”, “protestieren”, and “beschweren”; typical German expressions for protesting in
football.
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data gathering process introduced biases. We address this potential issue by providing a repli-
cation of previous results in our new dataset prior to presenting our main original results. As
we will show below, we replicate all core findings of previous empirical studies which applied
a similar methodology. Thus, although our dataset contains fewer observations and a larger and
less balanced distribution of matches across leagues than those used in previous studies, we are
confident that it does not differ from previously used data in the relevant respects. In fact, our
contribution complements previous studies, because it contains data from divisions below the
first league and covers countries not studied before.
3.2. Methodology and Variables
In our analysis, we use the minute of the match as the unit of observation, which is a relatively
new approach in the analysis of football matches (Buraimo et al., 2010; Buraimo et al., 2012;
del Corral et al., 2010). In contrast to analyses based on matches as the unit if observation,
e.g. Frick et al. (2008) and Stulp et al. (2012), this approach allows for capturing within-game
dynamics in detail, because the order of all events of interest occurring throughout the game is
included in the analysis. Our binominal dependent variable takes the value 1 when a yellow card
(of specific type) is awarded to a player of a given team in the respective minute and 0 otherwise.
In contrast to previous studies that analysed all yellow cards jointly, we extend the analysis of
illegal behaviour in contests in two directions. First, we differentiate between dissents and other
misconducts. Second, we separately analyse the cautioned illegal behaviour of captains and of
other players. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.
For the analysis we use the following set of independent variables. The variable goal dif-
ference measures the current difference in goals from the respective team’s perspective. It is
expected that teams lagging behind in score increase their effort and that this leads to an in-
crease in illegal activities, hence to an increased propensity of receiving yellow cards (Buraimo
et al., 2010; Deutscher and Schneemann, 2017). However, it is also possible that with high goal
differences, i.e. when a match is almost certainly decided, players’ efforts and hence the like-
lihood of yellow cards decrease. In order to capture these potentially non-linear effects of the
goal difference on players’ behaviour and on awards of yellow cards, we introduce the control
goal difference squared.
The variable minute captures the minute of the regular playing time. For all events that oc-
curred in the stoppage time of the first and the second half of a match, minute takes the values
45 and 90, respectively. Hence, the 45th and 90th minute are ‘longer’ minutes compared to the
other minutes in the dataset. Although the exact minutes in the respective stoppage time are
available in the dataset, it is problematic to use this information in this analysis. If a yellow
card is given in the first minute of stoppage time at the end of the first half, minute would take
the value 46. The value would be the same for events in the first minute of the second half,
although the situation is considerably different. Hence, minute contains only the minutes of the
regular game time. Following Buraimo et al. (2010) and Buraimo et al. (2012), the information
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics differentiated by captains and other players and dissents and other misconducts
Captain Other Player Dissent Other Misconduct
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Minute 58.70 22.67 56.57 24.11 59.71 22.86 55.90 24.23
Minute squared 3955.62 2507.78 3781.17 2604.71 4085.76 2571.15 3711.20 2596.51
45th Minute 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.08
90th Minute 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.21
Yellow cards last 3
min
0.15 0.38 0.12 0.35 0.17 0.39 0.11 0.34
Opponent yellow
cards last 3 min
0.14 0.35 0.15 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.16 0.39
Yellow cards prior 1.29 1.34 1.23 1.26 1.31 1.27 1.21 1.27
Opponent yellow
cards prior
1.52 1.45 1.33 1.30 1.34 1.30 1.36 1.32
Goal difference -0.25 1.15 -0.14 1.12 -0.47 1.15 -0.06 1.10
Goal difference
squared
1.37 2.13 1.28 2.18 1.54 2.68 1.21 1.99
Difference in
bookmaker proba-
bility
-0.01 0.32 -0.04 0.34 -0.01 0.35 -0.05 0.33
Difference in
bookmaker proba-
bility squared
0.10 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.15
Competitiveness 0.38 0.49 0.56 0.99 0.55 0.92 0.54 0.96
Attendance 9.55 1.30 9.48 1.28 9.46 1.27 9.49 1.29
Derby 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30
Observations 139 1206 316 1029
on minutes in stoppage time is captured by two dummy variables, 45th minute and 90th minute,
where 45th minute takes the value 1 whenever a yellow card was given in the stoppage time of
the first half while 90th minute is 1 for all yellow cards in the stoppage time of the second half.
The variables yellow cards prior and opponent yellow cards prior were included in order
to control for the potential effects of previous cautions on players’ misconducts. The former
gives the number of yellow cards a team has received before the respective caution, whereas
the latter measures the number of yellow cards the opponent team has received. As proposed
by Buraimo et al. (2010), the variables yellow cards last 3 min and opponent yellow cards last
3 min are also included to capture potential dynamics in players’ direct reactions to previous
cautions. They contain the number of cautions received by the team of the cautioned player
and the opposing team, respectively, within the last 3 minutes before an event and are separated
from the number of yellow cards received prior to this time horizon. The direction of a potential
effect of previous sanctions on dissents and sabotage is not clear. With respect to the incentive
to protest against the referee, the number of previously received yellow cards might increase
the probability of dissent by players of this team. A large number of cards could be perceived
by players as unfair treatment by the referee and hence cause them to challenge his decisions.
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However, a high number of previous yellow cards might also be a consequence of an escalation
of illegal contest behaviour between the competing teams and hence increase the likelihood of
further sabotage against the opposing team. Yet, at the same time, numerous previous cautions
for both the own and the opposing team might increase the perceived risk of punishment, which
could deter further misconducts.
To control for difference in team quality, we use the difference in the winning probabilities
of both teams. We calculate the difference in bookmaker probability from betting odds available
on the website betexplorer.de, which provides a comprehensive data base of historical betting
odds covering all leagues and seasons in our dataset. The higher the difference in bookmaker
probability, the higher is a team’s ability relative to its opponent. Betting odds have been used
frequently in previous studies as a measure of relative team strength and have proven to be a
good predictor of the match outcome (Buraimo et al., 2010; Forrest et al., 2005). A particular
advantage of this measure is that it does not only consider the respective teams’ latest results,
but also other relevant and recent information, such as injuries and fitness of (key) players,
dismissals of coaches, etc. Similar to goal difference, the variable’s square, difference in book-
maker probability squared, is included to account for potential non-linearities (Buraimo et al.,
2012).
We also include a variable to account for the competitiveness of the respective match. Simi-
lar to Witt (2005), we calculate the variable competitiveness as the absolute difference in table
positions of the competing teams prior to the match of interest weighted by the number of re-
maining matches in the season. Note that the smaller the value of competitiveness, the higher the
importance of the match. The advantage of this measure, compared to relying on the difference
in table positions, is that it accounts for the fact that matches against neighbouring teams in the
table gain importance towards the end of the season.5
Another factor that might affect the behaviour of contestants is the atmosphere in the stadium
(Deutscher and Schneemann, 2017). Hence, we include the log of the number of spectators at
the respective match into our models (attendance).
Furthermore, strong rivalries among teams might increase the intensity of aggressive be-
haviour in the respective matches. Following Buraimo et al. (2012), we control for this potential
effect by including the variable derby that takes the value of 1 if both teams are either local rivals
(e.g. Manchester City and Manchester United) or harbour historical rivalries (e.g. FC Barcelona
and Real Madrid) and 0 otherwise.
Finally, as previous evidence shows that referees on average award more yellow cards to
away teams, i.e. are home biased (see, e.g., Dohmen, 2008; Page and Page, 2010), we include
the dummy variable away taking the value of 1 if the team under consideration is the away team
and 0 for the home team.
5In many European football leagues, disbursements from TV rights to the clubs are increasing with a better
table position in the previous season. Furthermore, finishing on one of the first table positions might lead to
qualification for European competitions (in case of first divisions) or promotions to a higher league (in case of
lower divisions). Teams in the lowest positions in the table get relegated to a lower league.
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4. Results
For our analysis we combine the method of Deutscher and Schneemann (2017) with the minute-
by-minute approach (Buraimo et al., 2010; Buraimo et al., 2012; del Corral et al., 2010). As
the latter three studies investigate referee bias, they separately model the probability of cards
awarded to the home team and cards the away team using a bivariate probit model framework.
Following Deutscher and Schneemann (2017), who also investigate misconducts in a within-
match framework, we estimate the probability of receiving a yellow card (of respective type)
jointly for home and away teams. As the respective dependent variables are bivariate, we use
probit models to estimate this probability. As Buraimo et al. (2010) and Deutscher and Schnee-
mann (2017), we cluster the data by match to account for dependencies of observations within
matches. To capture fixed effects of seasons and the different leagues, two respective sets of
dummy variables are included in all specifications. Prior to presenting our main analyses, we
provide estimation results based on all yellow cards, i.e. not distinguishing between protests
and fouls, and compare these to those of previous studies. We then estimate two models to
analyse the drivers of dissenting behaviour and other misconducts. Subsequently, we distin-
guish between the behaviour of team captains and other players. Our analysis of the impact of
misconducts on the likelihood of winning a match concludes this section.
4.1. Replication of previous findings
In this subsection we jointly analyse all yellow cards. The following results provide a validation
of our new dataset and add to the previous literature by replicating its main results using new
data from across various European leagues including lower divisions. The results of our probit
model for all yellow cards are displayed in Table 3 (Model 0).
We find significant negative effects of both goal difference and goal difference squared. The
negative coefficient of goal difference implies that the probability of a yellow card of any kind
increases in the case of an unfavourable score from the perspective of the offending player’s
team. The result for goal difference squared indicates that the probability of yellow cards de-
creases the more a team is leading or lagging behind, i.e. there is an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship between goal difference and the likelihood of a yellow card. Both results are in line with
the findings of Buraimo et al. (2010), whereas in Buraimo et al. (2012) only the squared term
is significant. Deutscher and Schneemann (2017) and del Corral et al. (2010) do not consider a
squared term, but also find a significant negative effect of the match score.
The positive and significant coefficient of minute and the negative coefficient of minute
squared indicate that the probability of severe misconduct increases in the course of a match,
however, at a decreasing rate, which is similar to the findings of Buraimo et al. (2010), Buraimo
et al. (2012), del Corral et al. (2010), and Deutscher and Schneemann (2017). The dummy vari-
ables 45th minute and 90th minute are both positive and significant, as found by Buraimo et al.
(2010) and del Corral et al. (2010). Buraimo et al. (2012) find significant negative effects of
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Table 2: Probit Regressions with yellow card awarded for dissent, other misconduct, and all yellow cards as de-
pendent variables
(0) (1) (2)
All Dissent Other Misconduct
Goal difference -0.0625*** (4.98) -0.1488*** (5.06) -0.0246* (1.86)
Goal difference squared -0.0179*** (2.82) -0.0193 (1.50) -0.0193*** (2.59)
Minute 0.0173*** (8.37) 0.0190*** (4.54) 0.0153*** (7.04)
Minute squared -0.0001*** (3.58) -0.0001* (1.95) -0.0001*** (3.09)
45th Minute 1.8595*** (31.18) 1.5099*** (4.35) 1.5199*** (6.87)
90th Minute 1.3106*** (18.92) 1.0369*** (6.83) 1.1275*** (12.77)
Yellow cards last 3 min -0.0173 (0.44) 0.0992* (1.85) -0.0652 (1.47)
Opponent yellow cards last 3 min 0.1489*** (4.61) 0.0325 (0.50) 0.1699*** (4.76)
Yellow cards prior -0.1042*** (7.55) -0.0917*** (4.07) -0.0960*** (6.30)
Opponent yellow cards prior 0.0005 (0.03) -0.0342* (1.67) 0.0134 (0.89)
Difference in bookmaker proba-
bility
-0.1429*** (3.52) 0.0872 (1.34) -0.2102*** (4.83)
Difference in bookmaker proba-
bility squared
-0.1208 (0.97) -0.0726 (0.61) -0.1275 (0.96)
Competitiveness -0.0098 (0.99) -0.0053 (0.52) -0.0101 (0.97)
Attendance 0.0041 (0.16) 0.0218 (1.00) -0.0010 (0.03)
Derby 0.0728 (1.36) -0.0002 (0.00) 0.0845 (1.41)
Away 0.0398 (1.52) 0.0892** (2.00) 0.0186 (0.66)
Constant -2.5464*** (10.43) -3.3617*** (15.08) -2.5337*** (9.21)
Observations 41088 41088 41088
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.070 0.044
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the match level to account for
within-match dependences of observations. Significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
both dummies for the Spanish First Division. For matches in the UEFA Champions League,
they find a significant positive effect of 45th minute and an insignificant effect of 90th minute.
We included the four controls yellow cards prior, opponent yellow cards prior, yellow cards
last 3 min, and opponent yellow cards last 3 min as proposed by Buraimo et al. (2010) and
Buraimo et al. (2012). In line with both studies and Deutscher and Schneemann (2017), we
find that the number of yellow cards a team has received previously (except the last 3 minutes),
yellow cards prior, negatively affects the likelihood of a yellow card. Furthermore, the positive
effect of opponent yellow cards last 3 min we find is in line with Buraimo et al. (2010) and
Buraimo et al. (2012). The other two control variables have the same sign as in these two studies,
but are not significant in our model. However, in one specification in Buraimo et al. (2012) as
well as in Deutscher and Schneemann (2017) the effect of the number opponent yellow cards
prior is also not significant.
In line with previous findings, we find that difference in bookmaker probability has a sig-
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nificant and negative effect on the probability of a yellow card (Buraimo et al., 2010, 2012;
Deutscher and Schneemann, 2017). The effect of attendance is not significant in our study like
in del Corral et al. (2010), Deutscher and Schneemann (2017), Witt (2005). Finally, derby has
no effect on the probability of any type of cautioned misbehaviour, which supports the results
of Buraimo et al. (2010) for the German Bundesliga and Buraimo et al. (2012) for the Spanish
Primera División.
Thus, by and large, we replicate the main results of relevant previous studies. Therefore,
we consider our new dataset validated. In the remainder of this section, we present our main
original results.
4.2. Dissents vs. Other Misconducts
In order to differentiate between dissents and other misconducts, we estimate two models. The
dependent variable in Model 1 only contains yellow cards awarded for dissents, whereas Model
2 covers the remaining yellow cards.
The negative coefficients of goal difference in Models 1 and 2 imply that the probability of
both dissents against the referee and misconducts aimed at the opponent increase as the goal
difference decreases. Players in teams lagging behind are more likely to protest against referee
decisions as well as to engage in severe foul play. In the latter case, however, the coefficient
is only significant at the 10%-level. While the coefficient of goal difference squared is not
statistically significant for dissents, it is significant (at the 1%-level) and negative for other
misconducts.
The differences between the effects of the current score on dissent and other misconducts
are depicted in Figure 1. The figure shows the probability of dissent (per minute) as well as
the probability of other misconduct (per minute) for different goal differences as predicted by
Models 1 and 2, respectively. For other misconducts, there is an obvious inverted U-shaped
relationship as indicated by the coefficients. As long as the match is tight, i.e. the absolute goal
difference is small, the probability of sabotage is high.
For dissents against the referee, however, the effect of goal difference is substantially dif-
ferent. As can be seen in Figure 1, the probability of protesting against the referee increases,
when the goal difference decreases. In teams leading by a large margin, almost no dissents with
the referee can be observed, while protesting against the referee becomes substantially more
frequent when the team is lagging behind.
Another essential difference between dissents and other misconducts is the effect of the dif-
ference in teams’ abilities. According to Model 2, difference in bookmaker probability has a
significant and negative effect on the probability of a severe foul. The more inferior a team is
with respect to its ability compared to the opponent, the more sabotage is used to compensate
this disadvantage. In contrast, difference in bookmaker probability does not affect dissenting
behaviour of contestants.
The effects of the difference in ability on dissent and misconduct aimed at the opponent are
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Figure 1: Adjusted predictions of Dissent (left) and Other Misconduct (right) per minute at different goal differ-
ences and the means of other covariates with 95% confidence intervals.
illustrated in Figure 2. For the latter, we find a relationship as predicted by theories on sabotage
in contests: the lower the ability of a team compared to its opponent, the higher the probability
to engage in sabotage (Lazear, 1989). For dissents, the probability is almost identical across
different values of difference in bookmaker probability. The difference in the abilities of the
contestants does not significantly affect the probability to protest against the referee’s decision.
Further noteworthy differences between dissents and other misconducts include the follow-
ing. Previous sanctions have a differentiated effect. In Models 1 and 2, the number of yellow
cards a team received prior to the last three minutes of the subject minute reduces the proba-
bility of both dissents and severe fouls. However, while the number of prior cards the opponent
team received does not affect other misconducts, it affects the likelihood of dissents negatively.
Dissents and foul plays are reversely affected by yellow cards that the competing teams were
awarded recently. In the case of dissents, the coefficient of yellow cards last 3 min is positive
and weakly significant. This indicates that immediately after a cautioned sabotage of a player
from the own team, there is an increased probability for protesting behaviour. In contrast, the
number of yellow cards the opponent team received in the last three minutes (opponent yellow
cards last 3 min) does not affect dissents. With respect to other misconducts, the results are
reversed. While recently received yellow cards by the own team are statistically insignificant,
the number of yellow cards the opponent received in the last three minutes positively affects the
likelihood of other misconducts. Finally, for away teams, we only find an increased probability
for dissents, but not for other misconducts.
4.3. Captains vs. Other Players
We now analyse the behaviour of captains and other players by further disaggregating the de-
pendent variables. We divide yellow cards for dissents into dissents of captains and dissents
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Figure 2: Adjusted predictions of Dissent (left) and Other Misconduct (right) per minute at different levels of the
difference in ability and the means of other covariates with 95% Confidence Intervals.
of other players. Cautions for misconducts aimed at the opponent are similarly divided. The
independent variables remain the same as above. Table 3 summarises the results.
Most of the pre-match and within-match covariates have qualitatively the same effects on sab-
otage behaviour of captains and regular players. There are, however, some notable differences
between the two player types. Regular players’ sabotage behaviour is affected by the number of
yellow cards the opponent team has received in the last three minutes prior to the subject minute
(positive and significant coefficient of opponent yellow cards last 3 min). If the opponent just
engaged in severe foul play, players of the fouled team are more likely to engage in sabotage
themselves, which indicates retaliative foul play. Team captains, however, do not participate
in such retaliatory escalations of misconducts during the match. The number of yellow cards
recently awarded to the own team (yellow cards last 3 min) increases captains’ propensity to
dissent, while it has no effect on the dissenting behaviour of other players.
Finally, only team captains’ behaviours seem to be affected by the competiveness of the
match, i.e. the absolute difference in the table rank of competing teams relative to the remaining
matches in the season (negative and significant coefficients of competitiveness in Models 3 and
5). The more important a match is, the higher is the likelihood of misconducts by captains.
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Table 3: Probit Regressions with yellow cards for dissents and yellow vards for other misconducts awarded to
captains and other players, respectively, as dependent variables
Dissent Other Misconduct
(3) (4) (5) (6)
Captain Player Captain Player
Goal difference -0.1311** -0.1447*** -0.0433 -0.0213
(2.16) (5.26) (1.39) (1.52)
Goal difference squared -0.0198 -0.0186 -0.0111 -0.0194**
(0.69) (1.57) (0.79) (2.50)
Minute 0.0345*** 0.0152*** 0.0096* 0.0153***
(3.61) (3.49) (1.66) (6.95)
Minute squared -0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001***
(2.60) (1.10) (0.57) (3.11)
45th Minute 0.0000 1.5797*** 1.6422*** 1.2186***
(.) (4.49) (4.90) (4.67)
90th Minute 0.9629*** 0.9641*** 0.6933** 1.1038***
(3.66) (6.44) (2.57) (12.05)
Yellow cards last 3 min 0.1851** 0.0623 -0.1241 -0.0563
(2.00) (1.05) (1.08) (1.23)
Opponent yellow cards last 3 min -0.0360 0.0412 0.1233 0.1671***
(0.27) (0.62) (1.31) (4.48)
Yellow cards prior -0.0810* -0.0879*** -0.0864** -0.0924***
(1.65) (3.83) (2.07) (5.99)
Opponent yellow cards prior -0.0421 -0.0294 0.0632* 0.0054
(0.91) (1.35) (1.91) (0.36)
Difference in bookmaker probability 0.0643 0.0883 -0.0902 -0.2128***
(0.48) (1.26) (0.70) (4.82)
Difference in bookmaker probability squared -0.4656 0.0313 -0.3814 -0.0909
(1.26) (0.29) (1.41) (0.66)
Competitiveness -0.1130* 0.0064 -0.0749* -0.0047
(1.67) (0.60) (1.79) (0.43)
Attendance 0.0435 0.0143 0.1099* -0.0129
(0.62) (0.55) (1.75) (0.43)
Derby -0.2337 0.0481 0.0439 0.0838
(1.09) (0.73) (0.43) (1.31)
Away 0.0703 0.0882* -0.0439 0.0252
(0.76) (1.85) (0.57) (0.86)
Constant -4.4540*** -3.2761*** -4.4834*** -2.4383***
(6.53) (12.98) (7.10) (8.55)
Observations 41070 41088 40360 41088
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.065 0.061 0.042
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the match level to account for
within-match dependences of observations. Significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The variable 45th
Minute is omitted in Model (3) as there were no yellow cards awarded for dissent to captains in the stoppage time
of the first half in our dataset.
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4.4. Impact of Sabotage and Dissents on Team Success
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of dissents and sabotage on teams’ outcomes. For
the dependent variable, the match-level success of a team, two alternative measures are used.
Final score is measured as the goal difference between a team and its opponent at the end of the
match. Alternatively, the match outcome – loss, draw, win – is used as dependent variable. Both
measures have been used in similar previous studies (Anders and Rotthoff, 2011; Deutscher
and Schneemann, 2017; Franck and Nüesch, 2010).6 As measures for the intensity of dissents
and sabotage behaviour of a team in a match, we use the difference between dissents and other
misconducts of the respective team and its opponent. To control for the relative ability of both
teams, which is an important determinant of the outcome of a match, we include difference in
bookmaker probability. We further include attendance, derby, and length of the stoppage time
(minutes stoppage time) as controls.
Table 4 contains the results of OLS regressions for the models with final score as depen-
dent variable and ordered probit regressions for the case of match result. When considering the
difference in all yellow cards that the teams received (Models 7 and 8), the estimation results
show that the intensity of a team’s illegal behaviour negatively affects that team’s outcome,
while such illegal behaviour by the opponent team positively affects chances for success (neg-
ative coefficient of difference in all yellow cards). These findings are in line with Deutscher
and Schneemann (2017), who use a very similar model specification with data from the Ger-
man Bundesliga. Furthermore, there seem to be no qualitative differences between the effects
of dissents and other misconducts, when these are considered separately (Models 9 and 10).
We repeated the analyses as presented above with controls for the actual performance of
both contestants in the match by including the number of shots on target by both teams.7 The
results of these regressions are shown in Table 6 in the Appendix. Even after including these
controls, we still find indications of detrimental effects of misconducts on team success. Hence,
there seems to be either a negative or no impact of illegal team behaviour on team outcome,
irrespective of whether it takes the form of dissents or other misconducts. This finding is in line
with previous results (Anders and Rotthoff, 2011; Carmichael and Thomas, 2005; Carmichael
et al., 2000; Deutscher and Schneemann, 2017).
5. Discussion
Our differentiation between sabotage aimed at the opponent and dissent against the referee pro-
vides valuable new insights. For misconducts aimed at the opposing team directly, i.e. fouls, we
find that contestants with lower ability engage more in sabotage, which is in line with previous
6As two teams compete in a match, the match result – goal difference or match outcome – can be expressed from
both teams’ perspectives. We expressed all variables from the perspective of the home team. This, however,
does not affect our analysis as expression the variable from the away team’s perspective would yield symmetric
results.
7The data for shots on target and opponent team shots on target were obtained from football-data.co.uk, sport1.de,
and bundesliga.at.
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Table 4: OLS Regressions with final score (goal difference at the end of the match) and ordered probit regressions
with match result (loss, draw, win) as dependent variables
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Final Score Match Result Final Score Match Result
Difference in bookmaker probability 1.6037*** 1.3441*** 1.7382*** 1.4754***
(4.89) (4.65) (5.26) (4.97)
Attendance -0.1562 -0.1841 -0.1522 -0.1738
(0.97) (1.29) (0.95) (1.21)
Derby 0.4189 0.5309 0.3072 0.4422
(1.35) (1.48) (1.05) (1.24)
Minutes stoppage time -0.0979 -0.0393 -0.1129* -0.0440
(1.51) (0.67) (1.85) (0.76)
Difference in all yellow cards -0.2189*** -0.2058***
(4.54) (4.78)
Difference in dissents -0.4284*** -0.3973***
(5.53) (5.08)
Difference in other misconducts -0.1105* -0.1139**
(1.85) (2.38)
Observations 227 227 227 227
R2 0.285 0.322
Pseudo R2 0.157 0.180
Notes: Absolute t-statistics (OLS) and z-statistics (ordered probit) in parentheses. Robust standard errors.
Significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
findings (Balafoutas et al., 2012; Deutscher and Schneemann, 2017; Deutscher et al., 2013). In
contrast, the likelihood of misconducts aimed at the contest’s referee, i.e. dissents, seems to be
independent of ability. As only the former is sabotage as defined by contest theories, we provide
a more precise analysis of sabotage in contest compared to previous studies. Further, we find
that the marginal effect of difference in bookmaker probability on the probability of sabotage is
stronger than its effect on the probability of any misconduct.8 These results show that estimates
based on all sanctioned misconducts, as Deutscher et al. (2013), Deutscher and Schneemann
(2017), and our Model 0, are driven by foul plays and underestimate the effect of ability on the
likelihood of sabotage.
Further, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between goal difference and sabotage. An
explanation lending itself is that a realistic chance to improve the outcome of the match provides
incentives to exert effort, both ‘positive’ effort aimed at increasing the own team’s productivity
as well as ‘negative’ effort, i.e. sabotage. When the match is mostly decided, however, sabotage
is reduced, because players have lower incentives to engage in costly sabotage if the expected
pay-off decreases. This result could be partly driven by referee behaviour. The observation of
more frequent misconducts, e.g. in close matches, might induce stricter refereeing. This could,
to a certain extent, further increase the number of yellow cards for any type of misconduct in
tight matches. The effect of player behaviour, however, seems to be stronger as such an increase
8The marginal effect of difference in bookmaker probability on the probability of sabotage per minute is -.011
(Model 2), while its marginal effect on the probability of any misconduct per minute is -.009 (Model 0).
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in sanctions in close matches cannot be observed for dissents.
Our finding that the likelihood of dissents against the referee increases in the case of an
unfavourable score could indicate self-serving (or team-serving) attribution as, e.g., predicted by
the attributional theory of motivation and emotion (Weiner, 1985, 1986; for a review, see Allen
et al., 2012). One main prediction of this theory is that individuals attribute success to internal
factors, e.g. abilities, and failure to external factors, e.g. bad refereeing (Rees et al., 2005).
Lau and Russell (1980) provide evidence on the team-serving bias by analysing comments of
players and coaches in newspaper articles on major sports events. In a meta-analysis of 22
questionnaire-based studies in sports settings, Mullen and Riordan (1988) found evidence for
the self-serving bias, with its magnitude being larger for teams than individual athletes. Martin
and Carron (2012) compared studies using questionnaires based on the attribution dimensions
of Weiner’s theory and those using the team-oriented attribution scale developed by Greenlees et
al. (2005). They confirmed the robustness of the team-serving bias. While most of the previous
evidence on the attribution effect in sports is based on surveys of athletes after competitions, we
also find behavioural evidence supportive of this effect during competitions. Our results further
show that the likelihood of dissents decreases with the number of prior cards the opponent
team received. This finding could be explained by the fact that motives for dissents include
misconducts by the opposing team that are not sanctioned by the referee. Hence, the more often
the opponent is sanctioned, the lower the incentive for dissents against the referee.
The higher likelihood of dissent for away teams we observe in our data could indirectly hint
to a home bias of referees, i.e. a favourable treatment of the home team by the referee, which
has been found in numerous studies (Buraimo et al., 2010; Buraimo et al., 2012; Dawson and
Dobson, 2010; Dawson et al., 2007; Dohmen, 2008; Garicano et al., 2005; Page and Page, 2010;
Sutter and Kocher, 2004) . In experimental studies, van Prooijen et al. (2008) and Verboon and
van Dijke (2011) show that the procedural fairness of an authority implementing a sanction
system increases compliance with the authority. In the context of our study, this could lead
to away team players perceiving the favourable treatment of the home team by the authority
(the referee) as unfair, and result in their reduced compliance with the authority (more protests
against the referee’s decisions).
We find that all misconducts are negatively affected by the number of yellow cards the team
has previously received, which could be interpreted as a deterrence effect of previous sanctions
of the own team (Buraimo et al., 2010). This indicates that (severe) punishment might mitigate
illegal behaviour, as predicted by theory (Gilpatrick, 2011).
We also find some noteworthy results on the behaviour of captains and regular players. Regu-
lar players are more likely to engage in sabotage when the opponent team has recently conducted
a severe misconduct. Such retaliative foul plays, however, cannot be observed for captains. An
explanation could be, e.g., that team leaders are more capable of controlling their emotions
(Dupuis et al., 2006). The result is also in line with the finding of Price and Weiss (2011) that
peer leaders are characterised by better behavioural conduct. Furthermore, captains seem to re-
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act quickly to sanctioning of their teammates by challenging the referee’s decision. Although
captains do not have any privileges allowing them to challenge the referee according to FIFA’s
Laws of the Game, they are often seen to be responsible for their team’s behaviour and as a
spokesman for their team before the referee. Our data indicate that captains live up to this role
by challenging unfavourable referee decisions more frequently, even though it increases their
own chances of being cautioned.
Furthermore, the likelihood of captains challenging referees’ decisions and engaging in sab-
otage increases in important games. This finding could be related to the effect of prize spread
on the behaviour of contestants: the wider the prize spread, the higher the incentives to engage
in sabotage (Chowdhury and Gürtler, 2015). Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2014) and del Cor-
ral et al. (2010) provide evidence for increased sabotage after the points for winning a football
match were increased from two to three. The covariate competitiveness could measure a similar
effect. A match against a neighbouring team in the table, particularly towards the end of the sea-
son, not only provides the chance to receive three points for the own team, but also to deny three
points to a direct competitor in the table (making the game a so called ‘six-pointer’), which is a
widening of the prize spread compared to other matches. In this regard, increased sabotage is a
rational strategy in the case of a high prize spread. In this vein, the higher experience and age of
team captains as well as their higher capability to control their emotions (Dupuis et al., 2006;
Fransen et al., 2014) might result in ‘more rational’ behaviour compared to regular players.
In line with previous evidence, our findings show that the impact of illegal behaviour on team
outcome likely is negative or non-existent at best. Nonetheless, players do engage in both dis-
sents and sabotage. Deutscher and Schneemann (2017) argue that this self-damaging behaviour
could be driven by players perceiving any action as better than inaction, as the latter could be
interpreted as giving-up by observers (Grund et al., 2013). Hence, particularly weaker teams
could use sabotage too extensively in order to signal effort.9
6. Conclusion
We examined sanctioned misconducts in sports contests. The analyses presented here extend
previous insights into behaviour in contests in two ways: (i) we explicitly differentiate between
destructive actions directly aimed at the opposing team, i.e. fouls sanctioned with a yellow card,
and (ii) protesting behaviour aimed at the authority responsible for enforcing the rules of the
contest, i.e. dissents sanctioned with yellow cards. This differentiation allows for a more precise
analysis of sabotage in sports contests. A main result of our analysis of misconducts against the
opposing team is that contestants with lower ability engage more in sabotage than stronger
teams. This confirms theories on sabotage in contests and is in line with previous empirical
9In addition to the direct effect on match success, severe misconducts might negatively affect success in future
matches. Typically, players are suspended for at least one match if they received a certain amount of yellow
cards in the previous matches of that season. Hence, misconducts can negatively affect team performance in
more than just the current match.
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findings. However, we do not find this effect of ability on dissent with the referee.
With respect to dissents, we find that protesting against the referee increases in the case of an
unfavourable score. An explanation for this behaviour could be self-serving (or team-serving)
attribution. In contrast, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the goal difference
and the probability of sabotage. Furthermore, away teams dissent more, which could be due to
home-biased referees.
We further distinguish between the behaviour of captains and other players in the team. Our
results indicate that captains are more likely to dissent with the referee and engage in sabotage in
particularly important matches. Also, captains do not seem to participate in escalations of foul
play, which is in line with previous findings that team captains seem more capable to control
their emotions. However, captains are more likely to dissent with the referee if their own team
has recently been sanctioned.
Tournaments in other contexts, e.g. tournaments within firms, are often installed to provide
incentives to exert effort or to select the best contestants. However, in line with previous find-
ings, our results show that contests also incentivise undesirable sabotage. At the same time,
illegal behaviour seems to be detrimental for team success. A possible measure to prevent or
at least to reduce sabotage is punishment. Our results show that previous sanctions of illegal
activities of a team, i.e. the number of yellow cards a team received prior to the subject minute,
reduce the probability of misconduct. This indicates that punishments of team members, at least
if they can be observed, also lead to a reduction of illegal activities in non-punished individuals.
In spite of its detailed controls for within-match dynamics, our study has limitations. Analy-
ses based on misconducts actually sanctioned only contain illegal activities observed and inter-
preted as illegal by the referee. Hence, our data include wrong referee decisions (false positives),
lack activities not sanctioned by the referee (false negatives). Thus, one interesting aim for fur-
ther research is to include information on wrong referee decisions and unpunished sabotage.
This information could further prove meaningful in explaining players’ dissents with the ref-
eree and provide insights into how the effectiveness and fairness of punishment of sabotage
affects behaviour in contests.
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A. Appendix
Table 5: Allocation of all 227 matches across European leagues
Country No. of matches in the respective league
first league second league third league
Austria 15 15 4
England 13 - -
Germany 60 38 42
Spain 16 - -
Switzerland 21 - -
Turkey 3 - -
Table 6: OLS Regressions with final score (goal difference at the end of the match) and ordered probit regressions
with match result (loss, draw, win) as dependent variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Final Score Match Result Final Score Match Result
Difference in bookmaker probability 0.9038** 0.9583** 1.0275** 1.0528***
(2.24) (2.38) (2.58) (2.66)
Attendance -0.4211 -0.1769 -0.4959 -0.2413
(1.40) (0.61) (1.65) (0.83)
Derby 0.5124 0.4126 0.4843 0.3847
(1.24) (0.93) (1.19) (0.86)
Minutes stoppage time 0.0021 0.0898 -0.0279 0.0688
(0.03) (0.99) (0.38) (0.75)
Difference in shots on target 0.1879*** 0.1226*** 0.1841*** 0.1244***
(4.90) (3.11) (5.21) (3.25)
Difference in all yellow cards -0.1457** -0.1603***
(2.59) (2.64)
Difference in dissents -0.3040*** -0.3176***
(2.90) (2.84)
Difference in other misconducts -0.0753 -0.0878
(1.21) (1.40)
Observations 117 117 117 117
R2 0.516 0.535
Pseudo R2 0.270 0.285
Notes: Absolute t-statistics (OLS) and z-statistics (ordered probit) in parentheses. Robust standard errors.
Significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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1. Introduction
At the beginning of his study of the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776) discusses the causes
and positive effects of the division of labour and specialisation, namely that productivity can
be enhanced by concentrating on fewer tasks. Becker and Murphy (1992) argue that there are
returns to specialisation, as the returns to time spent on performing certain tasks are larger
for employees focussing on fewer tasks. More recently, Lazear (2004, 2005, 2012) proposed
that wage employment should benefit specialised skill sets with the exception of employees
in leadership roles that profit from being generalists. However, the empirical evidence on the
labour market success of generalists versus specialists is rather mixed with (i) evidence for
returns to specialisation (Aldén et al., 2017; Åstebro and Thompson, 2011; Simmons and Berri,
2009), (ii) returns to being a generalist (Coenen et al., 2015; Custódio et al., 2013; Datta and
Iskandar-Datta, 2014; Leighton and Speer, 2017) and (iii) studies without clear results for either
(Artz et al., 2014; Åstebro et al., 2011; Hartog et al., 2010; Parey, 2016). This paper provides
new evidence on the impact of skill variety on remuneration based on the concept of task-
specific human capital.
In his seminal work on human capital theory, Becker (1964) proposed a distinction between
general and firm-specific human capital. The former comprises general skills, such as educa-
tion or work experience. The latter is human capital that is specific to a certain firm and cannot
be transferred between firms. Other concepts of human capital are occupation- and industry-
specific human capital. Similar to firm-specific human capital, these types of human capital
cannot be transferred across occupations and industries. Gibbons and Waldman (2004, 2006)
suggest another concept of human capital: task-specific human capital, which they define as a
worker’s ability to perform a certain task. This type of human capital can be transferred be-
tween occupations, firms, and industries. The main idea is that task-specific human capital is
accumulated on the job by performing certain tasks through learning-by-doing. Clement et al.
(2007) show that past experience in performing a certain task increases human capital specific
to this task. Furthermore, task-specific human capital is an important driver of overall worker
productivity (Cook and Mansfield, 2016). Previous evidence indicates that, next to occupation-
specific human capital and work experience, task-specific human capital is an important driver
of individual salaries (Gathmann and Schönberg, 2010; Schulz et al., 2013).
This paper investigates whether the dispersion of task-specific human capital or skills affects
an employee’s remuneration. The basic idea is as follows. The more an employee focuses on
one of very few tasks, the higher is their productivity in that task(s) due to learning-by-doing.
Such an employee could be referred to as a specialist. In contrast, consider an employee, who
has performed a larger variety of different tasks, but each of them less often than the aforemen-
tioned specialists (given the same level of work experience). Such an individual would have less
specific human capital in each task, but is able to perform a larger variety of tasks and hence
would rather be more versatile, i.e. a generalist. The questions this paper tries to answer are:
Are specialists or generalists more valuable for the employer and thus receive higher salaries?
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Does the effect of the variety of task-specific skills on salary differ across occupations with
heterogeneous skill requirements?
This paper analyses the effect of the dispersion of task-specific human capital on remunera-
tion of employees based on data from the German Bundesliga and adds to the previous literature
in the following ways. I use a measure of skill variety that is based on task-specific human cap-
ital. So far, studies on the remuneration of generalists versus specialists have focussed on other
concepts of human capital, i.e. occupation- or industry-specific human capital, or other mea-
sures as cognitive abilities or college degrees. Second, it is among the first contributions using
professional sports data.1 A specific advantage of football data for this analysis is that it allows
for a very precise measurement of task-specific human capital, which is rather difficult in a
general labour market context. Due to the observability of employees’ (athletes’) attributes in
sports data (Kahn, 2000), it is further possible to control for factors, such as actual performance
or specific talents of individuals.
Task-specific skill specialisation is measured as follows. In association football, there are
three main field positions – defender, midfielder, and forward – that can be interpreted as dif-
ferent occupations in a football team.2 These can be further subdivided into twelve tactical
(sub-)positions.3 These positions can be interpreted as specific tasks in team production. Based
on the idea that task-specific human capital is accumulated through learning-by-doing, the num-
ber of matches a player has played on each of these positions can be interpreted as their specific
skill in performing the respective task. I construct measures of task-specific skill variety for
each player, which reflects whether a player is rather a specialist in one task or a generalist that
is able to perform several tasks. I then investigate whether the dispersion in task-specific human
capital affects salaries.
For all measures of skill variety, the base results indicate that the degree of skill specialisation
has a positive effect on earnings, i.e. more specialised players receive higher salaries. When
differentiating between occupations, I find that defenders and forwards receive a salary premium
if they are more specialised than the average player on the respective main position, while the
result are substantially different for midfielders. Midfielders receive neither a return on task-
specific skill versatility, i.e. for being generalists, nor a return for skill specialisation, i.e. for
being a specialist. An explanation for this result could be that defenders and forwards require
more specialised skill sets in the football match compared to midfielders. While the latter are
almost equally engaged in offensive and defensive plays, the former two groups mainly perform
1An exception are Simmons and Berri (2009), who study skill specialisation of running backs in the National
Football League (NFL). Furthermore, Franck et al. (2011) focus their empirical analysis based on data from
the German Bundesliga on general and team-specific human capital and thus have a complementary focus to
this study.
2Alternatively, one could argue that being a football player is an occupation. But as defenders, midfielders, and
forwards have different and distinct roles in a football team, these main positions can be referred to as different
occupations within a football club (firm). This definition of main positions as occupations is, however, not
critical for this analysis.
3The positions are left-, right-, and centre-back; left-, right-, defensive-, central-, and attacking midfield; left-,
right wing, secondary striker, and central forward.
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defensive or offensive tasks. Hence, it is not surprising that forwards and defenders profit from
a higher degree of specialisation. When transferred to the general labour market context, these
findings indicate that specialisation is more beneficial for employees, as there are no returns
from skill versatility even in occupations with a wide range of tasks. For occupations involving
a wider range of tasks, there seems to be a trade-off between skill specialisation and versatility.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on skill dispersion
and employee remuneration. Section 3 presents the institutional setting for the empirical anal-
ysis and provides an overview of the data and the estimation approach. Section 4 presents the
empirical results. Section 5 discusses the findings and concludes.
2. Previous Literature on Specialists, Generalists, and Remuneration
Various strands of literature have analysed the compensation of generalists versus specialists.
One strand of literature is based on a theory by Lazear (2004, 2005). He proposed that gen-
eralists are more likely to become entrepreneurs, while individuals specialised in certain tasks
are more likely to become employees. He argues that entrepreneurs should have some ability
or human capital in a variety of tasks. Entrants into self-employment typically have to perform
various tasks themselves and even when hiring specialists for certain tasks, entrepreneurs need
some basic knowledge in the respective task to be able to assess the applicants. In contrast,
employees typically perform one (or few) task(s). As they are paid based on their productivity
in performing the task, it is beneficial for workers if they are specialists.4
Based on Lazear’s Jack of all trades theory, several studies analysed individuals’ choices
between entrepreneurship and employment and their resulting earnings based on their skill va-
riety. As this paper focuses on employees, empirical results on entrepreneurs are not discussed.
Using the responses of 830 independent inventors to a survey conducted in 2004, Åstebro and
Thompson (2011) investigate how the number of industries and occupational fields the respon-
dents have previously worked in affect income. For employees they find that the number of
previous occupational fields negatively affects income, which indicates that employees benefit
from higher specialisation. Åstebro et al. (2011) conduct a similar analysis on employees using
data from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) and find the overall number of
prior job changes negatively affects earnings of employees. The authors decompose job changes
into within-employer changes in occupation, within-occupation changes of the employer, and
simultaneous changes in employer and occupation. The latter two components negatively im-
pact remuneration and thus indicate that skill specialisation leads to higher earnings. For within-
employer changes in occupation, Åstebro et al. (2011) find a positive effect on salaries and argue
that this finding is probably driven by promotions within the firm that often lead to occupational
4Lazear (2005) provides evidence for this theory based on transcripts of Stanford MBA alumni and employment
experiences of individuals. He finds that individuals with higher variety in their curriculum in the MBA studies
and those who had more roles in their employment history are more likely to become entrepreneurs. Hence,
more specialised individuals do rather choose to become / remain in employment. Wagner (2006) finds similar
results based on a survey of 12,000 individuals in Germany.
Generalists vs. Specialists: Skill Variety and Remuneration in Football 5
changes. Bublitz and Noseleit (2014) expand the aforementioned approaches by distinguishing
between different firm sizes. The main idea is that skill sets should be more balanced in smaller
firms, as employees typically take over more tasks. In contrast, task complexity increases with
firm size, which should induce a specialisation in fewer tasks. Using data from a 2006 Employ-
ment Survey, conducted by the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB)
and the Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BAuA) in Germany, the authors
confirm this hypothesis. With respect to compensation, Bublitz and Noseleit (2014) find that
employed generalists overall receive a premium, while the magnitude of the skill balance’s im-
pact on earnings decreases when business size increases.
In contrast to Åstebro and Thompson (2011) and Åstebro et al. (2011), who use employment
histories that could be interpreted as firm-, occupation-, or industry-specific human capital, other
studies base their analyses on cognitive abilities. Hartog et al. (2010) use cognitive test scores
from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to derive five measures of specific abilities.5 In order to
measure the balance of skills, the authors calculate a coefficient of variation across the specific
abilities to measure dispersion of skills. Their findings indicate that a balanced set of skills in-
creases earnings of entrepreneurs, as predicted by Lazear’s theory. For employees, however, the
authors do not find any effect of skill dispersion on income, i.e. no evidence for the hypothe-
sis that employees profit from being specialists. Aldén et al. (2017) conduct a similar analysis.
Their measure of balance in abilities is calculated as the standard deviation in individual scores
on five tests conducted during Swedish military enlistment. In contrast to Hartog et al. (2010),
the authors find a negative effect of balanced skills on earnings if employees, i.e. employees
profit from specialisation.
Another strand of literature originates from the analysis of the labour market returns to uni-
versity degrees. One potential core driver of differences in the returns across university degrees,
which is investigated in this literature, is the degree of specialisation. Artz et al. (2014) analyse
this issue based on a sample of alumni with various agricultural degrees. The authors find that
graduates from more specialised degree programmes earn more within the agricultural sector,
while those having more generalised degrees, i.e. degrees from programmes with broader curric-
ula, earn a salary premium in other non-agricultural sectors. Kinsler and Pavan (2015) also find
salary premiums for being employed in jobs related to studies, in particular for science-related
majors. Coenen et al. (2015) compare several narrow (more specialised) and broad (more gen-
eralised) vocational education programmes in the Netherlands with respect to their effect on the
respective graduates’ labour market returns. Overall, the authors find that specialists earn less
compared to generalists. This result even holds when specialised graduates have a job within
their occupational domain, but is particularly strong when specialists are employed outside that
domain. Leighton and Speer (2017) use four different measures of specialisation and find that
generalists receive the highest salary premiums throughout their careers.6 Particularly majors
5These are language or verbal ability, mathematical ability, technical ability, clerical ability, and social ability.
6The measures are an occupational Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a curriculum HHI, a vocational indicator,
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that teach skills that are highly transferable across occupations lead to premiums. Specialisa-
tion, however, only pays off in the short run. Rather than comparing different college majors,
Parey (2016) compares the labour market success of graduates from vocational education with
those doing a firm-based apprenticeship. The latter can be considered more specialised as they
are provided by firm that has an incentive to invest in human capital that is specific to the ap-
prentices’ tasks in the firm. There are, however, no differences with respect to their returns on
the labour market.
A third strand of literature focuses on top management. Lazear (2012) proposes a human
capital theory of corporate leadership, which is related to the theory of entrepreneurship versus
employment discussed above (Lazear, 2004, 2005). The core idea is that leaders within a firm,
i.e. (top) management, are confronted with a high variety of different problems and choices and
hence profit from a broader skill set.7 Frederiksen and Kato (2017) and Lazear (2012) provide
empirical support for this theory of corporate leadership, i.e. a higher variety of skills, mainly
through broadening human capital, increases the likelihood to be appointed in top manage-
ment. Lazear (2012) further shows that the quantity of previously experienced roles positively
affects the compensation of top management. Custódio et al. (2013) and Datta and Iskandar-
Datta (2014) provide further support. Custódio et al. (2013) construct a general ability index
for CEO’s, which includes, e.g., the number of firms and industries where the CEO worked as
well as the number of positions the CEO previously held. The authors find the generalist CEOs
earn a compensation premium. Datta and Iskandar-Datta (2014) focus on CFO compensation
and find that CFOs with elite MBA degrees (generalists) earn a premium compared to CFOs
with other non-MBA degrees or professional accounting certification (specialists).
3. Empirical Framework
Overall, previous findings on the remuneration of generalists and specialists are very mixed
indicating that this issue is still not fully understood. Furthermore, none of the previous studies
base their measurement of skill specialisation on task-specific human capital. This paper aims
to fill this gap in the literature by constructing a measure of skill specialisation based on the
and a Theil measure. The occupational HHI is based on the distribution of graduates in a major across different
occupational fields. The higher the value of this measure, the higher is the concentration of graduates in one
/ few occupations and hence the more specialised is this major. The intuition behind the curriculum HHI is
similar: the fewer courses from other fields than the major, the more general is the major. The vocational
measure is based on the National Center for Education Statistics. The authors interpret majors classified as
academic as general, while career or career technical majors are interpreted as vocational (specialised). The
Theil measure captures the transferability of graduates’ skills across occupations, by measuring the differences
in returns to a major in different occupations.
7Gibbons and Waldman (2004) use a similar argument in their theory on task-specific human capital. Assuming
that employees accumulated task-specific human capital, when performing certain tasks, job rotation may be
useful tool for future managers. By moving from job to job, management candidates gain knowledge on a
variety of different tasks, which is useful for supervising employees on lower levels that actually perform those
tasks. Murphy and Zábojník (2004) propose a theory predicting that CEOs should receive a compensation
premium for general skills that are not firm-specific.
Generalists vs. Specialists: Skill Variety and Remuneration in Football 7
concept of task-specific human capital. I first introduce the institutional setting of this study and
discuss the advantages of using a professional sports setting for this analysis. I then present the
data used in the empirical analysis and describe the estimation approach.
3.1. Institutional Setting
The institutional setting is the top level of professional association football in Germany, namely
the Bundesliga.8 There are 18 teams in the Bundesliga, each of them playing 34 matches in
one season, i.e. twice against each team in the league. The team ranked first in the table at the
end of the season wins the championship, while up to three teams (ranked last in the table) get
relegated to the second division. In a football match, there are eleven players on the pitch, while
the total team rosters are larger (unlimited) and typically range between 25 and 35 players.
Clubs hire players, who typically get offered contracts with a specific duration and negotiate
their salaries with the respective club. If the player wants to transfer to another club before
the contract expires, the current club (employer) has the right to veto the transfer and require
a transfer fee from the potential new club (Feess et al., 2015). Since the so-called Bosman
Judgement in 1995, players are free to move to other teams after their contract has expired.9
Overall, the Bundesliga resembles other European football leagues, while there are key aspects
that differ compared to US professional sports leagues. The latter are structured to promote a
competitive balance among competing teams through, e.g., salary caps and a draft system for
rookie players (Torgler and Schmidt, 2007). In contrast, there is more active transfer markets
and less regulated salaries in European top football leagues, as the Bundesliga.
Advantages of studying labour markets based on sports data are the observability of attributes,
performance, and earnings of workers (athletes) and the quality of statistics that are often more
accurate and detailed than typical microdata (Kahn, 2000). Thus, a professional sports setting
provides a unique laboratory for labour market research as many factors that cannot be observed
in other labour markets, such as the abilities of employees or their actual performance in team
production, can be controlled for in this field environment. This allows a clearer isolation of
specific effects. However, a professional sports context also has unique attributes compared
to other labour markets, such as, on average, very high salaries, and the fact that individual
performance in team production is observed by thousands of spectators in stadiums (Franck
and Nüesch, 2011). These specific attributes of labour markets in professional sports limits
the generalisably of findings (Harder, 1992). The applicability of my findings based on the
professional football setting to a general labour market context are discussed in Section 5.
Thus, numerous studies have investigated various determinants of remuneration based on
professional football data (See Frick (2007) for a review). These include the role of scarce talent
(Bryson et al., 2013), migration (Bryson et al., 2014), player popularity (Franck and Nüesch,
8There are two further national leagues in German club football, i.e. the second division, 2. Bundesliga, and the
third division, 3. Liga.
9See Court of Justice of the European Communities, Case C-415/93. Prior to this judgement, a club could demand
a transfer fee even when the contract has expired.
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Table 1: Main field positions and their (sub-) positions
Defender Midfielder Forward
Centre-Back (CB) Defensive MF (DM) Secondary Striker (SS)
Left- / Right-Back (LB / RB) Central MF (CM) Centre Forward (CF)
Attacking MF (AM) Left / Right Wing (LW/ RW)
Left / Right MF (LM / RM)
2012; Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol, 2007; Lehmann and Schulze, 2008; Lucifora and Simmons,
2003), the consistency of performance (Deutscher and Büschemann, 2015), or firm-specific and
general human capital (Franck et al., 2011). To the best of my knowledge, the only empirical
study that investigates the returns to specialisation compared to versatility in a professional
sports setting was conducted by Simmons and Berri (2009) using data on running backs in the
NFL. The authors consider skills to perform two main skills of running backs, namely rushing
and pass reception, and find that running backs specialised in one of two skills have higher
returns than more versatile players. This paper adds to previous findings by simultaneously
analysing different main positions (occupations) with potentially different skill sets required,
while Simmons and Berri (2009) focussed on one position. Furthermore, players in the NFL
typically only play on one position that requires very specialised skills. In association football,
however, the level of specialisation varies across players and thus seems a more suitable setting
to draw conclusions for other labour markets.
A specific advantage of football data for this analysis is that it allows for a very precise
measurement of task-specific specialisation of players. In football, there are three main field
positions: defender (DE), midfielder (MF), and forward (FW). These positions can be further
subdivided into twelve tactical (sub-)positions, as depicted in Table 1. Goalkeepers are not
included in this analysis, as they only perform one task and mature professional goalkeepers do
not switch to any other positions.
These positions can be interpreted as specific tasks in team production. The skill to perform
each task, i.e. task-specific human capital, is accumulated by performing the respective task
(Gibbons and Waldman, 2004). Thus, in the professional football setting of this study, the num-
ber of matches a player has played on a certain position in his career prior to the respective
season can be interpreted as the player’s human capital to perform this specific task that he has
accumulated through learning-by-doing. In addition to on-field learning, the number of matches
played on a position also reflects the player’s ability to perform this specific task, as coaches
select the, in their opinion, best player to appear in matches on certain positions (Simmons and
Berri, 2009). The number of career matches played on all possible positions reveals whether the
player is specialised on one or few positions or whether a player has a more versatile skill set,
but a lower skill-intensity per position.10 I construct different measures of skill variety for each
10Two examples help to illustrate the information used. Prior to the 2015/16 season, Robert Lewandowski (for-
ward, Bayern Munich) played 92% of all his career matches as central forward, 7% as secondary forward, and
1% as attacking midfielder and hence is rather specialised. In contrast, Zlatko Junuzovic’s (midfielder, Werder
Bremen) career match distribution is as follows: 37% attacking midfield, 18% left midfield, 13% left wing,
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player, which reflect whether a player is rather a specialist in one task or a generalist, able to
perform several tasks. I then investigate how the skill variety, controlling for individual player
characteristics as well as club- and season fixed effects, affects player wages.
3.2. Data
The database of this study covers the seasons 2010/11 - 2016/17 of the German Bundesliga.
Most of the information on salaries and player characteristics was gathered from Kicker, a
highly respected German football magazine. From this source, I collected information on player
performance (based on expert evaluations), experience (age, career matches in the national
team, season matches as starter/substitute in the Bundesliga, and main position). I use data from
the website www.transfermarkt.de on the number of career matches the athletes have played
on a certain position and the footedness of players.11 Both data sources have frequently been
used in previous empirical studies (Battré and Höhmann, 2011; Bryson et al., 2013; Deutscher
and Büschemann, 2015; Franck and Nüesch, 2011; Frick, 2011; Lehmann and Schulze, 2008;
Torgler and Schmidt, 2007). Combing the data from these sources yields an unbalanced panel
dataset with 2002 player-year observations. A more detailed description of all dependent and
explanatory variables is presented below.
3.2.1. Salary
Following the literature, I use market valuations of Kicker as a proxy for player salaries that
are largely undisclosed (Bryson et al., 2013; Deutscher and Büschemann, 2015; Franck and
Nüesch, 2011; Frick, 2011; Lehmann and Schulze, 2008). As previous studies, annual salary
in season t is approximated as the Kicker valuation in season t divided by a factor of 1.5.
These market valuations are likely to be consistent, as it has been systematically estimated over
several years (Torgler and Schmidt, 2007). First proxies of market values were published by the
magazine in the mid-1990s (Franck et al., 2011). Franck and Nüesch (2011) have investigated
the reliability of the Kicker data by comparing it to estimates from www.transfermarkt.de.12
They find a correlation between the market value estimates of Kicker and market value estimates
from www.transfermarkt.de of 0.89. Torgler and Schmidt (2007) find a correlation coefficient of
0.83. Frick (2006) compares the salary estimates from Kicker to a sample of actually observed
salary data for two seasons of the Bundesliga and finds a correlation of 0.8. Thus, the market
valuations by Kicker can be deemed a reliable proxy for player salaries.
11% left midfield, 10% defensive midfield, 5% central midfield, 5% right wing, and 1% secondary striker.
Thus, he is rather a generalist.
11For the footedness of players, I also use hard copies of the German sport magazine Sportbild to cross-check and
supplement the data.
12On this website, market values are updated based on actual past transfer values, the players’ performance, age,
injuries, etc. The estimates of the market values are determined by registered users together with moderators of
the respective forums and thus are based on a “wisdom of the crowds” principle (Gerhards et al., 2014). Ger-
hards et al. (2014) compared market value estimates from www.transfermarkt.de with transfer fees of actually
performed transfers and found a correlation of 0.93 indicating a high reliability of the estimates.
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Figure 1: Density estimates of annual player salaries
Figure 1 (left panel) shows density estimates of players’ annual salaries by season. The distri-
bution has the typical attribute of many income distributions, i.e. a long high-income tail. Thus,
I use the natural logarithm of annual salaries as the dependent variable in the analysis (Log of
Annual Salary). The distribution of Log of Annual Salary better resembles a normal distribution,
as can be seen in the right panel of Figure 1.
3.2.2. Measuring Skill Specialisation
The measure on skill variety is based on information on the number of matches a player has
played on each of the twelve positions prior to the respective season. As outlined in Subsection
3.1, the number of career matches on a certain position are proxies for the players’ accumulated
task-specific human capital to perform the respective tasks. For robustness, three alternative
measures of skill variety for each player are calculated based on the data. All three metrics have
in common that the metric for a specific season is based on the players’ career matches prior to
the season.
As a first measure, I calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the con-
centration of task-specific skills, which has been used as a measure of the specificity of college
majors in previous related studies (Blom et al., 2015; Leighton and Speer, 2017). The HHI of
player i in season t is calculated as follows:
HHIit =
12∑
p=1
s2ipt−1,
where p denotes each of the twelve available positions and sipt−1 is the share of career matches
played on position p relative to total career matches at the end of season t − 1. This measure
varies between 0 and 1 and the higher the skill concentration, i.e. the more specialised the
player is, the higher is the HHI. A value of 1 would mean that the player has only played on one
position in his career prior to season t.
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Figure 2: Means of skill specialisation by main position measured by HHI, Gini, and CV. The horizontal dashed
line is the overall mean.
As a second measure, I use the Gini coefficient, which is a common metric to measure in-
equality, typically in income distributions.13 Similar to the HHI, the Gini coefficient also varies
between 0 and 1. A value of 0 would indicate complete equality, i.e. a player has played the
same number of matches on all possible positions in his career. The higher the Gini coefficient,
the higher the inequality in the skill distribution, i.e. the more specialised is the player. Finally, I
also compute the coefficient of variation (CV), which has been previously used as a measure of
ability balance in the literature (Hartog et al., 2010). The CV is defined as the ratio of standard
deviation to the mean. In this case, it is the standard deviation of the skill distribution, i.e. the
distribution of career matches over all possible positions, divided by the mean of career matches
per position. Higher values of the CV indicate a more pronounced task specialisation.
Figure 2 shows the means of all three metrics for defenders, midfielders, and forwards. The
horizontal dashed line is the respective mean for the whole sample irrespective of main position.
As can be seen for all three metrics, midfielders are on average more versatile players compared
to defenders and forwards, which is, among other things, due to the fact that there are more
(sub-) positions that midfielders can play compared to defenders and forwards. This means that
the variety of relevant tasks to be performed is larger for the former players. To account for this,
I adjust the metric for skill specialisation by dividing them for each individual player by the
respective seasonal position mean. Thus, the variables that are used in the empirical analysis –
HHI, Gini, and CV – measure the degree of specialisation or versatility relative to the mean of
the respective main position in the respective season. In robustness checks, however, I use the
absolute values of those metrics – HHI (Absolute), Gini (Absolute), and CV (Absolute).
13I use the Stata Module lorenz to estimate Lorenz curves and compute the Gini coefficients (Jann, 2016).
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3.2.3. Other Explanatory Variables
In addition the measures of specialisation in task-specific human capital, I include several con-
trol variables to account for players’ experience and physical condition, namely the age (Age),
the number of matches played for a professional club (Total Club Matches)14, and the num-
ber of appearances in the national team (Total National Matches). Furthermore, Age Squared
is included as the relationship between age and remuneration is likely to be non-linear. While
experience increases with age and thus is expected to positively affect remunerations, player’s
physical abilities decrease with age, which has the opposite effect.
I further include the number of matches a player has actually played in the season. Typically
the teams head coach decides, which athletes are playing in a season match. A high number of
appearances indicates that the player is important from the coach’s perspective. Furthermore,
only players actually appearing in matches actively affect the team’s success. Thus, I expect
that the number of appearances in a season positively affect remuneration. For the analyses, I
split up all appearances in a season into matches, where the player was in the starting line-up
(Season Matches Starter), and the number of matches, where he was substituted in (Season
Matches Substitute).15 While the expected positive effect holds for the former, it is less clear for
the latter. A higher number of (Season Matches Substitute) might also imply that the player is
rather a backup and not first choice. This disaggregation allows to control for this possibility.
As a measure of actual on-field performance, I use expert evaluations from the football maga-
zine Kicker. Experts of Kicker evaluate individual match performances for every player that has
been on the pitch for at least 30 minutes (Franck and Nüesch, 2010). The performance rating is
based on the German school grading system from 1.0 (very good) to 6.0 (insufficient). Expert
evaluations, in particular of Kicker, have been widely used in previous studies (Bryson et al.,
2013; Carrieri et al., 2017; Deutscher and Büschemann, 2015; Franck and Nüesch, 2010, 2011;
Frick, 2011). For the empirical analysis, I use the average Kicker grade a player received in a
season and, for ease of interpretation, subtract this average grade from 7, such that a higher value
means better performance. Previous studies using these evaluations have shown that expert rat-
ings notably differ between positions, e.g. goalkeepers tend to be rated substantially better than
midfielders and defenders, while forwards receive, on average, the lowest grades (Battré and
Höhmann, 2011; Deutscher and Büschemann, 2015; Franck and Nüesch, 2010). Thus, follow-
ing Battré and Höhmann (2011), Bryson et al. (2013), and Franck and Nüesch (2010, 2011), I
adjust the Kicker evaluations by dividing it by the mean of the player’s respective main position
average in the respective season in order to eliminate any potential positional biases in the rat-
ing. Thus, the variable (Performance) measures the average position adjusted performance in a
specific season.
14An alternative measure would all matches played in the Bundesliga, but this measure does not appropriately cap-
ture experience of players that previously played professional leagues outside of Germany. However, choosing
this alternative measure does not affect the models main results and yields quantitatively very similar effects to
Total Club Matches
15The coach is allowed to perform three player substitutions in a Bundesliga match.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Log of Annual Salary 2002 14.1 0.62 11.8 15.7
Age 2002 25.8 3.65 18 38
Age Squared 2002 677.6 192.5 324 1444
Total National Matches 2002 14.1 22.0 0 119
Total Club Matches 2002 113.9 71.8 0 491
Performance 2002 1.00 0.13 0.43 1.52
Season Matches Starter 2002 18.2 9.80 0 34
Season Matches Substitute 2002 4.18 4.26 0 27
Right Footed 2002 0.58 0.49 0 1
Left Footed 2002 0.22 0.41 0 1
Two Footed 2002 0.20 0.40 0 1
Last Season 2. Bundesliga 2002 0.093 0.29 0 1
Defender 2002 0.36 0.48 0 1
Midfielder 2002 0.45 0.50 0 1
Forward 2002 0.19 0.39 0 1
Gini 2002 1.00 0.080 0.69 1.18
HHI 2002 1.00 0.37 0.26 2.38
CV 2002 1.00 0.23 0.42 1.70
Gini (Absolute) 2002 0.83 0.078 0.54 0.92
HHI (Absolute) 2002 0.57 0.25 0.15 1
CV (Absolute) 2002 2.55 0.69 1.03 3.61
Following Bryson et al. (2013), I also introduce footedness as a measure of (scarce) ability
into the model. The authors argue that footedness is to a large extent an innate ability. Most pro-
fessional football players are right footed, while left- and two-footed players are rather scarce.
Thus, it is possible that left-footed players receive a salary premium due to their scarce ability
that makes them particularly well suited to certain positions (e.g. left back, - midfielder, or -
wing). In particular two-footed players are likely to receive returns on this ability, as it gives
them more opportunities on the pitch. For example, they pass and shoot with both feet and
hence their actions during a football are less predictable for opponent players. Thus, I include
three dummy variables – Right Footed, Left Footed, and Two Footed – to control for the effect
of footedness on remuneration.
Like Battré and Höhmann (2011), I introduce the dummy variable Last Season 2. Bundesliga
to control for those players who played in the second division in the previous season. Previous
evidence indicates that, even when controlling for performance, talent, experience, and other
player characteristics, there remain significant influences of players’ main positions and club-
specific effects on remuneration (Deutscher and Büschemann, 2015; Frick, 2011, 2012; Idson
and Kahane, 2000; Kahane, 2012; Lehmann and Schulze, 2008). Thus, I include a set of dum-
mies for the player’s main field position – Defender, Midfielder, and Forward – as well as club
dummies. Finally, I also include season dummies to control for time effects. Table 2 provides
an overview of the descriptive statistics of all variables.
Generalists vs. Specialists: Skill Variety and Remuneration in Football 14
3.3. Estimation Approach
The general model used in the empirical analysis is:
Ln(Salary) = f (Age, Age Squared, Total National Matches, Total Club Matches,
Performance, Season Matches Starter, Season Matches Substitute,
Footedness, Main Position, Skill Specialisation, League Last S eason,
Club and Season Ef fects).
In order to avoid a possible endogeneity problem, I use the lagged values of the player’s per-
formance as well as the number of appearances (as started and substitute), i.e. the values from
the respective previous season. All experience measures (age, total career matches played for
a club and the national team) as well as the measure of skill specialisation are determined at
the beginning of the season. In a first step, I estimate the model as described above to analyse
the effect of skill specialisation for all players. In addition to this base model, I also analyse
an alternative specification with interactions between the main position dummies and skill spe-
cialisation. This specification allows an investigation of the potential differences in the effect of
skill specialisation on remuneration between defenders, midfielders, and forwards.
In a first step, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with robust standard errors.16
In addition, I also use quantile regression (QR) estimations, which are based on the work of
Koenker and Bassett (1978) and have been increasingly used in recent empirical analysis of
remuneration based on professional sports data (Battré and Höhmann, 2011; Bryson et al., 2013,
2014; Deutscher and Büschemann, 2015; Deutscher et al., 2017; Lehmann and Schulze, 2008;
Simmons and Berri, 2009).
QR estimation is a very useful tool in the context of this study due to the following reasons. As
displayed in Figure 1, the salary distribution is right-skewed, i.e. there is a small number of top
players that earn substantially more than their colleagues. This skewness is particularly strong in
professional team sports (Deutscher et al., 2017; Lucifora and Simmons, 2003). Log salaries are
typically characterised by an excess kurtosis. This can also be seen in my sample, where the log
salary’s kurtosis value of 3.37 exceeds 3 and thus indicates that the salary distribution is not log-
normal. This non-normality of the dependent variable might violate the normality assumption
for the error terms. When performing OLS regressions, standard errors and confidence intervals
and thus the significance levels of the estimates might be affected. In contrast, QR estimation
does not rely on the normality assumption and is thus applicable in this case (Leeds, 2014).
Another advantage of QR estimation is that it allows for valuable additional insights. QR
allows an estimation of the marginal effects of the explanatory variables at different points of
the dependent variable’s distribution (Koenker, 2009). Within this study, I can investigate the
effect of skill specialisation and other explanatory variables on remuneration at different salary
16White- and Breuch-Pagan tests after running OLS regressions reject the null hypothesis that the variance of the
residuals is homogenous.
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quantiles. While OLS coefficients are the impact of a covariate on the conditional mean of re-
muneration, QR estimates refer to the impact of an independent variable on salary for a specific
quantile of the conditional salary distribution (Leeds, 2014).17 QR allows for an investigation
whether skill specialisation and skill versatility have different impacts on players at the lower
end of the conditional salary distribution compared to the high paid top players. I estimate the
0.1, 0.25, 0.5 (median), 0.75, and 0.9 quantiles with bootstrapped standard errors.18 For both
model specifications (without and with main position interactions), I perform both OLS regres-
sions and QRs.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. OLS Estimates
The OLS estimation results for the base model and the specification with skill specialisation
by position are reported in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Before discussing the main results, I
turn to the impacts of the control variables. Overall, the effects of the control variables have the
expected signs, are mostly statistically significant, and are almost identical across the measures
of skill specialisation (Gini, HHI, and CV) and model specifications.
As predicted, the coefficient of Age has a positive sign, while its squared term’s coefficient
has a negative sign, indicating a reversed U-shaped relationship between a player’s age and
remuneration. The turning point of Age is around 25 years, i.e. the age level that maximises
salary. Furthermore, all previous career appearances for clubs (Total Club Matches) and for the
national team (Total National Matches) positively affect remuneration, while the effect of the
latter is notably larger than the former. An explanation could be that matches for the national
team could, in addition to experience, measure an additional notion of player talent, as typically
the best players are nominated to play for the national team.
The number of matches played in the starting line-up in the previous season has a positive
and significant effect on remunerations. The larger Season Matches Starter, the higher is the
player’s active contribution to team production resulting in a higher salary. Furthermore, the
coefficient of Season Matches Starter is notably larger than the coefficient of Total Club Matches
indicating that recent appearances have a stronger effect than previous career appearances. The
number of matches, where the player was a backup and substituted in during the match (Season
Matches Substitute), also has a positive effect on remuneration, which is, however, notably
17This is important, when interpreting coefficients of a QR. It is the impact of a certain covariate, say player’s age,
on the salary of a player in specific quantile of the conditional salary distribution, e.g. the 0.9 quantile. This
coefficient, however, does not say anything about the effect of age on salaries for the top 10% earning players
in the sample. Instead, the coefficient of the 90th percentile shows how an additional year of age affects the
salary of a player, who earns relatively much relative to other players given their age. Leeds (2014) provides a
more detailed discussion on the interpretation of QR estimates and typical misinterpretations, in particular in
sports economics.
18I bootstrapped with 250 repetitions. Most of the recent studies on remuneration in a profession sports context
bootstrap with 200 repetitions (Bryson et al., 2013, 2014; Frick, 2011; Simmons and Berri, 2009).
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Table 3: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary: OLS regression results
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.2363*** (8.23) 0.2358*** (8.22) 0.2362*** (8.24)
Age Squared -0.0047*** (-8.78) -0.0047*** (-8.76) -0.0047*** (-8.77)
Total National Matches 0.0029*** (6.55) 0.0028*** (6.54) 0.0028*** (6.47)
Total Club Matches 0.0014*** (8.87) 0.0014*** (8.88) 0.0014*** (8.83)
Performance 1.3731*** (13.66) 1.3723*** (13.66) 1.3739*** (13.67)
Season Matches Starter 0.0236*** (19.29) 0.0236*** (19.30) 0.0236*** (19.32)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0062** (2.37) 0.0062** (2.37) 0.0062** (2.37)
Left Footed 0.0296 (1.57) 0.0291 (1.54) 0.0275 (1.46)
Two Footed 0.0435** (2.07) 0.0434** (2.07) 0.0413** (1.96)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.4876*** (-13.43) -0.4874*** (-13.41) -0.4867*** (-13.34)
Midfielder 0.1275*** (6.96) 0.1275*** (6.97) 0.1278*** (6.98)
Forward 0.3319*** (13.38) 0.3319*** (13.38) 0.3320*** (13.37)
HHI 0.0663*** (3.25)
CV 0.1099*** (3.28)
Gini 0.2688*** (2.68)
Constant 9.1000*** (23.07) 9.0620*** (22.95) 8.8925*** (21.90)
Observations 2002 2002 2002
R2 0.698 0.698 0.697
Notes: Club- and season fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is log
of annual salary. t-statistics in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
smaller than the effect of matches in the starting line-up. This finding could indicate the potential
opposing effects of being substituted as mentioned above: a positive effect on remuneration
due to increased participation in team production and a negative effect as a higher number of
matches as a substitute indicates that the player’s status is rather that of a back-up player. In
fact, the QR results, which will be discussed below, shed some light on this relationship as they
show differences in the effect across the conditional salary distribution.
As expected, the actual performance in the previous season has a positive and highly sig-
nificant effect on remuneration. There is, however, no statistically significant return on left-
footedness. In contrast, players that are two-footed, i.e. can play (almost) equally well with both
feet, receive a salary premium (positive and significant effect of Two Footed). An interpretation
of these results could be that the scarcity of a talent alone, as in the case of left-footed players
that make up 22% in the sample, does not entail a salary premium. Two-footedness, however,
is not only a scarce talent (20% of the players in the sample), but also gives the player advan-
tages over one footed players, whether left or right footed, on the pitch, as they can intercept,
play, and shoot the ball with both feet equally well, which makes them less predictable for their
opponents. Finally, midfielders and forwards receive salary premiums compared to defenders
(reference category), as can be seen from the results in Table 3.
I now turn to the discussion of the main results of the empirical analysis. For all three mea-
sures of skill specialisation (Gini, HHI, and CV), OLS regression results indicate that the degree
of skill specialisation has a positive effect on earnings (see Table 3). The coefficients of HHI,
CV, and Gini are significant at the 1%-level. Players who performed fewer tasks in their ca-
reers and thus have accumulated relatively higher levels of task-specific human capital receive
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Table 4: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary by main position: OLS regression results
(4) (5) (6)
Age 0.2300*** (8.00) 0.2300*** (8.00) 0.2314*** (8.06)
Age Squared -0.0046*** (-8.57) -0.0046*** (-8.58) -0.0046*** (-8.63)
Total National Matches 0.0029*** (6.52) 0.0029*** (6.52) 0.0028*** (6.49)
Total Club Matches 0.0014*** (8.94) 0.0014*** (8.96) 0.0014*** (8.93)
Performance 1.3742*** (13.57) 1.3742*** (13.59) 1.3746*** (13.64)
Season Matches Starter 0.0235*** (19.32) 0.0235*** (19.33) 0.0235*** (19.33)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0057** (2.19) 0.0057** (2.19) 0.0059** (2.23)
Left Footed 0.0313* (1.65) 0.0307 (1.62) 0.0281 (1.49)
Two Footed 0.0457** (2.18) 0.0464** (2.21) 0.0455** (2.16)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.4856*** (-13.49) -0.4854*** (-13.48) -0.4847*** (-13.42)
Midfielder 0.2980*** (5.50) 0.4046*** (4.74) 1.0222*** (3.88)
Forward 0.3672*** (5.80) 0.3887*** (4.01) 0.6012* (1.96)
HHI 0.1667*** (3.98)
HHI * Midfielder -0.1703*** (-3.42)
HHI * Forward -0.0328 (-0.58)
CV 0.2738*** (3.96)
CV * Midfielder -0.2770*** (-3.37)
CV * Forward -0.0546 (-0.59)
Gini 0.8961*** (3.87)
Gini * Midfielder -0.8949*** (-3.41)
Gini * Forward -0.2684 (-0.88)
Constant 9.0818*** (22.93) 8.9768*** (22.52) 8.3382*** (18.67)
Observations 2002 2002 2002
R2 0.700 0.700 0.699
Notes: Club- and season fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is log
of annual salary. t-statistics in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
a salary premium, even when controlling for other effects, such as specific abilities or perfor-
mance.
The interactions between skill specialisation and main position (defender, midfielder, and
forward) provides additional insights (see Table 4). As defenders are the base category, the
respective metric of skill specialisation measures the effect for defenders. In Model 4, e.g., the
positive and significant coefficient of HHI indicates that defenders that are more specialised than
the average player on this main position receive higher salaries. This result remains robust across
all three metrics. Thus, the statistically not significant interaction HHI * Forward indicates
that there is no difference between defenders and forwards, i.e. also the latter receive a salary
premium on skill specialisation.19 The same result is obtained for Gini and CV.
There is, however, a difference of the effect in the case of midfielders, as the interaction term
HHI * Midfielder is negative and statistically significant (Model 4). The same result is obtained
in the models with Gini and CV (Models 5 and 6). The effect of skill specialisation for mid-
fielders can be computed by summing up the coefficient of HHI * Midfielder the coefficient of
the reference group (HHI), which yields 0.1667 − 0.1703 = −0.0036. When Gini or CV are
used, the impact of skill specialisation on remunerations of midfielders is also close to zero.
This indicates that, compared to defenders and forwards, there is no effect of skill specialisation
19H0 : HHI + HHI * Forward = 0 is rejected at the 1%-level.
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on midfielders’ salaries. Testing the effect of skill specialisation on midfielders’ remuneration
supports this finding, i.e. the coefficients of the base group’s specialisation and the interac-
tion with midfielders are jointly not significantly different from zero.20 This finding is further
supported by estimates of OLS regressions performed for each main position seperately (not
reported here). While there is a positive and significant effect of specialisation for defenders
and forwards, the effect is not significantly different from zero for midfielders.
4.2. QR Estimates
Tables 5 and 6 report the estimation results using HHI as a measure of skill specialisation for
the base model and the specification with HHI by main position. The results for the alterna-
tive measures of skill specialisation, Gini and CV, can be found in Appendix A (Tables 7, 8, 9,
and 10). For all QR model specifications, the results concerning player experience (Age, Age
Squared, Total National Matches, Total Club Matches) as well as appearances in the starting
line-up in the previous season (Season Matches Starter) are qualitatively identical across quan-
tiles and support the OLS estimates presented above. Thus, the discussion of the QR results will
focus on additional insights compared to the OLS estimates and starts with control variables.
Across the models and specifications, the results show that the effect of two-footedness is
not significant across all quantiles. Based on the respective specification, the coefficient of two-
footedness is often only (weakly) significant for at most one of the estimated five quantiles of the
log salary distribution. As reported in Table 6 for the case of HHI interacted with main position,
two-footedness has a positive and significant effect on remuneration for players at median of
the conditional distribution. An explanation for the weaker impact compared to the results of
Bryson et al. (2013) could be the inclusion of a measure for skill versatility. The authors argue
that an indirect effect of two-footedness on remuneration is its effect on players’ variability,
which could be captured by HHI, Gini, and CV, respectively.
The QR estimates reveal further insights on the effect of the number of matches a player
started as a back-up and was substituted in during the match (Season Matches Substitute). In
the OLS regressions the effect of this variable was positive and significant, but notably smaller
than the effect of Season Matches Starter. The QR estimates reveal that the effect varies notably
across quantiles. For players at the lower end of the conditional salary distribution, the number
of matches the player was substituted in has a positive return. In contrast, salaries of players
in the remainder of the conditional salary distribution are not affected. In sum specifications,
the effect is even negative in the upper tail of the conditional salary distribution. An intuition
for this result could be that players at the lower end of the conditional salary distribution, i.e.
players that are low-paid given their number of substitutions into matches, are mainly back-ups
with lower abilities. In their case, the number of matches they are actually substituted in mean
that their contribution to team production increases and thus yields a salary premium.
I now turn to the discussion of the impact of skill specialisation across salary quantiles.
20H0 : HHI + HHI * Midfielder = 0 cannot be rejected (p = 0.9). The same result is obtained for Gini and CV.
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Table 5: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary: QR results (HHI)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Age 0.3182*** 0.2282*** 0.1547*** 0.1336*** 0.1363***
(5.81) (5.28) (3.75) (4.43) (3.77)
Age Squared -0.0062*** -0.0046*** -0.0031*** -0.0028*** -0.0029***
(-6.16) (-5.57) (-4.09) (-4.97) (-4.27)
Total National Matches 0.0030*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0023*** 0.0026***
(4.71) (4.10) (4.04) (3.97) (3.51)
Total Club Matches 0.0010*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0014***
(3.65) (5.16) (6.45) (7.02) (4.83)
Performance 1.7105*** 1.6574*** 1.5710*** 1.3871*** 1.2528***
(10.95) (11.69) (14.11) (13.88) (8.78)
Season Matches Starter 0.0309*** 0.0272*** 0.0218*** 0.0179*** 0.0147***
(17.10) (14.75) (13.86) (12.38) (6.59)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0136*** 0.0098** 0.0052 -0.0003 -0.0075
(3.21) (2.32) (1.55) (-0.12) (-1.45)
Left Footed 0.0473 0.0194 0.0180 -0.0072 -0.0146
(1.54) (0.71) (0.78) (-0.29) (-0.40)
Two Footed 0.0620 0.0440 0.0368 0.0214 0.0094
(1.59) (1.50) (1.49) (0.85) (0.26)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.5143*** -0.5335*** -0.4742*** -0.3806*** -0.3476***
(-5.72) (-10.58) (-10.26) (-7.87) (-5.02)
Midfielder 0.0809** 0.1144*** 0.1254*** 0.1503*** 0.1845***
(2.41) (4.27) (5.47) (7.40) (5.96)
Forward 0.2861*** 0.3143*** 0.3593*** 0.3840*** 0.3761***
(6.17) (8.61) (12.98) (12.77) (9.47)
HHI 0.0741** 0.0983*** 0.0621** 0.0525** 0.0606*
(2.07) (3.36) (2.39) (2.09) (1.75)
Constant 7.1241*** 8.5824*** 9.9495*** 10.8372*** 11.1926***
(9.26) (14.98) (17.41) (26.33) (22.61)
Pseudo R2 0.4770 0.4546 0.4589 0.4950 0.5193
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions with club- and season fixed effects. N = 2002. The dependent
variable is log of annual salary. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 repetitions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
The results of the base specification, i.e. the models without interaction with main positions,
support the OLS regression results, i.e. returns to skill specialisation. Both HHI and CV have a
statistically significant positive effect on remuneration across all quantiles. With the exception
of the 0.9 quantile in the model with HHI (Table 5) and the 0.1. quantile in the model with CV
(Table 8 in Appendix A) the effect of the skill specialisation on remuneration is significant at
the 5%- or 1%-level. The effect of Gini log salaries is also positive across the conditional salary
distribution, however, at lower significance levels (Table 7 in Appendix A).
Figure 3 illustrates the core QR results of the main specifications, i.e. the models with mea-
sures of task-specific skill specialisation by main position.21 The shaded area around the line
connecting the coefficient estimates for the respective quantile represents a 90% confidence
band. Thus, when the band does not include zero, the coefficient is significant. The respective
OLS estimates are represented by the black horizontal lines, as they do not change at different
21The full regression results can be found in Tables 6 as well as Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix A.
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Table 6: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary by main position: QR results (HHI)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Age 0.3291*** 0.2224*** 0.1455*** 0.1245*** 0.1364***
(6.21) (5.15) (3.64) (4.37) (3.55)
Age Squared -0.0064*** -0.0045*** -0.0030*** -0.0027*** -0.0029***
(-6.58) (-5.45) (-3.99) (-4.93) (-4.08)
Total National Matches 0.0031*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0023*** 0.0027***
(4.72) (4.04) (3.82) (3.93) (3.63)
Total Club Matches 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0014*** 0.0013***
(3.47) (5.41) (8.16) (8.21) (5.00)
Performance 1.7291*** 1.6354*** 1.5623*** 1.3732*** 1.1976***
(12.03) (12.29) (14.52) (13.73) (8.12)
Season Matches Starter 0.0309*** 0.0273*** 0.0222*** 0.0178*** 0.0134***
(18.22) (15.45) (14.20) (13.04) (7.12)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0153*** 0.0070* 0.0047 -0.0018 -0.0075*
(3.94) (1.78) (1.29) (-0.61) (-1.67)
Left Footed 0.0346 0.0076 0.0216 -0.0014 0.0065
(1.15) (0.29) (0.92) (-0.06) (0.19)
Two Footed 0.0483 0.0382 0.0455* 0.0299 0.0188
(1.24) (1.37) (1.77) (1.23) (0.62)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.5181*** -0.5228*** -0.4658*** -0.4024*** -0.3042***
(-6.00) (-12.30) (-10.28) (-8.08) (-4.51)
Midfielder 0.1605* 0.2460*** 0.3044*** 0.3031*** 0.4347***
(1.76) (3.20) (4.46) (4.80) (6.03)
Forward 0.1692 0.2140** 0.3720*** 0.3989*** 0.5216***
(1.44) (2.53) (4.72) (4.88) (5.60)
HHI 0.0935 0.1240** 0.1705*** 0.1471*** 0.1869***
(1.28) (2.08) (2.97) (3.10) (3.10)
HHI * Midfielder -0.0761 -0.1290* -0.1822*** -0.1477** -0.2317***
(-0.91) (-1.81) (-2.64) (-2.46) (-3.34)
HHI * Forward 0.1357 0.1156 -0.0253 -0.0161 -0.1191
(1.29) (1.51) (-0.34) (-0.22) (-1.38)
Constant 6.9189*** 8.6702*** 9.9793*** 10.8602*** 11.0935***
(9.20) (14.60) (17.58) (26.72) (19.85)
Pseudo R2 0.4784 0.4576 0.4613 0.4975 0.5229
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions with club- and season fixed effects. N = 2002. The dependent
variable is log of annual salary. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 repetitions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
levels of the salary distribution. In general, the QR results are similar to the OLS estimates.
Defenders receive a salary premium and forwards are not significantly different for defenders.
The interaction term of skill specialisation and midfielders is negative.
The figure shows different patterns of impacts for defenders, forwards, and midfielders across
the salary distribution, which are similar across all three measures (HHI, Gini, and CV). Overall,
the effect of skill specialisation or versatility does not have a statistically significant impact for
players that are at the very end of the conditional salary distribution’s lower tail. The effect
is not statistically significant for the 0.1 quantile for all specifications. For defenders, there
seems to be a modest increase of the impact of specialisation on remuneration going from the
lowest to the highest point of the conditional salary distribution (three panels on the left in the
figure). Relative to defenders, an opposite pattern can be observed for forwards, i.e. the impact
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Figure 3: Quantile regression coefficients of the measures on skill specialisation (HHI, Gini, and CV) and their
interaction terms with main positions. The horizontal dashed black line is the respective OLS estimate.
The shaded area represents a 90% confidence band.
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of specialising on fewer tasks decreases along the conditional salary distribution (at least form
the 0.25 quantile onwards), as can be seen in the three panels on the right in the figure. The
latter effect, however, is not significant for any point of this distribution, which supports the
OLS result that there is no statistically significant difference between defenders and forwards.
As in the OLS regressions, midfielders differ from the other two main positions (three pan-
els in the middle column of Figure 3). For all quantiles above 0.1, the estimated coefficients
of the interaction between skill specialisation and midfielders are statistically significant and
negative and thus indicate that the impact of task-specific skill specialisation on remuneration
is significantly lower for midfielders compared to defenders. This negative impact seems to in-
crease for the upper end of the conditional salary distribution, i.e. the 0.9 quantile. Again, the
effect of skill specialisation for midfielders can be computed by summing up the coefficient
of the interaction between the midfielder dummy and the measure of skill specialisation with
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the coefficient of the latter for the reference group (defenders). As in the OLS regression, the
effect of skill specialisation on remuneration is close to zero for midfielders. Using Gini or CV
yields a similar result, which indicates that midfielders neither benefit from skill specialisation
nor from being generalists. Overall, Figure 3 shows interesting patterns across the conditional
salary distribution for the coefficients. These differences across quantiles should, however, not
be over-interpreted. As almost all estimates lie within the respective confidants bands, the dif-
ferences among these respective QR estimates and between these QR estimates and the OLS
estimates are not statistically significant (Leeds, 2014).
4.3. Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, I performed all estimates analysed above with measures of skill spe-
cialisation / versatility without the position adjustment, i.e. HHI (Absolute), Gini (Absolute),
and CV (Absolute). The measures used above were adjusted by the respective main positions
mean for every season due to the observed differences between the means of the specialisation
measures across main positions, i.e. defenders and forwards are, on average, rather specialised,
while midfielders are more versatile (See Figure 2). The measures used for robustness checks
describe the players’s absolute degree of specialisation. All tables with estimation results are
provided in Appendix B.
The OLS estimates for all three metrics are in line with the results above. When not dif-
ferentiating between player types, increased task-specific specialisation yields positive returns.
Including interactions with main positions shows that defenders and forwards receive salary
premiums on specialisation, while there is no effect of skill specialisation or versatility of mid-
fielders’ remunerations. As in the case of position adjusted measures of skill specialisation, all
results are highly significant. This result is also supported when OLS regressions are estimated
separately for the main positions (not reported). For defenders and forwards, there is a positive
and significant impact of skill specialisation on remuneration, while the effect is statistically not
different from zero for midfielders. Similar to the OLS estimates, the QR estimates based on the
non-adjusted specialisation measures are very similar to those with position adjustment.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the impact of skill variety on remuneration of employ-
ees. In contrast to previous studies, which focus on occupation- or industry specific human
capital, cognitive abilities, or higher education, this paper is a first contribution using a mea-
sure of skill specialisation that is based on task-specific human capital. Furthermore, it is one
of the first studies that investigates returns to specialisation versus versatility in a professional
sports setting, namely the German Bundesliga. This setting allows to control for employees’
actual performance and specific abilities, which is very difficult, when using data from other
labour markets. Of course, the findings in this paper are limited in their generalisability, as they
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are derived from a professional sports setting that has unique attributes. Football teams can be
compared to workplace teams, whose clearly defined members work interdependently within a
larger organisation (Katz, 2001). These teams can be characterised as performance teams pro-
ducing the primary product of the organisation or firm and this production is the primary task
of the team members (Crown, 2000). Thus, the findings of the impact of skill specialisation on
remuneration are generalisable to employees that work in teams that are involved with the pro-
duction of any firm’s or organisation’s output. In turn, they seem inappropriate to describe other
types of employees as (top) management or types of service staff not involved in production
(Wolfe et al., 2005).
In the analysis, I use the number of matches a player has played on each of the tactical posi-
tions in association football as a measure of the accumulated task-specific human capital, i.e. the
skill to perform this task. Based on this information, three different measures of skill variety are
computed for each player: the HHI, a Gini Coeffient, and a Coefficient of Variation. As the base
model, I analyse the relationship without differentiating between occupations, i.e. main field
positions (defender, midfielder, forward) in this setting. OLS results indicate a salary premium
from specialisation. These results, however, are only partly supported by QR estimates. Over-
all, this finding of returns from specialisation is in line with previous empirical studies using
different measures of skill variety (Aldén et al., 2017; Åstebro and Thompson, 2011; Simmons
and Berri, 2009). Considering the applicability of this study’s setting to other labour market
contexts, it is also not surprising that my findings indicate no returns to generalisation. Most of
the previous evidence for returns on skill versatility was found for CEOs and CFOs (Custódio
et al., 2013; Datta and Iskandar-Datta, 2014) or university graduates with general major de-
grees (Artz et al., 2014; Coenen et al., 2015; Leighton and Speer, 2017). CEOs and CFOs are
in charge or part of a firm’s top management, while a certain fraction of those graduates with
tertiary education end up in lower to middle management positions. These have coordinating or
supervisory roles rather than direct contributions to firms’ outputs and thus naturally require a
wider skill set compared to members of production teams.
In a next step of the analysis, I interact the measures of specialisation with the main field
position in order to investigate whether there are differences between these occupations. OLS
estimates confirm the base results for defenders and forwards, i.e. increased specialisation yields
a salary premium. In contrast, the impact of skill specialisation is negligible in the case of
midfielders. Thus, compared to defenders and forwards, midfielders receive neither a return
on task-specific versatility nor a return on specialisation. This finding is in line with previous
studies, which did not find any impact of skill specialisation or versatility on remuneration
(Åstebro et al., 2011; Hartog et al., 2010; Parey, 2016).
An explanation for the findings could be that defenders and forwards have more specialised
tasks in the football match compared to midfielders. While the latter are almost equally engaged
in offensive and defensive plays, the former two groups mainly perform defensive or offensive
tasks (Frick, 2007). In addition, this can be seen in the share of tasks performed that are not
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related to a player’s main occupation.22 On average, a defender plays on defence positions
in 89% of all seasonal matches. In the case of forwards, the respective share is almost 95%.
Midfielders, however, play only in 67% of all season matches on midfield positions. In the
other matches, players whose main occupation is midfielder also perform tasks of defenders of
forwards. Thus, they are used more flexibly in team production and seem to be shifted more
often between tasks due to, e.g., tactical considerations of team coaches.
An additional intuition behind the results could be the differences in task complexity. While
high task complexity benefits specialised employees, employees with versatile skill sets should
have a comparative advantage when tasks are less complex (Bublitz and Noseleit, 2014). An-
derson (2012) shows that, when problems are difficult to solve, i.e. tasks are difficult, more
individuals choose to specialise. Tasks typically performed by defenders and forwards are pos-
sibly more specialised / more difficult to learn, while tasks of midfielders do not differ as much.
One could argue that the difference between the required abilities / attributes of a centre- ver-
sus a left- or right-back (or a centre forward and a left- or right wing) is relatively large. In
other words, they require quite specific skills. In contrast, the difference with respect to the
requirements of, e.g., defensive-, central-, or attacking midfielders are relatively small. Hence,
defenders and forwards should have a higher incentive to specialise, while midfielders should
have rather an incentive to become generalists.
Thus, it is not surprising that forwards and defenders earn a premium as specialists. For
midfielders, there seems to be a trade-off between skill versatility and specialisation. On the one
hand, the relatively large range of comparable tasks and a higher required flexibility provide
incentives for a versatile skill set. On the other hand, midfielders also increase their task-specific
skills by learning-by-doing. As a task has to be performed several times in order to actually
accumulate specific human capital, there is also an incentive for midfielders to focus on fewer
tasks. Or in other words, the productivity returns to time spent performing tasks are, in general,
greater for employees focussing on fewer tasks (Becker and Murphy, 1992). These opposing
effects could be an explanations for why there is no impact on skill versatility on remuneration
for midfielders.
Overall, the findings presented in this paper, as well as previous evidence, indicate that em-
ployees receive returns to specialisation. For occupations involving a wide range of tasks, how-
ever, the positive impact of skill specialisation on remuneration disappears. An explanation
could be a trade-off between specialising on certain tasks and skill versatility. Thus, these find-
ings indicate that the impact of specialisation on remuneration is moderated by the characteris-
tics of the occupation. Thus, one direction of future research could be to further investigate how
different types of occupations might create comparative advantages for specialists or generalists.
22The following shares are based on the sample for the seasons 2010/11 - 2015/16.
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A. Appendix: Additional Quantile Regression Results
Table 7: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary: QR results (Gini)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Age 0.3297*** 0.2182*** 0.1515*** 0.1260*** 0.1384***
(6.16) (4.76) (3.90) (4.24) (3.70)
Age Squared -0.0063*** -0.0043*** -0.0031*** -0.0027*** -0.0029***
(-6.40) (-4.95) (-4.20) (-4.81) (-4.22)
Total National Matches 0.0028*** 0.0021*** 0.0020*** 0.0021*** 0.0024***
(4.54) (3.73) (3.25) (3.72) (3.39)
Total Club Matches 0.0010*** 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0015***
(3.70) (5.24) (7.61) (7.65) (5.16)
Performance 1.7683*** 1.6436*** 1.5924*** 1.4067*** 1.2668***
(11.66) (11.60) (13.32) (13.68) (8.57)
Season Matches Starter 0.0311*** 0.0273*** 0.0220*** 0.0178*** 0.0147***
(17.42) (14.81) (13.69) (11.77) (6.87)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0134*** 0.0092** 0.0051 -0.0005 -0.0067
(3.24) (2.36) (1.61) (-0.18) (-1.51)
Left Footed 0.0507* 0.0179 0.0155 -0.0148 -0.0130
(1.89) (0.63) (0.74) (-0.64) (-0.43)
Two Footed 0.0656 0.0424 0.0355 0.0160 0.0158
(1.61) (1.31) (1.41) (0.66) (0.47)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.5258*** -0.5307*** -0.4704*** -0.3830*** -0.3521***
(-6.68) (-12.14) (-11.03) (-8.29) (-5.27)
Midfielder 0.0810** 0.1107*** 0.1311*** 0.1427*** 0.1865***
(2.52) (4.16) (5.94) (6.77) (5.99)
Forward 0.2932*** 0.3160*** 0.3542*** 0.3735*** 0.3794***
(6.30) (9.12) (13.89) (12.18) (10.85)
Gini 0.2217 0.3876** 0.2134* 0.2581* 0.3146*
(1.46) (2.56) (1.88) (1.93) (1.90)
Constant 6.7312*** 8.4339*** 9.8218*** 10.7025*** 10.8804***
(9.15) (13.19) (18.30) (25.32) (19.64)
Pseudo R2 0.4761 0.4536 0.4580 0.4949 0.5196
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions with club- and season fixed effects. N = 2002. The dependent
variable is log of annual salary. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 repetitions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 8: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary: QR results (CV)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Age 0.3248*** 0.2284*** 0.1548*** 0.1343*** 0.1420***
(6.11) (4.87) (3.88) (4.40) (3.70)
Age Squared -0.0063*** -0.0046*** -0.0031*** -0.0029*** -0.0030***
(-6.29) (-5.08) (-4.17) (-5.04) (-4.21)
Total National Matches 0.0029*** 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 0.0024*** 0.0025***
(4.41) (3.82) (3.65) (4.12) (3.62)
Total Club Matches 0.0010*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0015***
(3.73) (5.27) (7.06) (7.67) (5.13)
Performance 1.7396*** 1.6633*** 1.5623*** 1.3861*** 1.2586***
(11.17) (11.46) (13.67) (13.22) (7.76)
Season Matches Starter 0.0308*** 0.0269*** 0.0219*** 0.0177*** 0.0148***
(15.88) (15.53) (14.67) (12.27) (7.64)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0129*** 0.0091** 0.0054 -0.0011 -0.0070
(3.13) (2.28) (1.60) (-0.40) (-1.54)
Left Footed 0.0459 0.0202 0.0158 -0.0031 -0.0144
(1.47) (0.77) (0.75) (-0.13) (-0.39)
Two Footed 0.0620 0.0481* 0.0377 0.0204 0.0116
(1.61) (1.70) (1.52) (0.89) (0.36)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.5180*** -0.5355*** -0.4750*** -0.3876*** -0.3495***
(-6.17) (-13.50) (-10.35) (-7.86) (-4.86)
Midfielder 0.0836*** 0.1177*** 0.1262*** 0.1511*** 0.1834***
(2.65) (4.37) (5.40) (6.92) (5.57)
Forward 0.2894*** 0.3189*** 0.3552*** 0.3856*** 0.3785***
(6.00) (7.84) (12.25) (14.03) (11.29)
CV 0.0985* 0.1594*** 0.0987*** 0.0996** 0.1047**
(1.81) (3.55) (2.68) (2.30) (1.99)
Constant 6.9721*** 8.5338*** 9.9197*** 10.7956*** 11.0630***
(9.49) (13.78) (18.27) (25.34) (19.94)
Pseudo R2 0.4766 0.4545 0.4588 0.4952 0.5196
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions with club- and season fixed effects. N = 2002. The dependent
variable is log of annual salary. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 repetitions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 9: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary by main position: QR results (Gini)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Age 0.3174*** 0.2079*** 0.1481*** 0.1257*** 0.1377***
(6.23) (4.88) (4.03) (4.39) (3.47)
Age Squared -0.0061*** -0.0042*** -0.0030*** -0.0027*** -0.0029***
(-6.49) (-5.15) (-4.40) (-4.98) (-3.97)
Total National Matches 0.0030*** 0.0023*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0024***
(4.70) (4.26) (3.75) (3.78) (3.22)
Total Club Matches 0.0010*** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0015***
(3.41) (5.50) (7.11) (7.46) (5.32)
Performance 1.7572*** 1.6303*** 1.5736*** 1.3818*** 1.2252***
(11.36) (11.10) (13.34) (12.83) (8.57)
Season Matches Starter 0.0309*** 0.0271*** 0.0218*** 0.0177*** 0.0140***
(17.43) (16.37) (14.47) (14.60) (7.73)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0143*** 0.0067* 0.0038 -0.0022 -0.0071*
(3.51) (1.66) (1.15) (-0.86) (-1.70)
Left Footed 0.0437 -0.0016 0.0174 -0.0085 -0.0014
(1.52) (-0.05) (0.79) (-0.35) (-0.04)
Two Footed 0.0775* 0.0275 0.0432 0.0300 0.0417
(1.96) (0.95) (1.59) (1.28) (1.21)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.5189*** -0.5061*** -0.4569*** -0.4008*** -0.3109***
(-6.42) (-10.87) (-10.56) (-8.54) (-5.05)
Midfielder 0.3475 0.9020** 1.1224*** 0.8931** 1.0572***
(0.78) (2.37) (3.25) (2.56) (3.08)
Forward 0.0517 -0.1328 0.4635 0.2946 0.9754**
(0.10) (-0.33) (1.15) (0.63) (2.28)
Gini 0.2321 0.5714* 0.8832*** 0.7577** 0.9229***
(0.64) (1.75) (2.74) (2.35) (3.28)
Gini * Midfielder -0.2659 -0.7787** -0.9938*** -0.7371** -0.8732**
(-0.60) (-2.07) (-2.88) (-2.13) (-2.54)
Gini * Forward 0.2485 0.4696 -0.1076 0.0801 -0.5945
(0.46) (1.17) (-0.27) (0.17) (-1.41)
Constant 6.8951*** 8.4352*** 9.2423*** 10.2338*** 10.3443***
(8.61) (12.66) (16.11) (20.03) (16.77)
Pseudo R2 0.4767 0.4569 0.4611 0.4970 0.5223
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions with club- and season fixed effects. N = 2002. The dependent
variable is log of annual salary. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 repetitions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 10: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary by main position: QR results (CV)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Age 0.3228*** 0.2233*** 0.1487*** 0.1216*** 0.1326***
(5.94) (5.62) (4.02) (4.02) (3.43)
Age Squared -0.0062*** -0.0045*** -0.0031*** -0.0026*** -0.0028***
(-6.22) (-5.93) (-4.41) (-4.59) (-4.00)
Total National Matches 0.0031*** 0.0023*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0024***
(4.88) (4.45) (3.80) (3.71) (3.07)
Total Club Matches 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0015*** 0.0014*** 0.0014***
(3.38) (5.44) (7.42) (7.25) (5.08)
Performance 1.7400*** 1.6409*** 1.5864*** 1.3709*** 1.1955***
(10.61) (11.09) (13.51) (12.03) (8.15)
Season Matches Starter 0.0311*** 0.0269*** 0.0221*** 0.0179*** 0.0136***
(16.71) (14.90) (15.07) (14.44) (7.26)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0155*** 0.0068* 0.0049 -0.0019 -0.0079*
(3.74) (1.74) (1.40) (-0.67) (-1.83)
Left Footed 0.0321 0.0063 0.0232 0.0021 0.0100
(1.06) (0.23) (1.02) (0.08) (0.29)
Two Footed 0.0497 0.0355 0.0434 0.0311 0.0228
(1.20) (1.20) (1.63) (1.36) (0.69)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.5275*** -0.5254*** -0.4666*** -0.4013*** -0.2955***
(-6.39) (-11.73) (-11.31) (-8.31) (-4.47)
Midfielder 0.1457 0.3236*** 0.4078*** 0.3929*** 0.5212***
(1.06) (2.80) (3.91) (3.91) (4.62)
Forward 0.0949 0.1529 0.3680*** 0.3925*** 0.5923***
(0.55) (1.18) (2.90) (2.95) (4.38)
CV 0.1141 0.1896** 0.2630*** 0.2443*** 0.3011***
(1.00) (2.02) (2.71) (3.01) (3.30)
CV * Midfielder -0.0657 -0.2040* -0.2821*** -0.2364** -0.3269***
(-0.48) (-1.84) (-2.69) (-2.40) (-2.88)
CV * Forward 0.2051 0.1845 -0.0174 -0.0133 -0.1942
(1.21) (1.51) (-0.15) (-0.11) (-1.50)
Constant 6.9367*** 8.5972*** 9.8236*** 10.8072*** 11.0631***
(9.31) (15.73) (19.23) (27.35) (20.11)
Pseudo R2 0.4776 0.4575 0.4614 0.4976 0.5227
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions with club- and season fixed effects. N = 2002. The dependent
variable is log of annual salary. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 repetitions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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B. Appendix: Robustness Checks
Table 11: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary: OLS regression results
(R1) (R2) (R3)
Age 0.2346*** (8.17) 0.2347*** (8.18) 0.2359*** (8.22)
Age Squared -0.0047*** (-8.74) -0.0047*** (-8.74) -0.0047*** (-8.76)
Total National Matches 0.0029*** (6.55) 0.0028*** (6.54) 0.0028*** (6.47)
Total Club Matches 0.0014*** (9.02) 0.0014*** (9.00) 0.0014*** (8.90)
Performance 1.3706*** (13.63) 1.3704*** (13.65) 1.3729*** (13.67)
Season Matches Starter 0.0236*** (19.31) 0.0236*** (19.32) 0.0236*** (19.33)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0062** (2.38) 0.0062** (2.39) 0.0062** (2.39)
Left Footed 0.0311 (1.64) 0.0300 (1.58) 0.0278 (1.47)
Two Footed 0.0456** (2.17) 0.0451** (2.15) 0.0420** (2.00)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.4872*** (-13.46) -0.4871*** (-13.43) -0.4866*** (-13.34)
Midfielder 0.1745*** (8.34) 0.1725*** (8.21) 0.1628*** (7.71)
Forward 0.3457*** (13.98) 0.3456*** (13.96) 0.3429*** (13.80)
HHI (Absolute) 0.1575*** (4.35)
CV (Absolute) 0.0546*** (4.09)
Gini (Absolute) 0.3824*** (3.12)
Constant 9.0796*** (23.06) 9.0291*** (22.89) 8.8312*** (21.70)
Observations 2002 2002 2002
R2 0.699 0.699 0.698
Notes: Club- and season fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is log
of annual salary. t-statistics in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 12: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary by main position: OLS regression results
(R4) (R5) (R6)
Age 0.2296*** (7.98) 0.2294*** (7.97) 0.2308*** (8.03)
Age Squared -0.0046*** (-8.55) -0.0046*** (-8.56) -0.0046*** (-8.61)
Total National Matches 0.0029*** (6.53) 0.0029*** (6.53) 0.0028*** (6.49)
Total Club Matches 0.0014*** (8.98) 0.0014*** (8.99) 0.0014*** (8.97)
Performance 1.3737*** (13.57) 1.3737*** (13.59) 1.3744*** (13.64)
Season Matches Starter 0.0235*** (19.32) 0.0235*** (19.33) 0.0235*** (19.34)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0058** (2.20) 0.0058** (2.20) 0.0059** (2.24)
Left Footed 0.0316* (1.67) 0.0309 (1.63) 0.0283 (1.50)
Two Footed 0.0458** (2.18) 0.0466** (2.22) 0.0457** (2.17)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.4856*** (-13.49) -0.4855*** (-13.49) -0.4848*** (-13.43)
Midfielder 0.2954*** (5.45) 0.4005*** (4.69) 1.0171*** (3.84)
Forward 0.3588*** (5.65) 0.3722*** (3.84) 0.5424* (1.77)
HHI (Absolute) 0.2323*** (3.98)
HHI (Absolute) * Midfielder -0.2313*** (-2.66)
HHI (Absolute) * Forward -0.0066 (-0.08)
CV (Absolute) 0.0931*** (3.97)
CV (Absolute) * Midfielder -0.0915*** (-2.91)
CV (Absolute) * Forward -0.0054 (-0.17)
Gini (Absolute) 1.0316*** (3.90)
Gini (Absolute) * Midfielder -1.0087*** (-3.28)
Gini (Absolute) * Forward -0.2109 (-0.60)
Constant 9.0861*** (22.94) 8.9814*** (22.54) 8.3320*** (18.65)
Observations 2002 2002 2002
R2 0.700 0.700 0.700
Notes: Club- and season fixed effects estimation with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is log
of annual salary. t-statistics in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 13: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary: QR results (HHI)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Age 0.3061*** 0.2249*** 0.1504*** 0.1310*** 0.1338***
(5.15) (5.74) (3.82) (4.16) (3.33)
Age Squared -0.0059*** -0.0045*** -0.0031*** -0.0028*** -0.0029***
(-5.39) (-5.98) (-4.17) (-4.76) (-3.85)
Total National Matches 0.0030*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0022*** 0.0025***
(4.58) (4.13) (3.79) (3.62) (3.60)
Total Club Matches 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014***
(3.72) (5.17) (7.93) (8.07) (5.54)
Performance 1.6926*** 1.6009*** 1.5920*** 1.3782*** 1.2625***
(11.65) (12.21) (13.18) (12.59) (8.31)
Season Matches Starter 0.0311*** 0.0278*** 0.0217*** 0.0176*** 0.0142***
(16.31) (16.26) (14.53) (12.71) (7.49)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0138*** 0.0099** 0.0051 -0.0019 -0.0070
(3.36) (2.31) (1.48) (-0.65) (-1.52)
Left Footed 0.0457 0.0153 0.0182 -0.0003 -0.0085
(1.35) (0.58) (0.79) (-0.01) (-0.24)
Two Footed 0.0643 0.0408 0.0404 0.0222 0.0055
(1.56) (1.34) (1.54) (0.94) (0.16)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.5168*** -0.5223*** -0.4690*** -0.3908*** -0.3421***
(-6.53) (-11.73) (-10.47) (-8.55) (-5.34)
Midfielder 0.1264*** 0.1741*** 0.1692*** 0.1927*** 0.2257***
(3.28) (6.54) (6.87) (8.10) (6.82)
Forward 0.3012*** 0.3344*** 0.3732*** 0.3978*** 0.4028***
(6.31) (8.93) (12.91) (13.51) (11.83)
HHI (Absolute) 0.1570** 0.1975*** 0.1543*** 0.1392*** 0.1417**
(2.49) (3.88) (3.22) (3.04) (2.39)
Constant 7.2549*** 8.6167*** 9.9488*** 10.8510*** 11.1595***
(8.93) (17.13) (18.54) (25.15) (19.91)
Pseudo R2 0.4776 0.4559 0.4602 0.4961 0.5208
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions with club- and season fixed effects. N = 2002. The dependent
variable is log of annual salary. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 repetitions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 14: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary: QR results (Gini)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Age 0.3296*** 0.2147*** 0.1538*** 0.1275*** 0.1367***
(6.66) (4.79) (3.96) (4.73) (3.71)
Age Squared -0.0063*** -0.0043*** -0.0031*** -0.0027*** -0.0029***
(-6.84) (-5.00) (-4.22) (-5.39) (-4.28)
Total National Matches 0.0028*** 0.0021*** 0.0019*** 0.0023*** 0.0023***
(4.25) (4.01) (3.31) (3.95) (3.08)
Total Club Matches 0.0010*** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0015***
(3.40) (4.99) (7.06) (7.92) (5.92)
Performance 1.7596*** 1.6538*** 1.5843*** 1.3858*** 1.2465***
(11.83) (11.33) (12.99) (12.91) (8.13)
Season Matches Starter 0.0312*** 0.0272*** 0.0222*** 0.0180*** 0.0145***
(16.41) (14.92) (14.39) (12.22) (7.63)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0132*** 0.0094** 0.0060* -0.0002 -0.0063
(3.31) (2.44) (1.80) (-0.08) (-1.52)
Left Footed 0.0502* 0.0230 0.0179 -0.0131 -0.0121
(1.65) (0.81) (0.85) (-0.54) (-0.35)
Two Footed 0.0683 0.0444 0.0360 0.0188 0.0256
(1.64) (1.42) (1.41) (0.78) (0.80)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.5227*** -0.5352*** -0.4762*** -0.3802*** -0.3436***
(-6.21) (-12.14) (-10.10) (-8.81) (-5.56)
Midfielder 0.1096*** 0.1612*** 0.1598*** 0.1792*** 0.2215***
(3.31) (6.22) (6.60) (7.30) (7.10)
Forward 0.3061*** 0.3353*** 0.3611*** 0.3814*** 0.3918***
(6.83) (10.11) (12.97) (12.49) (11.43)
Gini (Absolute) 0.2737 0.5225*** 0.3336** 0.3857*** 0.4314**
(1.48) (2.68) (2.33) (2.62) (2.38)
Constant 6.7165*** 8.3965*** 9.6960*** 10.6226*** 10.8672***
(9.43) (12.85) (17.57) (27.04) (20.08)
Pseudo R2 0.4763 0.4763 0.4584 0.4584 0.5202
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions with club- and season fixed effects. N = 2002. The dependent
variable is log of annual salary. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 repetitions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 15: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary: QR results (CV)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Age 0.3167*** 0.2265*** 0.1507*** 0.1314*** 0.1328***
(5.88) (5.22) (3.88) (4.37) (3.36)
Age Squared -0.0061*** -0.0045*** -0.0031*** -0.0028*** -0.0028***
(-6.21) (-5.48) (-4.27) (-5.04) (-3.88)
Total National Matches 0.0029*** 0.0022*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0025***
(4.80) (4.09) (3.99) (3.91) (3.48)
Total Club Matches 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014***
(3.71) (5.25) (7.03) (7.86) (5.43)
Performance 1.7136*** 1.6380*** 1.5615*** 1.3743*** 1.2518***
(11.97) (12.21) (13.93) (12.70) (8.46)
Season Matches Starter 0.0310*** 0.0274*** 0.0218*** 0.0177*** 0.0141***
(16.69) (15.90) (15.22) (13.47) (6.90)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0132*** 0.0100** 0.0048 -0.0011 -0.0077*
(3.11) (2.42) (1.54) (-0.45) (-1.67)
Left Footed 0.0472* 0.0172 0.0162 -0.0003 -0.0087
(1.76) (0.64) (0.75) (-0.01) (-0.24)
Two Footed 0.0618 0.0477 0.0423* 0.0174 0.0094
(1.61) (1.59) (1.65) (0.71) (0.27)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.5216*** -0.5349*** -0.4612*** -0.3896*** -0.3423***
(-5.87) (-11.76) (-10.16) (-8.57) (-5.21)
Midfielder 0.1177*** 0.1701*** 0.1690*** 0.1915*** 0.2294***
(3.08) (5.91) (6.96) (7.37) (7.10)
Forward 0.3041*** 0.3311*** 0.3735*** 0.3976*** 0.4040***
(5.80) (8.66) (13.89) (13.13) (11.44)
CV (Absolute) 0.0442* 0.0689*** 0.0517*** 0.0497*** 0.0524**
(1.88) (3.98) (3.07) (2.91) (2.34)
Constant 7.0882*** 8.5138*** 9.9237*** 10.7989*** 11.1375***
(9.56) (14.57) (18.81) (26.04) (19.75)
Pseudo R2 0.4770 0.4555 0.4597 0.4960 0.5209
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions with club- and season fixed effects. N = 2002. The dependent
variable is log of annual salary. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 repetitions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 16: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary by main position: QR results (HHI)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Age 0.3302*** 0.2248*** 0.1486*** 0.1216*** 0.1317***
(5.95) (5.16) (3.84) (4.12) (3.53)
Age Squared -0.0064*** -0.0045*** -0.0030*** -0.0026*** -0.0028***
(-6.26) (-5.43) (-4.20) (-4.69) (-4.12)
Total National Matches 0.0031*** 0.0023*** 0.0021*** 0.0023*** 0.0026***
(4.62) (4.10) (3.57) (3.90) (3.56)
Total Club Matches 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0014*** 0.0013***
(3.71) (5.64) (8.00) (7.62) (4.92)
Performance 1.7451*** 1.6318*** 1.5688*** 1.3606*** 1.2115***
(11.62) (11.23) (13.00) (12.15) (8.55)
Season Matches Starter 0.0306*** 0.0273*** 0.0222*** 0.0178*** 0.0134***
(16.69) (14.95) (15.48) (12.97) (6.63)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0147*** 0.0069* 0.0048 -0.0019 -0.0076*
(3.41) (1.78) (1.36) (-0.66) (-1.74)
Left Footed 0.0380 0.0074 0.0250 0.0004 0.0119
(1.22) (0.27) (1.12) (0.02) (0.38)
Two Footed 0.0408 0.0376 0.0482* 0.0300 0.0172
(0.97) (1.32) (1.86) (1.25) (0.54)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.5137*** -0.5199*** -0.4688*** -0.4084*** -0.2963***
(-5.79) (-12.27) (-11.90) (-8.41) (-4.72)
Midfielder 0.1366 0.2445*** 0.2991*** 0.3028*** 0.4313***
(1.50) (3.02) (4.73) (4.52) (5.83)
Forward 0.1473 0.2074** 0.3584*** 0.3847*** 0.5228***
(1.20) (2.34) (4.79) (5.04) (5.78)
HHI (Absolute) 0.1111 0.1729** 0.2336*** 0.2061*** 0.2703***
(1.18) (1.96) (3.16) (3.13) (3.30)
HHI (Absolute) * Midfielder -0.0499 -0.1805 -0.2489** -0.2026* -0.3516***
(-0.33) (-1.42) (-2.53) (-1.96) (-2.88)
HHI (Absolute) * Forward 0.2504 0.2099* 0.0108 0.0266 -0.1492
(1.53) (1.87) (0.11) (0.27) (-1.27)
Constant 6.9366*** 8.6406*** 9.9273*** 10.9115*** 11.1527***
(8.89) (14.69) (18.07) (27.16) (20.89)
Pseudo R2 0.4787 0.4579 0.4617 0.4978 0.5231
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions with club- and season fixed effects. N = 2002. The depen-
dent variable is log of annual salary. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 repetitions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 17: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary by main position: QR results (Gini)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Age 0.3146*** 0.2055*** 0.1520*** 0.1224*** 0.1330***
(5.97) (4.98) (4.35) (4.17) (3.19)
Age Squared -0.0060*** -0.0042*** -0.0031*** -0.0026*** -0.0029***
(-6.21) (-5.23) (-4.80) (-4.77) (-3.70)
Total National Matches 0.0030*** 0.0024*** 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 0.0024***
(4.24) (3.99) (3.70) (3.75) (3.19)
Total Club Matches 0.0010*** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0015***
(3.22) (5.25) (7.83) (7.35) (5.61)
Performance 1.7534*** 1.6317*** 1.5778*** 1.3877*** 1.2253***
(11.98) (11.68) (13.70) (12.85) (8.86)
Season Matches Starter 0.0309*** 0.0270*** 0.0221*** 0.0176*** 0.0137***
(17.50) (15.68) (14.41) (11.95) (6.81)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0150*** 0.0068* 0.0045 -0.0026 -0.0073
(3.93) (1.69) (1.23) (-0.93) (-1.63)
Left Footed 0.0446 -0.0014 0.0217 -0.0070 -0.0021
(1.51) (-0.05) (1.04) (-0.30) (-0.06)
Two Footed 0.0697* 0.0271 0.0433 0.0265 0.0373
(1.80) (1.01) (1.59) (1.03) (1.08)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.5235*** -0.5081*** -0.4555*** -0.4029*** -0.3117***
(-6.82) (-11.41) (-10.44) (-8.39) (-4.49)
Midfielder 0.2430 0.8784** 1.0766*** 0.8813*** 0.9959***
(0.56) (2.28) (3.18) (2.67) (2.87)
Forward -0.0328 -0.1133 0.4126 0.2360 0.9242**
(-0.06) (-0.26) (1.08) (0.56) (2.27)
Gini (Absolute) 0.2413 0.6709* 1.0079*** 0.8753** 1.0132***
(0.58) (1.85) (2.84) (2.55) (3.05)
Gini (Absolute) * Midfielder -0.1886 -0.8789** -1.0870*** -0.8168** -0.9140**
(-0.37) (-1.97) (-2.74) (-2.14) (-2.20)
Gini (Absolute) * Forward 0.3906 0.5578 -0.0312 0.2057 -0.6003
(0.64) (1.13) (-0.07) (0.43) (-1.29)
Constant 6.9574*** 8.4502*** 9.1702*** 10.2689*** 10.4363***
(8.65) (14.01) (16.26) (21.59) (16.60)
Pseudo R2 0.4769 0.4574 0.4615 0.4974 0.5226
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions with club- and season fixed effects. N = 2002. The depen-
dent variable is log of annual salary. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 repetitions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 18: The impact of task-specific skill specialisation on salary by main position: QR Results (CV)
q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
Age 0.3201*** 0.2199*** 0.1468*** 0.1195*** 0.1366***
(5.84) (5.13) (3.83) (3.86) (3.45)
Age Squared -0.0062*** -0.0044*** -0.0030*** -0.0026*** -0.0029***
(-6.08) (-5.44) (-4.22) (-4.47) (-4.02)
Total National Matches 0.0030*** 0.0024*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0024***
(4.69) (4.26) (3.62) (3.94) (3.24)
Total Club Matches 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0014*** 0.0014***
(3.61) (6.11) (7.82) (7.93) (5.26)
Performance 1.7412*** 1.6157*** 1.5746*** 1.3601*** 1.1921***
(11.73) (11.53) (13.50) (12.43) (8.18)
Season Matches Starter 0.0309*** 0.0271*** 0.0221*** 0.0179*** 0.0136***
(16.21) (15.83) (15.54) (13.30) (6.75)
Season Matches Substitute 0.0151*** 0.0065 0.0045 -0.0019 -0.0086**
(3.66) (1.55) (1.26) (-0.70) (-2.06)
Left Footed 0.0335 0.0087 0.0234 -0.0011 0.0077
(1.07) (0.31) (1.03) (-0.05) (0.22)
Two Footed 0.0505 0.0371 0.0439* 0.0300 0.0309
(1.26) (1.30) (1.75) (1.29) (0.93)
Last Season 2. Bundesliga -0.5233*** -0.5182*** -0.4656*** -0.4076*** -0.2962***
(-6.41) (-11.74) (-11.63) (-9.34) (-4.43)
Midfielder 0.1084 0.3239*** 0.4089*** 0.4043*** 0.5099***
(0.75) (2.73) (4.04) (3.82) (4.44)
Forward 0.0510 0.1570 0.3351*** 0.3815*** 0.5938***
(0.28) (1.32) (2.85) (2.90) (4.71)
CV (Absolute) 0.0318 0.0634** 0.0882*** 0.0850*** 0.1085***
(0.81) (2.10) (3.08) (3.23) (3.45)
CV (Absolute) * Midfielder -0.0030 -0.0701 -0.0973*** -0.0830** -0.1067**
(-0.06) (-1.59) (-2.59) (-2.10) (-2.41)
CV (Absolute) * Forward 0.0950 0.0718* 0.0136 0.0087 -0.0621
(1.47) (1.71) (0.35) (0.20) (-1.45)
Constant 7.0032*** 8.6558*** 9.8626*** 10.8335*** 10.9949***
(9.31) (15.52) (18.42) (24.97) (19.34)
Pseudo R2 0.4780 0.4580 0.4618 0.4980 0.5230
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions with club- and season fixed effects. N = 2002. The depen-
dent variable is log of annual salary. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 repetitions. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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